{"title":"为什么行业与CEO薪酬相关?管理自由裁量权的解释","authors":"S. Finkelstein","doi":"10.2174/1874761200903020042","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Although research on CEO compensation is voluminous, only limited attention has been paid to the role of industry. In this paper we develop an industry-level explanatory theory based on the concept of managerial discretion, and test it using a multi-level structural equation modeling approach at the industry level. In contrast to previous work, this theory offers an explanation of why, and how, industry is related to CEO compensation. In a sample of 933 firms in 109 3-digit SIC industries, we find that the level of industry discretion is significantly related to both the level of CEO compensation, and the proportion of performance-contingent CEO compensation. The implications of these findings for industry-level research in general, and research on CEO compensation in particular, are discussed.","PeriodicalId":352758,"journal":{"name":"The Open Ethics Journal","volume":"393 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"29","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why is Industry Related to CEO Compensation?: A Managerial Discretion Explanation\",\"authors\":\"S. Finkelstein\",\"doi\":\"10.2174/1874761200903020042\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Although research on CEO compensation is voluminous, only limited attention has been paid to the role of industry. In this paper we develop an industry-level explanatory theory based on the concept of managerial discretion, and test it using a multi-level structural equation modeling approach at the industry level. In contrast to previous work, this theory offers an explanation of why, and how, industry is related to CEO compensation. In a sample of 933 firms in 109 3-digit SIC industries, we find that the level of industry discretion is significantly related to both the level of CEO compensation, and the proportion of performance-contingent CEO compensation. The implications of these findings for industry-level research in general, and research on CEO compensation in particular, are discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":352758,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Open Ethics Journal\",\"volume\":\"393 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-08-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"29\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Open Ethics Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020042\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Open Ethics Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2174/1874761200903020042","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Why is Industry Related to CEO Compensation?: A Managerial Discretion Explanation
Although research on CEO compensation is voluminous, only limited attention has been paid to the role of industry. In this paper we develop an industry-level explanatory theory based on the concept of managerial discretion, and test it using a multi-level structural equation modeling approach at the industry level. In contrast to previous work, this theory offers an explanation of why, and how, industry is related to CEO compensation. In a sample of 933 firms in 109 3-digit SIC industries, we find that the level of industry discretion is significantly related to both the level of CEO compensation, and the proportion of performance-contingent CEO compensation. The implications of these findings for industry-level research in general, and research on CEO compensation in particular, are discussed.
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