Consciousness & Emotion最新文献_第3页

The developmental roots of consciousness and emotional experience 意识和情感体验的发展根源

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.1.1.05DAL

T. Dalton

{"title":"The developmental roots of consciousness and emotional experience","authors":"T. Dalton","doi":"10.1075/CE.1.1.05DAL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.1.1.05DAL","url":null,"abstract":"Charles Darwin is generally credited with having formulated the first systematic attempt to explain the evolutionary origins and function of the expression of emotions in animals and humans. His ingenious theory, however, was burdened with popular misconceptions about human phylogenetic heritage and bore the philosophical and theoretical deficiencies of the brain science of his era that his successors strove to overcome. In their attempts to rectify Darwin’s errors, William James, James Mark Baldwin and John Dewey each made important contributions to a theory of emotion, which attempted to put it on a more secure philosophical and scientific footing. My contention is that Dewey and his collaborator, infant experimentalist Myrtle McGraw, succeeded where their contemporaries failed. They pointed the way out of the morass of recapitulationism, and showed how a developmental theory of consciousness, mind and emotion could be formulated that avoided the epistemological and ontological pitfalls of Darwin’s theory. Drawing on an extensive body of research from contemporary experimental studies of infant development, this essay attempts to put the questions raised by these historical figures about the structure, function and value of emotions in a theoretical framework. A developmental theory is proposed about the complex, interacting neurobiological and neurobehavioral factors that contribute to human emotional development. This theory identifies the possible relationships among emotions, consciousness and mind and how their co-development influences the capacity of young children to form moral judgments.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131917382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Review of “The blank slate” by Steven Pinker 史蒂芬·平克的《白板》书评

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.4.1.12HOC

M. Hocutt

引用次数: 1

Review of “Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen” by Adela Pinch 评论阿德拉·平奇的《奇异的激情:从休谟到奥斯汀的情感认知论》

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/ce.1.1.12bar

Scott Bartlett

引用次数: 0

Järvilehto’s seductive ideas: Provocative concepts without data? Järvilehto诱人的想法:没有数据的煽动性概念?

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.1.08PAN

J. Panksepp

{"title":"Järvilehto’s seductive ideas: Provocative concepts without data?","authors":"J. Panksepp","doi":"10.1075/CE.2.1.08PAN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.2.1.08PAN","url":null,"abstract":"Introductory Note: This commentary developed out of an informal discussion of Part I (2000) of Jarvilehto’s two-part Consciousness & Emotion series with Ralph Ellis at the recent Amsterdam Symposium on Feelings and Emotions (June 13–16, 2001). Part II of Jarvilehto’s series appears in the present issue. Ellis asked me to share my critical concerns with Jarvilehto’s Part I in this commentary, with an advance copy supplied to Jarvilehto, who will reply in the next issue of Consciousness & Emotion. I think most of us recognize the need for pluralism in the study of complex processes such as consciousness and emotions, but to place emotions and feelings so strongly into the environment as does Jarvilehto strikes me simply as a category mistake. I acknowledge that my commentary comes from my own unique (and by some standards radical) perspective on how the field might best move forward empirically. I believe an honest understanding of how natural psychological kinds emerge from specifiable brain functions, which are obviously modulated by environmental events, is presently the most important and most poorly studied aspect of modern mind-science. I felt that Jarvilehto’s holistic approach would only further serve to discourage investigators from pursuing those important issues neuro-empirically.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133567640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Feeling as knowing — Part II: Emotion, consciousness, and brain activity 感觉即认知-第二部分:情感、意识和大脑活动

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.1.04JAR

T. Järvilehto

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引用次数: 13

Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain 自然主义，内省，以及对痛苦的直接现实主义

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.1.03AYD

M. Aydede

引用次数: 23

Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life: The “imaginatio creatrix,” subliminal passions, and the moral sense 蒂米涅涅卡的生命现象学:“想象、创造矩阵”、潜意识激情和道德感

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.1.05BAC

G. Backhaus

{"title":"Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life: The “imaginatio creatrix,” subliminal passions, and the moral sense","authors":"G. Backhaus","doi":"10.1075/CE.2.1.05BAC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.2.1.05BAC","url":null,"abstract":"Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka expands the phenomenological study of meanings (sense-bestowal) into an onto-genetic inquiry by grounding it in a phenomenology of life, including the emotional dimension. This phenomenology of life is informed by the empirical sciences and its doctrines parallel the new scientific paradigm of open dynamic systems. Embedded in the dynamics of the real individuation of life forms, human consciousness emerges at a unique station in the evolutionary process. Tymieniecka treats the constitution of sense as a function of life, and thus the transcendental constitutive function of the cognitive, objectifying intentionality of consciousness, the purview of classical phenomenology, is viewed as a project that is limited in its scope. According to the phenomenology of life, meaning-genesis is exhibited throughout the various stages of structurization in the evolution of life. This paper highlights the transformative function of the “Imaginatio Creatrix,” which is the dynamic process at the human station of evolution that accounts for humanity’s inventive capacities necessary for the construction of a human world. The Imaginatio Creatrix transforms the more primitive stirrings of the human “soul” into subliminal passions of human existential significance. The enactive theory of the mind corroborates Tymieniecka’s rejection of Husserl’s doctrine of passive synthesis. However, Tymieniecka’s study of the creative function offers a key for further advancement in enactive theory. Three sense-bestowing functions of the Imaginatio Creatrix account for the human expansion of life: the Aesthetic/Poetic sense, the Objectifying Sense, and the Moral Sense. The Moral Sense, for Tymieniecka, is not the product of reasoning powers, but rather the fruit of subliminal passions that acquire their moral aspect through trans-actions guided by the “benevolent sentiment.”","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127007731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

The function of the cerebellum in cognition, affect and consciousness: Empirical support for the embodied mind 小脑在认知、情感和意识中的功能:具身心灵的经验支持

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.2.06SCH

J. Schmahmann, C. Anderson, Natika Newton, R. Ellis

引用次数: 18

Review of “Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind” by Talis Bachman 塔利斯·巴赫曼的《意识思维的微遗传学方法》综述

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.3.1.10FAW

Bill Faw

引用次数: 0

Review of “Consciousness and intentionality” by Grant R. Gillett and John Mcmillan Grant R. Gillett和John Mcmillan的《意识与意向性》书评

Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.3.1.11ELL

R. Ellis

引用次数: 0