{"title":"项目融资贷款中的信息不对称、知识汇集和辛迪加","authors":"Gaby Contreras, J. Bos, S. Kleimeier","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In a collaborative setting, banks have an additional way to deal with asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information. We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool information, thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool information is high enough.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Link About It: Information Asymmetry, Knowledge Pooling and Syndication in Project Finance Lending\",\"authors\":\"Gaby Contreras, J. Bos, S. Kleimeier\",\"doi\":\"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In a collaborative setting, banks have an additional way to deal with asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information. We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool information, thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool information is high enough.\",\"PeriodicalId\":275677,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"GSBE research memoranda\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-04-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"GSBE research memoranda\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"GSBE research memoranda","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Link About It: Information Asymmetry, Knowledge Pooling and Syndication in Project Finance Lending
In a collaborative setting, banks have an additional way to deal with asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information. We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool information, thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool information is high enough.