{"title":"Spinoza's anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience","authors":"H. Ravven","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.2.07MOR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.2.07MOR","url":null,"abstract":"Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"208-209 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127071841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of “Affective Neuroscience” by Jaak Panksepp","authors":"R. Ellis","doi":"10.1075/CE.1.2.08ELL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.1.2.08ELL","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123732815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some background and further theoretical consequences of the organism-environment approach: A reply to the commentary by Panksepp","authors":"T. Järvilehto","doi":"10.1075/CE.2.2.08JAR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.2.2.08JAR","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128533140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of “The hidden genius of emotion: Lifespan transformations of personality” by Carol Magai and Jeanette Haviland-Jones","authors":"R. Stolorow","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.1.14STO","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.1.14STO","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130723076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meta-emotions about anger and amae : A cross-cultural comparison","authors":"M. Ferrari, Emiko Koyama","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.2.06FER","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.2.06FER","url":null,"abstract":"Foundationalists and culturalists are at odds about whether emotions are biological and innate or whether culture is crucial to creating and developing particular human emotions (or whether all cultures even have emotions in the English sense of the word). From the foundationalists' point of view, the best case for innate emotions are the basic emotions such as anger and joy that are observed through facial expressions universally around the world, with homologies even in some other mammals. On the other hand, the culture-specific emotions (such as the Japanese amae) that apparently have no one-word equivalent in any other culture are the best case for the cultur-alists' point of view. In addition, personal theories of emotions - how people interpret their own emotional experiences - are called meta-emotions (Gottman, 1995). Meta-emotions greatly influence how we interpret and deal with our own and others' emotions. We suggest that ultimately it is in the symbiosis of biological capacity and cultural interpretation that persons consciously orient their lives, as guided by felt emotions.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132383558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are emotional expressions intentional?: A self-organizational approach","authors":"R. Gibbs, G. Orden","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.1.02GIB","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.1.02GIB","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the debate over whether emotional expressions are spontaneous or intentional actions. We describe a variety of empirical evidence supporting these two possibilities. But we argue that the spontaneous-intentional distinction fails to explain the psychological dynamics of emotional expressions. We claim that a complex systems perspective on intentions, as self-organized critical states, may yield a unified view of emotional expressions as a consequence of situated action. This account simultaneously acknowledges the embodied status of environment, evolution, culture and mind in theories of emotion.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123095270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of “Emotions, Qualia and Consciousness” by Alfred Kaszniak (Ed.)","authors":"L. Greenberg","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.2.12GRE","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.2.12GRE","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121170314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of “Daniel Hutto” by Daniel Hutto","authors":"N. Fischer","doi":"10.1075/CE.1.2.09FIS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.1.2.09FIS","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116693653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The problem of affectivity in cognitive theories of emotion","authors":"M. Salmela","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.2.04SAL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.2.04SAL","url":null,"abstract":"Despite their paradigmatic status in the modern philosophy of emotions, cognitive theories have been criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of affectivity in emotions. I agree with much of this criticism, but I argue that an amended cognitive theory can overcome the flaws of the two main theories, strong cognitivism and componential cognitivism. I argue that feeling cannot be reduced to the evaluative content of emotion and attitudinal mode of holding it as strong cognitivists suggest. Typical emotional feelings are induced by either propositionally explicable or biologically “hard-wired” evaluations instead of being involved in the latter. We, then, face the challenge of explaining why the feeling and the evaluative construal that figure into an emotion are aspects of the same state, unlike occasional feelings and thoughts that happen to occur in us at the same time. I propose that evaluative content and feeling are different kinds of representations of the formal property of an emotional object. This is a second-order property that is ascribed to every individual object of a particular emotion-type in virtue of its perceived first-order properties and that is experienced as a property of those objects in a state of emotion. Evaluative content involves a conceptual representation of the formal property while feeling represents its inherent affective quality.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131161036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}