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Team vs. Individual Tournaments: Evidence from Prize Structure in eSports 团队与个人比赛:来自电子竞技奖励结构的证据
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2787819
D. Coates, Petr Parshakov
{"title":"Team vs. Individual Tournaments: Evidence from Prize Structure in eSports","authors":"D. Coates, Petr Parshakov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2787819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787819","url":null,"abstract":"This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on eSports (video game) competitions. We incorporate team production with the theory of rank order elimination tournaments since in our analysis, competitors in an elimination tournament are groups rather than individuals. In this setting, the issue of proper incentives becomes more complicated than in the normal tournament model. Our findings demonstrate that the prize structure is convex in rank order which means that the contestants in eSports tournaments are risk averse. The results for the team games are more consistent with the tournament theory than the results for individual games. From the practical point of view, we provide decision-makers in both sports and business with the insights about the compensation design with respect to importance of the competition and its type.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"164 18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129907933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Harmful Transparency in Teams 团队中有害的透明度
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2749534
P. Bag, Nona Pepito
{"title":"Harmful Transparency in Teams","authors":"P. Bag, Nona Pepito","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2749534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2749534","url":null,"abstract":"In a two-period continuous effort investment game as in Mohnen, et al. (2008), we demonstrate that peer transparency can be strictly harmful. This contrasts with Mohnen et al.'s result that transparency, through the observability of interim efforts, induces more effort and is thus beneficial if team members are inequity-averse. If, instead, preferences are standard utilitarian, the marginal benefit is decreasing and marginal cost is increasing in a player's own effort, then players' collective and individual efforts are strictly less with transparency than under non-transparency.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114934928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Informational Frictions and Practice Variation: Evidence from Physicians in Training 信息摩擦和实践变化:来自培训医师的证据
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI: 10.3386/W21855
David C. Chan
{"title":"Informational Frictions and Practice Variation: Evidence from Physicians in Training","authors":"David C. Chan","doi":"10.3386/W21855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W21855","url":null,"abstract":"Substantial practice variation across physicians for seemingly similar patients remains an unresolved puzzle. This paper studies physicians in training to explore the behavioral foundations of practice variation. A discontinuity in the formation of teams reveals a large contribution of relative experience in the size of practice variation. Among the same physician trainees, convergence towards a common practice differs by practice environment, with more convergence in specialist-driven services. Rich trainee characteristics and training histories, including the practice styles of prior supervising physicians, explain little if any variation. These findings suggest a major role for informational frictions in the origins of practice variation.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122972022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Playing to Win: The Surprising Power of Play in Innovation 游戏取胜:游戏在创新中的惊人力量
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2676363
S. Piotrowski, K. Lyytinen, R. Boland, J. Gaskin
{"title":"Playing to Win: The Surprising Power of Play in Innovation","authors":"S. Piotrowski, K. Lyytinen, R. Boland, J. Gaskin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2676363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2676363","url":null,"abstract":"Organizational teams are the primary mechanism by which ideas are birthed and recombined into innovations for maintaining or achieving competitive advantage. We know that resources of people, time and funding impact team effectiveness in innovating. We also know that factors such as individual traits of talent, expertise, and collaboration skills also matter greatly. What is less known, and less studied, is the role of team characteristics, in particular, team play and team playfulness on innovation results. Our two-part study examined 145 teams and discovered that team playfulness is present on all successful innovation teams and its forms emerge as divergence and deep engagement. These are two paradoxical forms of play both of which positively impact team innovation success. Findings support two emerging theories of play in organizations, and run counter to prevailing notions that plat serves no role in the serious and competitive work of organizations.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132818238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Team Production, Endogenous Learning About Abilities and Career Concerns 团队生产、关于能力的内生学习和职业关注
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-08-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2648130
Evangelia Chalioti
{"title":"Team Production, Endogenous Learning About Abilities and Career Concerns","authors":"Evangelia Chalioti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2648130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2648130","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116401068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain 团队激励与绩效:来自零售连锁店的证据
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2649884
G. Friebel, Matthias Heinz, Miriam Krüger, N. Zubanov
{"title":"Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain","authors":"G. Friebel, Matthias Heinz, Miriam Krüger, N. Zubanov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2649884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2649884","url":null,"abstract":"We test the effectiveness of team incentives by running a natural field experiment in a retail chain of 193 shops and 1,300 employees. As a response to intensified product market competition, the firm offered a bonus to shop teams for surpassing sales targets. A bonus to teams rather than individuals was a natural choice because the firm does not measure individual performance and relies on flexible task allocation among employees. On average, the team bonus increases sales and customer visits in the treated shops by around 3%, and wages by 2.3%. The bonus is highly profitable for the firm, generating for each bonus dollar an extra $3.80 of sales, and $2.10 of operational profit. The results show the importance of complementarities within teams and suggest that improved operational efficiency is the main mechanism behind the treatment effect. Our analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects offers a number of insights about the anatomy of teamwork. The firm decided to roll out the bonus to all of its shops, and the performance of treatment and control shops converged after the roll-out.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125815096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 158
Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior 团队中的性别互动:绩效与惩罚行为的实验证据
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2626327
SeEun Jung, R. Vranceanu
{"title":"Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior","authors":"SeEun Jung, R. Vranceanu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2626327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2626327","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports results from a real-e ort experiment in which men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a real-eff ort task. Each participant receives an equal share of the team's output. Workers who perform better than their partner can punish him/her by imposing a fi ne. We manipulate the teams' gender composition (man-man, man-woman, and woman-woman) to analyze whether an individual's performance and sanctioning behavior depends on his/her gender and the gender interaction within the team. The data show that, on average, men perform slightly better than women. A man's performance will deteriorate when paired with a woman, while a woman's performance will improve when paired with a woman. When underperforming, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; if sanctioned, men tend to improve their performance, while women's performance does not change.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116153533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Collaboration in Global Distributed Teams: An Interdisciplinary Review 全球分布式团队中的协作:跨学科综述
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2352798
Yi Wang
{"title":"Collaboration in Global Distributed Teams: An Interdisciplinary Review","authors":"Yi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2352798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2352798","url":null,"abstract":"This survey aims to characterize the interdisciplinary study of human collaboration in global distributed teams. Literature on this topic spreads over many research areas including computer-supported cooperative work, economics, management, organizational behavior, and software engineering, among others. The key insight of this review is to set forth a well-founded, unified taxonomy that categorizes the literature from different research domains. The taxonomy has two dimensions: primary research goals and ways of knowing. Using this taxonomy, we classified 199 recent journal papers (since 2005) in leading journals from 10 areas. In classifying the existing literature, we identified the opportunities and challenges to furthering the knowledge and application of research in global distributed teams. Stemming from the review, one of our proposals is to apply Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) to modeling human collaboration in global distributed teams and we demonstrate ways of applying EGT with specific examples. Three specific research directions are proposed in section 4. In addition to classifying journal papers, we also classified 74 papers since 2010 in leading conferences since conference papers are generally considered as formal publication in computer and information sciences. This supplement is presented as an appendix (see APPENDIX II).","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"180 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116062565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Self-Enforcing Agreement in Cooperative Teams: An Agent-Based Modelling Approach 合作团队中的自我执行协议:基于代理的建模方法
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-04-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2621606
Hang Xiong, Stephen Kinsella, D. Payne
{"title":"The Self-Enforcing Agreement in Cooperative Teams: An Agent-Based Modelling Approach","authors":"Hang Xiong, Stephen Kinsella, D. Payne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2621606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2621606","url":null,"abstract":"We present an agent-based model to test two competing hypotheses in the theory of self-enforcing agreement. In cooperative teams (such as agricultural cooperatives), self-enforcing agreement plays a critical role in guaranteeing members’ work incentives when the monitoring from a third party is absent. In order to provide an effective sanction to the violators so as to maintain the agreement, two seemingly conflicting strategies are proposed. One is allowing the members to exit the team freely. The other is imposing a high exit cost to restrict members from leaving the team. The arguments behind each strategy are elaborated in Lin (1993) and Dong and Dow (1993), respectively. However, these strategies have never been tested in the same model. In fact, no formal model is presented for one of the arguments. To fill this gap, we develop a model that incorporates the two arguments as two scenarios in a shared framework. Our model takes heterogeneity of team members (e.g., their laziness, work ability and patience to future well-being) into consideration, which allows us to better understand the divergence of these two arguments. We find the two arguments essentially claim different consequences under different conditions of members’ characteristics and team size. Our study demonstrates agent-based simulation can be an effective approach of testing game theoretical arguments and exploring game theoretical ideas.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117190274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reflexivity, Stress, and Unlearning in the New Product Development Team: The Moderating Effect of Procedural Justice 新产品开发团队的反身性、压力与遗忘:程序公正的调节作用
ERN: Teams (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2011.00645.x
L. Lee, B. M. Sukoco
{"title":"Reflexivity, Stress, and Unlearning in the New Product Development Team: The Moderating Effect of Procedural Justice","authors":"L. Lee, B. M. Sukoco","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2011.00645.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2011.00645.x","url":null,"abstract":"The success of new product development (NPD) depends on a team's abilities to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences and the flexibility to address rapidly changing environments. To develop innovative products it is desirable that these processes should not be constrained by current beliefs and routines. NPD teams therefore need to engage in an unlearning process to overcome any resistance to new ideas and to facilitate a fresh approach. The paper recognizes that the controlled experience of stress plays a part in unlearning (e.g., confusion about technology or market change can encourage changes) and argues that teams should systematically reflect on the progress they are making in projects and in unlearning. The fairness of procedures used by the management moderates the proposed relationships. Two hundred and ninety eight team members and 77 NPD team leaders participated in the study. The results indicate that team reflexivity positively influences unlearning and product innovation, while team stress has a negative effect. The perceived fairness of management procedures strengthens the positive effects of team reflexivity on unlearning and product innovation, and reduces negative effect of team stress.","PeriodicalId":273930,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Teams (Topic)","volume":"265 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122846865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 63
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