{"title":"树上单峰域的随机社会选择函数","authors":"H. Peters, Souvik Roy, Soumya Sadhukhan","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.","PeriodicalId":275677,"journal":{"name":"GSBE research memoranda","volume":"195 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees\",\"authors\":\"H. Peters, Souvik Roy, Soumya Sadhukhan\",\"doi\":\"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.\",\"PeriodicalId\":275677,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"GSBE research memoranda\",\"volume\":\"195 5\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-02-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"GSBE research memoranda\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"GSBE research memoranda","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees
Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.