Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain

G. Friebel, Matthias Heinz, Miriam Krüger, N. Zubanov
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引用次数: 158

Abstract

We test the effectiveness of team incentives by running a natural field experiment in a retail chain of 193 shops and 1,300 employees. As a response to intensified product market competition, the firm offered a bonus to shop teams for surpassing sales targets. A bonus to teams rather than individuals was a natural choice because the firm does not measure individual performance and relies on flexible task allocation among employees. On average, the team bonus increases sales and customer visits in the treated shops by around 3%, and wages by 2.3%. The bonus is highly profitable for the firm, generating for each bonus dollar an extra $3.80 of sales, and $2.10 of operational profit. The results show the importance of complementarities within teams and suggest that improved operational efficiency is the main mechanism behind the treatment effect. Our analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects offers a number of insights about the anatomy of teamwork. The firm decided to roll out the bonus to all of its shops, and the performance of treatment and control shops converged after the roll-out.
团队激励与绩效:来自零售连锁店的证据
我们通过在一家拥有193家商店和1300名员工的零售连锁店中进行自然实地实验来测试团队激励的有效性。为了应对日益激烈的产品市场竞争,该公司向超过销售目标的销售团队提供奖金。将奖金发放给团队而非个人是一种自然的选择,因为公司不衡量个人表现,而是依赖于员工之间灵活的任务分配。平均而言,团队奖金使受治疗商店的销售额和顾客访问量增加了3%左右,工资增加了2.3%。奖金对公司来说是高利润的,每一美元奖金产生3.8美元的额外销售额和2.10美元的运营利润。结果显示了团队内部互补性的重要性,并表明提高操作效率是治疗效果背后的主要机制。我们对异质性治疗效果的分析提供了许多关于团队合作解剖的见解。该公司决定在所有门店推出奖金,治疗店和控制店的业绩在推出后趋同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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