《现在付,以后赔:奖金和非股权激励在2007-2009年金融危机中的作用》

Dan Palmon, M. Santoro, Ronald J. Strauss
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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文引起了人们对高管激励薪酬、奖金和非股权激励领域的关注,并提出了一些问题,这些领域似乎不成比例地奖励了高管,而股东仍然面临着巨大的持续经济风险。这一重点领域之所以浮出水面,是因为从2007年开始一直持续到2008年,金融服务公司遭受了巨额亏损,而在亏损泛滥之前的几年里,许多高管获得了巨额奖金和非股权激励。我们评估了与此类支付相关的风险,并建立了一个框架,以评估股东和高管的利益如何因奖金和非股权薪酬而产生分歧。我们的分析还旨在为未来的实证研究提供基础,研究高管现金激励薪酬(奖金和非股权激励)与财务错报和夸大收入之间的关系,而这正是金融危机的核心所在。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pay Now, Lose Later: The Role of Bonuses and Non-Equity Incentives in the Financial Meltdown of 2007-2009
This paper draws attention to and raises questions about an area of executive incentive compensation, bonuses and non-equity incentives, which seems to have disproportionally rewarded executives while shareholders remain exposed to substantial ongoing economic risks. This area of focus has surfaced because, beginning in 2007 and continuing throughout 2008, financial services firms incurred massive losses, while in the years immediately preceding this deluge of losses many executives were awarded substantial bonuses and non-equity incentives. We assess the risks associated with such payments and build a framework for assessing how shareholder and executive interests diverge as a result of bonuses and non-equity compensation. Our analysis is also meant to serve as a building block for future empirical studies about the relationship between executive incentive compensation paid in cash (bonuses and non-equity incentives) and the financial misstatements and overstatements of income that were at the heart of the financial meltdown.
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