环境冲突中的不对称补偿和或有费用:可观察合同与不可观察合同

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2023-07-28 DOI:10.3390/g14040055

Sunghoon Park, Chad Settle

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了原告和他的律师之间合同的可观察性对环境冲突的效率和环境冲突结果的公平性的影响。通过纳入两个具体的博弈论模型（可观察的契约博弈和不可观察的合同博弈），我们发现了两个关键结果：（i）合同的不可观察性可能会增加环境冲突在法律努力方面的低效率；然而，（ii）合同的不可观察性可能会增加原告在竞争中获胜的概率方面的结果的公平性。

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Asymmetric Reimbursement and Contingent Fees in Environmental Conflicts: Observable vs. Unobservable Contracts

We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff’s probability of winning the contest.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.