发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Games最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Border Games: A Game Theoretic Model of Undocumented Immigration 边境博弈:无证移民的博弈模型
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-08-24 DOI: 10.3390/g14050058
J. Yazar, Robert J. Gitter
{"title":"Border Games: A Game Theoretic Model of Undocumented Immigration","authors":"J. Yazar, Robert J. Gitter","doi":"10.3390/g14050058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050058","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials in the destination country, and the undocumented immigrants from the Source Country. We show that the impact of border enforcement is dampened because strategic interaction between the players will tend to mute any unilateral changes. We also study the effect of uncertainty in the labor market on migration issues and analyze the two cases where policymakers have to make their decisions before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the market state is realized.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44299180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair Allocation in Crowd-Sourced Systems 众包系统中的公平分配
Games Pub Date : 2023-08-15 DOI: 10.3390/g14040057
Mishal Assif, William Kennedy, Iraj Saniee
{"title":"Fair Allocation in Crowd-Sourced Systems","authors":"Mishal Assif, William Kennedy, Iraj Saniee","doi":"10.3390/g14040057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040057","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. We use the framework of a Shapley allocation which is regarded as a fundamental method of computing the fair share of all participants in a cooperative game when the values of all possible coalitions could be quantified. To quantify the value of all coalitions, we define a class of value functions for crowd-sourced systems which capture the contributions of the founders and the crowd plausibly and derive closed-form expressions for Shapley allocations to both. These value functions are defined for different scenarios, such as the presence of oligopolies or geographic spread of the crowd, taking network effects, including Metcalfe’s law, into account. A key result we obtain is that under quite general conditions, the crowd participants are collectively owed a share between 12 and 23 of the total value of the crowd-sourced system. We close with an empirical analysis demonstrating the consistency of our results with the compensation offered to the crowd participants in some public internet content sharing companies.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135064195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Duopoly and Endogenous Single Product Quality Strategies 双头垄断与内生单一产品质量策略
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-08-15 DOI: 10.3390/g14040056
Amit Gayer
{"title":"Duopoly and Endogenous Single Product Quality Strategies","authors":"Amit Gayer","doi":"10.3390/g14040056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040056","url":null,"abstract":"This research paper investigates a duopolistic market characterized by vertical product differentiation. The study considers both product qualities and consumer preferences represented as one-dimensional intervals. The focus is on analyzing the equilibrium in a duopoly game with convex production costs. In this setting, each firm has the option to present a multi-product strategy consisting of quality–price pairs, and their profits are determined by the decisions made by consumers. The findings of the study reveal that, under typical consumer preference conditions, both firms tend to offer a single quality–price pair. Additionally, the market is shown to be fully served, and firm profits decrease as the index of product quality increases. A comparative analysis is also conducted with the case of a monopoly.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41698443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts 环境冲突中的不对称补偿和或有费用:可观察合同与不可观察合同
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-07-28 DOI: 10.3390/g14040055
Sunghoon Park, Chad Settle
{"title":"Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts","authors":"Sunghoon Park, Chad Settle","doi":"10.3390/g14040055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040055","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff’s probability of winning the contest.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48665333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets 水市场中的Stackelberg社会均衡
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-07-11 DOI: 10.3390/g14040054
Harold Houba, Françeska Tomori
{"title":"Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets","authors":"Harold Houba, Françeska Tomori","doi":"10.3390/g14040054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040054","url":null,"abstract":"Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example of a duopoly market.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42047822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Price and Quantity Competition under Vertical Pricing 垂直定价下的价格与数量竞争
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.3390/g14040053
D. Basak
{"title":"Price and Quantity Competition under Vertical Pricing","authors":"D. Basak","doi":"10.3390/g14040053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040053","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a vertically related market where one quantity-setting and another price-setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an upstream input supplier. In contrast to the traditional belief, we show that the price-setting firm produces a higher output and earns a higher profit than the quantity-setting firm when bargaining is decentralised. Additionally, both firms produce the same output, whereas the profit is higher under the price-setting firm than the quantity-setting firm when bargaining is centralised.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47331767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Evasion Differential Game of Multiple Pursuers and a Single Evader with Geometric Constraints in ℓ2 几何约束下的多追踪者和单追踪者逃避微分对策
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.3390/g14040052
G. Ibragimov, Marks Ruziboev, I. Zaynabiddinov, B. Pansera
{"title":"Evasion Differential Game of Multiple Pursuers and a Single Evader with Geometric Constraints in ℓ2","authors":"G. Ibragimov, Marks Ruziboev, I. Zaynabiddinov, B. Pansera","doi":"10.3390/g14040052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040052","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate a differential evasion game with multiple pursuers and an evader for the infinite systems of differential equations in ℓ2. The control functions of the players are subject to geometric constraints. The pursuers’ goal is to bring the state of at least one of the controlled systems to the origin of ℓ2, while the evader’s goal is to prevent this from happening in a finite interval of time. We derive a sufficient condition for evasion from any initial state and construct an evasion strategy for the evader.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44473592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Power Indices under Specific Multicriteria Status 特定多标准状态下的功率指标
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-06-27 DOI: 10.3390/g14040051
Y. Liao
{"title":"Power Indices under Specific Multicriteria Status","authors":"Y. Liao","doi":"10.3390/g14040051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14040051","url":null,"abstract":"By considering the maximal efficacy among allocation vectors, we define two power indices under specific multicriteria conditions. Additionally, we introduce a reduction approach to the axiomatic framework for these power indices. Furthermore, we propose an alternative formulation that focuses on discrepancy mapping. Based on reduction and discrepancy mapping, we also provide two dynamic procedures.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41933033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Some Properties of Interval Shapley Values: An Axiomatic Analysis 区间Shapley值的一些性质：公理分析
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-06-15 DOI: 10.3390/g14030050
S. Ishihara, Junnosuke Shino
{"title":"Some Properties of Interval Shapley Values: An Axiomatic Analysis","authors":"S. Ishihara, Junnosuke Shino","doi":"10.3390/g14030050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030050","url":null,"abstract":"Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty. Characteristic functions thus assign a closed interval instead of a real number. This study revisits two interval game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley value and the interval Shapley-like value) and characterizes them using an axiomatic approach. For the interval Shapley value, we show that the existing axiomatization can be generalized to a wider subclass of interval games called size monotonic games. For the interval Shapley-like value, we show that a standard axiomatization using Young’s strong monotonicity holds on the whole class of interval games.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43094051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Gender and Risk Aversion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 性别与风险厌恶:来自自然实验的证据
IF 0.9
Games Pub Date : 2023-06-14 DOI: 10.3390/g14030049
L. Pacheco, Júlio Lobão, Sílvia Coelho
{"title":"Gender and Risk Aversion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment","authors":"L. Pacheco, Júlio Lobão, Sílvia Coelho","doi":"10.3390/g14030049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030049","url":null,"abstract":"The theoretical literature on risk aversion and Expected Utility Theory is extensive; however, the analysis of this behaviour with natural experiments could be more comprehensive. In this paper, we use data from 120 episodes of the Portuguese version of the TV game show The Price is Right, namely from The Wheel game, to explore risk aversion as well as the impact of gender in decision-making. The Wheel game has straightforward rules and huge expected payoffs. All contestants have access to the same information and distributions of uncertainty, making it a unique field laboratory to conduct an experimental test of rational decision theory. The objective is to infer the risk aversion levels of decision-makers from their choice to turn the wheel and the influence of gender on risk attitudes. There is a widespread view that women are more risk-averse than men. However, we could not reject the hypothesis that women and men have the same level of risk aversion. Nevertheless, we have evidence that contestants are more risk-averse than risk-seeking. The omission bias, loss aversion and regret can explain that behaviour.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46362372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信