发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Philosophy of Action eJournal最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Desires, Preferences and Sen's Liberal Paradox 欲望、偏好与森的自由悖论
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2015-01-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2553883
M. Holler
{"title":"Desires, Preferences and Sen's Liberal Paradox","authors":"M. Holler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2553883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2553883","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, Sen’s Liberal Paradox is used to discuss differences between desires and preferences and the relationship between these two concepts. Desires and preferences can mix in real life and in theorizing. In fact, it seems that the mixing of desires and preferences can explain many of the inconsistencies that people show in decision making, especially in experiments that take place in laboratories, but also in theorizing. A power analysis and a game theoretical model of Sen’s example of reading Lady Chatterley’s Lover illustrate the problem of mixing desires and preferences. The paper discusses the question: Are there preferences on desires and are these preferences different from preferences on alternatives?","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126302249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Tale of Two Tails: Preferences of Neutral Third-Parties in Three-Player Ultimatum Games 两个反面的故事:三人最后通牒博弈中中立第三方的偏好
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2014-10-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2261081
Ciril Bosch-Rosa
{"title":"A Tale of Two Tails: Preferences of Neutral Third-Parties in Three-Player Ultimatum Games","authors":"Ciril Bosch-Rosa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2261081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2261081","url":null,"abstract":"We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The oer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy prole of a neutral third-party whose payos are independent from his decisions. If the oer is accepted the split takes place as suggested, if rejected, then both proposer and receiver get $0. Our results show a decision-maker whose main concern is to reduce the inequality between proposer and responder and who, in order to do so, is willing to reject both selsh and generous oers.This pattern of rejections is robust through a series of treatments which include changing the at-fee payo of the decision-maker, introducing a monetary cost for the decision-maker in case the oer ends up in a rejection, or letting a computer replace the proposer to randomly make the splitting suggestion between proposer and responder. Further, through these dierent treatments we are able to show that decision- makers ignore the intentions behind the proposers suggestions, as well as ignoring their own relative payos, two surprising results given the existing literature.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131517763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Indeterminate Probabilities and Smithian and Keynesian Uncertainty 不确定概率与斯密和凯恩斯的不确定性
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2014-08-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2486025
M. E. Brady
{"title":"Indeterminate Probabilities and Smithian and Keynesian Uncertainty","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2486025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2486025","url":null,"abstract":"Smith, Keynes, and Knight, in that order, made seminal contributions to decision making which emphasized uncertainty and indeterminate probabilities, as opposed to mere imprecision.De Finetti’s views on uncertainty are diametrically opposed to those of Smith, Keynes, and Knight once the clear cut distinction is drawn between imprecise probabilities and indeterminate probabilities.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133974236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
It's Not So Bad to Have Limits, as Long as You Know Them: Economic Theory in Light of the Aristotelian Tradition 有限制并不坏，只要你知道它们:亚里士多德传统下的经济理论
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2014-03-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2432249
Andrew M. Yuengert
{"title":"It's Not So Bad to Have Limits, as Long as You Know Them: Economic Theory in Light of the Aristotelian Tradition","authors":"Andrew M. Yuengert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2432249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2432249","url":null,"abstract":"Economists overlook an ally in the Aristotelian tradition, since both economics and Aristotle begin their analysis with human choice. Economics can learn much about its limits from the Aristotelian tradition, which describes aspects of choice behavior which cannot be precisely modeled. This article argues through three propositions that economists cannot understand the limits of their modeling approach for normative work unless they engage with more comprehensive accounts of human decision making, like the account offered in the Aristotelian tradition.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"221 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122151534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Procese Decizionale În Cadrul Managementului Riscurilor (Decision-Making Processes in the Risk Management) process decisiizionale În cadrull Management(风险管理中的决策过程)
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2013-10-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2341304
R. Stefanescu, Ramona Dumitriu
{"title":"Procese Decizionale În Cadrul Managementului Riscurilor (Decision-Making Processes in the Risk Management)","authors":"R. Stefanescu, Ramona Dumitriu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2341304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2341304","url":null,"abstract":"Această lucrare abordează managementul riscului ca pe un proces decizional in care cea mai bună soluţie pentru o expunere este identificată si implementată. Un astfel de proces include cinci etape: identificarea riscului, evaluarea riscului, analiza soluţiilor pentru problema riscului, adoptarea soluţiei optime si implementarea soluţiei adoptate.This paper approaches the risk management as a decision making process in which the best solution to an exposure is found and implemented. Such a process includes five stages: identifying the risk, assessment of exposure, analysis of the alternatives to deal with the exposure, adopting the optimum alternative and the implementation of the adopted solution.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116606777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Free Will from the Neuroscience Point of View 从神经科学的角度看自由意志
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2013-09-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2325902
A. D. da Rocha, F. Rocha
{"title":"Free Will from the Neuroscience Point of View","authors":"A. D. da Rocha, F. Rocha","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2325902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2325902","url":null,"abstract":"There is still a controversy if human volitions and actions are governed by causal laws or obeys free will. Neurosciences start to study the neural correlates of free will by investigating how brains make decisions. Here, some of questions about free will are discussed from the neurosciences point of view taking into consideration a neuroeconomic model of decision making. This model is used here with the purpose of providing very formal definitions of key concepts raised in any free will discussion such as goals, necessity, motivation, etc., and to provide a formal background for discussing decision making. One of the conclusions of this discussion is that free will is computable but unpredictable, therefore not submitted to causal laws. In addition, the electroencephalogram was recorded in an experiment about choice selection of alternative actions and it presented here as an example of how neurosciences may study the neural correlates of free will.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130912094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Axiomatic Choice Theory Traveling between Mathematical Formalism, Normative Choice Rules and Psychological Measurement, 1944-1956 公理选择理论穿梭于数学形式主义、规范选择规则和心理测量之间，1944-1956
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2013-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2296884
Catherine Herfeld
{"title":"Axiomatic Choice Theory Traveling between Mathematical Formalism, Normative Choice Rules and Psychological Measurement, 1944-1956","authors":"Catherine Herfeld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2296884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2296884","url":null,"abstract":"The following analysis is meant to contribute to a history of rational choice theory. More specifically, I provide a multi-layered account of rational choice theory in terms of its biography as a scientific object. I argue that its axiomatic version, choice theory traveled between different research sites, became specified through different mathematical formalisms and occupied distinct epistemic functions; it was being applied to prescribe rules of proper behavior, as representation of behavioral hypotheses, and as measurement device to capture individual values. New modifications of what I call ‘axiomatic choice theory’ did not fully replace old versions of it, which prevents the reconstruction of its journey as a continuous process of progressive knowledge production and suggests a more nuanced account of axiomatic choice theory that acknowledges its different versions currently used in the social sciences. Furthermore, by revealing the diversity of its manifestations within the context of social networks and within particular research sites, the account of axiomatic choice theory developed here will ultimately contributes to an explanation of the disunity and confusion surrounding current debates about rational choice theory and allows for providing a more nuanced picture of its nature and scope. Jacob Marschak’s professional development is used as a guide through this history of axiomatic choice theory to illustrate its journey.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116422834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Freedom and Its Value 自由及其价值
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2013-06-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2327059
P. Pattanaik, Yongsheng Xu
{"title":"Freedom and Its Value","authors":"P. Pattanaik, Yongsheng Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2327059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2327059","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses freedom and its value. We focus on the conceptual structure of freedom and the value of freedom. We also discuss several issues relating to the measurement of freedom and the value of freedom, and the notion of opportunity sets, a key component of the conceptual structure of freedom.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128345581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Behavioral Characterization of Weighted (Separable) Utility 加权(可分)效用的行为特征
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2293640
P. Blavatskyy
{"title":"Behavioral Characterization of Weighted (Separable) Utility","authors":"P. Blavatskyy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2293640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293640","url":null,"abstract":"Nontrivial decision problems typically involve a trade-off among multiple attributes of choice options. One simple way of resolving such trade-offs is to aggregate multiple attributes into one real-valued index, known as weighted or separable utility. Applications of weighted utility can be found in choice under risk (expected utility) and uncertainty (subjective expected utility), intertemporal choice (discounted utility) and welfare economics (utilitarian social welfare function). This paper presents an improved behavioral characterization (preference axiomatization) of weighted utility. It is shown that necessary and sufficient conditions for weighted utility are completeness, continuity, Thomsen condition (and transitivity if none of the attributes is null, or inessential).","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122481376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tangible Temptation in the Social Dilemma: Cash, Cooperation, and Self-Control 社会困境中的有形诱惑:现金、合作和自我控制
Philosophy of Action eJournal Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2270485
K. O. R. Myrseth, Gerhard Riener, C. Wollbrant
{"title":"Tangible Temptation in the Social Dilemma: Cash, Cooperation, and Self-Control","authors":"K. O. R. Myrseth, Gerhard Riener, C. Wollbrant","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2270485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2270485","url":null,"abstract":"The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract (merely numbers on-screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also include psychometric measures of self-control and impulsivity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible a stronger positive association between cooperation and self-control—and a stronger negative association between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results shed light on the conditions under which self-control matters for cooperation.","PeriodicalId":299964,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Action eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121060890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 83
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信