Games最新文献_第2页

On a Special Two-Person Dynamic Game 关于一个特殊的双人动态游戏

Games Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.3390/g14060067

Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky, Maryam Hamidi

{"title":"On a Special Two-Person Dynamic Game","authors":"Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky, Maryam Hamidi","doi":"10.3390/g14060067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14060067","url":null,"abstract":"The asymptotical properties of a special dynamic two-person game are examined under best-response dynamics in both discrete and continuos time scales. The direction of strategy changes by the players depend on the best responses to the strategies of the competitors and on their own strategies. Conditions are given first for the local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium if instantaneous data are available to the players concerning all current strategies. Next, it is assumed that only delayed information is available about one or more strategies. In the discrete case, the presence of delays has an effect on only the order of the governing difference equations. Under continuous scales, several possibilities are considered: each player has a delay in the strategy of its competitor; player 1 has identical delays in both strategies; the players have identical delays in their own strategies; player 1 has different delays in both strategies; and the players have different delays in their own strategies. In all cases, it is assumed that the equilibrium is asymptotically stable without delays, and we examine how delays can make the equilibrium unstable. For small delays, the stability is preserved. In the cases of one-delay models, the critical value of the delay is determined when stability changes to instability. In the cases of two and three delays, the stability-switching curves are determined in the two-dimensional space of the delays, where stability becomes lost if the delay pair crosses this curve. The methodology is different for the one-, two-, and three-delay cases outlined in this paper.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135315604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Centralized versus Decentralized Cleanup of River Water Pollution: An Application to the Ganges 集中与分散的河流水污染清理:恒河的应用

Games Pub Date : 2023-10-07 DOI: 10.3390/g14050066

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Hamid Beladi

{"title":"Centralized versus Decentralized Cleanup of River Water Pollution: An Application to the Ganges","authors":"Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Hamid Beladi","doi":"10.3390/g14050066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050066","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit the public good attributes of Ganges water pollution cleanup and theoretically analyze an aggregate economy of two cities—Kanpur and Varanasi—through which the Ganges flows. Our specific objective is to study whether water pollution cleanup in these two cities ought to be provided in a centralized or in a decentralized manner. We first determine the efficient cleanup amounts that maximize the aggregate surplus from making the Ganges cleaner in the two cities. Second, we compute the optimal amount of water pollution cleanup in the two cities in a decentralized regime in which spending on cleanup is financed by a uniform tax on the city residents. Third, we ascertain the optimal amount of water pollution cleanup in the two cities in a centralized regime subject to equal provision of cleanup and cost sharing. Fourth, we show that if the two cities have the same preference for pollution cleanup, then centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as there is a spillover from pollution cleanup. Finally, we show that if the two cities have dissimilar preferences for pollution cleanup, then centralization is preferable to decentralization as long as the spillover exceeds a certain threshold.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135300759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When Efficiency Requires Arbitrary Discrimination: Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Equilibrium Selection 当效率需要任意歧视:均衡选择的理论与实验分析

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-30 DOI: 10.3390/g14050065

Werner Güth, Hironori Otsubo

引用次数: 0

Game Theoretic Foundations of the Gately Power Measure for Directed Networks 有向网络门功率测度的博弈论基础

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-26 DOI: 10.3390/g14050064

Robert P. Gilles, Lina Mallozzi

引用次数: 0

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Baccara Chemin de Fer, II Baccara Chemin de Fer的博弈论分析，2

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.3390/g14050063

Stewart N. Ethier, Jiyeon Lee

引用次数: 0

On the Nash Equilibria of a Duel with Terminal Payoffs 论具有终端收益的决斗的纳什均衡

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.3390/g14050062

Athanasios Kehagias

引用次数: 0

A Two-Player Resource-Sharing Game with Asymmetric Information 信息不对称的二人资源共享博弈

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-17 DOI: 10.3390/g14050061

Mevan Wijewardena, Michael J. Neely

引用次数: 1

Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer 交易延迟:具有不可分割性和轮依赖转移的议价

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.3390/g14050060

Jijian Fan

引用次数: 0

Quantum Tapsilou—A Quantum Game Inspired by the Traditional Greek Coin Tossing Game Tapsilou 量子塔普西罗--受希腊传统掷硬币游戏 "塔普西罗 "启发的量子游戏

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI: 10.3390/g14060072

Kalliopi Kastampolidou, T. Andronikos

{"title":"Quantum Tapsilou—A Quantum Game Inspired by the Traditional Greek Coin Tossing Game Tapsilou","authors":"Kalliopi Kastampolidou, T. Andronikos","doi":"10.3390/g14060072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14060072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a new quantum game called Quantum Tapsilou that is inspired by the classical traditional Greek coin tossing game tapsilou. The new quantum game, despite its increased complexity and scope, retains the most important characteristic of the traditional game. In the classical game, both players have 14 probability to win. The quantum version retains this characteristic feature, which is that both players have the same probability to win, but only now this probability varies considerably and depends on previous moves and choices. The two most important novelties of Quantum Tapsilou can be attributed to its implementation of entanglement via the use of rotation gates instead of Hadamard gates, which generates Bell-like states with unequal probability amplitudes, and the integral use of groups. In Quantum Tapsilou both players agree on a specific cyclic rotation group of order n, for some sufficiently large n. The game is based on the chosen group, in the sense that both players will draw their moves from its elements. More specifically, both players will pick rotations from this group to realize their actions using the corresponding Ry rotation gates. In the Quantum Tapsilou game, it is equally probable for both players to win. This fact is in accordance with a previous result in the literature showing that quantum games where both players choose their actions from the same group, exhibit perfect symmetry by providing each player with the possibility to pick the move that counteracts the other player’s action.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139343065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Art of Sharing Resources: How to Distribute Water during a Drought Period 资源共享的艺术：干旱时期如何分配水

IF 0.9

Games Pub Date : 2023-08-25 DOI: 10.3390/g14050059

Sebastián Cano-Berlanga, María-José Solís-Baltodano, Cori Vilella

引用次数: 0