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A Game of the Throne of Saint Peter 圣彼得王座的游戏
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2018-05-08 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018015
Andrew Mackenzie
{"title":"A Game of the Throne of Saint Peter","authors":"Andrew Mackenzie","doi":"10.26481/umagsb.2018015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2018015","url":null,"abstract":"In the Roman Catholic Church, the pope is elected by the (cardinal) electors through “scrutiny,” where each elector casts an anonymous nomination. Using historical documents, we argue that a guiding principle for the church has been the protection of electors from the temptation to defy God through dishonest nomination. Based on axiomatic analysis involving this principle, we recommend that the church overturn the changes of Pope Pius XII (1945) to reinstate the scrutiny of Pope Gregory XV (1621), and argue that randomization in the case of deadlock merits consideration.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122389747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization 俱乐部良好机制:从搭便车到公民股东，从不可能到特征化
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2018-05-08 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2018012
Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau
{"title":"Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization","authors":"Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018012","url":null,"abstract":"Consider a community that shares a technology for producing a club good (Buchanan, 1965): any group of agents can “win” for an associated monetary cost. Who should win, and how should production be funded? To address this question, we seek rules (that is, direct mechanisms) where each agent participates voluntarily and is incentivized to report his valuation honestly, and where these reports are used to select winners efficiently without running a deficit. We find that whether or not there are such rules depends on the production technology. If costs are even “somewhat concave,” then there are no such rules: the free-rider problem (Wicksell, 1896; Samuelson, 1954; Green and Laffont, 1979) persists even when agents who do not contribute can be excluded. If costs are symmetric and convex, however, then there are such rules that moreover satisfy no-envy-in-trades (Kolm, 1971; Schmeidler and Vind, 1972). We characterize this class, whose Pareto-worst member is the familiar minimum-price Walrasian rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Demange, 1982; Leonard, 1983); the other rules do better by treating the agents as equal shareholders in the technology and offering social dividends (Lange, 1936).","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125436302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Link About It: Information Asymmetry, Knowledge Pooling and Syndication in Project Finance Lending 项目融资贷款中的信息不对称、知识汇集和辛迪加
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2018-04-05 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008
Gaby Contreras, J. Bos, S. Kleimeier
{"title":"Link About It: Information Asymmetry, Knowledge Pooling and Syndication in Project Finance Lending","authors":"Gaby Contreras, J. Bos, S. Kleimeier","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008","url":null,"abstract":"In a collaborative setting, banks have an additional way to deal with asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information. We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool information, thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool information is high enough.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127500769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees 树上单峰域的随机社会选择函数
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2018-02-08 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004
H. Peters, Souvik Roy, Soumya Sadhukhan
{"title":"Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees","authors":"H. Peters, Souvik Roy, Soumya Sadhukhan","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004","url":null,"abstract":"Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"195 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114017996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments (RM/17/002-revised) 社会环境的近视稳定集(RM/17/002-修订本)
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2018-02-01 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2018001
T. Demuynck, P. Herings, Riccardo D. Saulle, C. Seel
{"title":"The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments (RM/17/002-revised)","authors":"T. Demuynck, P. Herings, Riccardo D. Saulle, C. Seel","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018001","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is defined for a general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity assumptions, it is also unique. The MSS generalizes and unifies various results from more specific applications. It coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games when this set is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the Gale-Shapley matching model; with the set of Pareto optimal allocations in the Shapley-Scarf housing matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in pseudo-potential games and finite supermodular games; and with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in several classes of two-player games.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128162032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules 社会福利规则中的孔多塞与参与标准
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2017-09-14 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2017020
B. Can, Emre Ergin, Mohsen Pourpouneh
{"title":"Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules","authors":"B. Can, Emre Ergin, Mohsen Pourpouneh","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2017020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2017020","url":null,"abstract":"Moulin (1988) shows that there exists no social choice rule, that satisfies the following two criteria at the same time: the Condorcet criterion and the participation criterion, a.k.a., No Show Paradox. We extend these criteria to social welfare rules, i.e., rules that choose rankings for each preference profile. We show that the impossibility does not hold, and one particular rule, the Kemeny rule satisfies both the Condorcet and the participation criteria.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"413 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131892364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings 转换成本:对匹配的度量
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2017-06-06 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017015
B. Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken
{"title":"Cost of transformation: a measure on matchings","authors":"B. Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken","doi":"10.26481/umagsb.2017015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2017015","url":null,"abstract":"This paper constructs a normative framework to quantify the difference between two matchings in roommate markets. We investigate the “cost of transformation” from one mechanism to another, based on the differences in the outputs of these mechanisms. Several conditions are introduced to ensure this cost reflects the welfare effect of the transformation on individuals. We introduce a measure called the Borda measure, which is fully characterized by these conditions. Several possible applications of this measure under different contexts interpretations are also discussed, such as measuring how unstable, how unfair, or how inefficient a matching is.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127614334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Framework for Better Evaluations of Supply Chain Collaborations: Evidence from the Dutch Fast Moving Consumer Goods Industry 更好地评估供应链合作的框架:来自荷兰快速消费品行业的证据
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2017-05-22 DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2017014
Verena Jung, Marianne Peeters Rutten, T. Vredeveld
{"title":"A Framework for Better Evaluations of Supply Chain Collaborations: Evidence from the Dutch Fast Moving Consumer Goods Industry","authors":"Verena Jung, Marianne Peeters Rutten, T. Vredeveld","doi":"10.26481/umagsb.2017014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2017014","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework to better evaluate potential supply chain collaborations (SCCs). Design/methodology/approach – Prior research is used to develop a conceptual framework of all relevant factors, both drivers and resistors, which is, next, empirically tested in the Dutch fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry. Findings –The study provides a complete overview of all potential factors that should be evaluated before starting SSCs, categorized in “benefits”, “forces”, “enablers/barriers” and “risks”. Research limitations/implications – The sample of the study only consists of parties from one Dutch industry. Further research in other geographical areas and/or industries may result in stronger support. Furthermore, the importance of each driver and resistor has not been quantified for the specific party and collaboration. Quantifying the factors for each party might be beneficial and should also be considered in further research. Practical implications – The study provides a checklist containing all potential factors for all parties involved. Originality/value –This paper enriches the supply chain management (SCM) literature with an extensive specification of all potential drivers and resistors for starting SCCs structured in a framework.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130770578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Deposit Insurance in Times of Crises: Safe Haven or Regulatory Arbitrage? 危机时期的存款保险:安全港还是监管套利?
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2017-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2668495
S. Kleimeier, Shusen Qi, H. Sander
{"title":"Deposit Insurance in Times of Crises: Safe Haven or Regulatory Arbitrage?","authors":"S. Kleimeier, Shusen Qi, H. Sander","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2668495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2668495","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance DI schemes on bilateral cross-border deposits. Our results suggest that not only the existence of explicit DI, but also DI design features, which reflect its credibility have an impact on cross-border deposits, and that the relative differences between reporting and depositor countries also matter. More importantly, in times of crises, depositors rely more on DI in general, but DI acts primarily as a Safe Haven rather than enabling Regulatory Arbitrage. During the global financial crisis of 2008/09 the emergency actions of bank country governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of cross-border deposits.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126750155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
How to choose a delegation for a peace conference 如何选择参加和平会议的代表团
GSBE research memoranda Pub Date : 2017-04-06 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2017008
B. Can, P. Csóka, Emre Ergin
{"title":"How to choose a delegation for a peace conference","authors":"B. Can, P. Csóka, Emre Ergin","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2017008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2017008","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a novel class of threshold rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules impose that a delegation is chosen when its combined support in the society first reaches a particular percentage of the public opinion - depending on the size of the delegation. Conversely, minority opinions that are not reflected in the delegation should always be below a threshold, which follows a geometric series.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116612023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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