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Consciousness & Emotion最新文献

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Moving Ourselves, Moving Others. Motion and emotion in intersubjectivity, consciousness and language 感动自己，感动他人。主体间性、意识与语言中的运动与情感
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 2012-04-12 DOI: 10.1075/CEB.6
A. Foolen, Ulrike Lüdtke, T. Racine, J. Zlatev
{"title":"Moving Ourselves, Moving Others. Motion and emotion in intersubjectivity, consciousness and language","authors":"A. Foolen, Ulrike Lüdtke, T. Racine, J. Zlatev","doi":"10.1075/CEB.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CEB.6","url":null,"abstract":"The close relationship between motion (bodily movement) and emotion (feelings) is not an etymological coincidence. While moving ourselves, we move others; in observing others move - we are moved ourselves. The fundamentally interpersonal nature of mind and language has recently received due attention, but the key role of (e)motion in this context has remained something of a blind spot. The present book rectifies this gap by gathering contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists and linguists working in the area. Framed by an introducing prologue and a summarizing epilogue (written by Colwyn Trevarthen, who brought the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity to a wider audience some 30 years ago) the volume elaborates a dynamical, active view of emotion, along with an affect-laden view of motion - and explores their significance for consciousness, intersubjectivity, and language. As such, it contributes to the emerging interdisciplinary field of mind science, transcending hitherto dominant computationalist and cognitivist approaches. (Less)","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115611337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 136
From molecules to mindfulness: How vertically convergent fractal time fluctuations unify cognition and emotion* 从分子到正念:垂直收敛的分形时间波动如何统一认知和情感*
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.1.2.02AND
C. Anderson
{"title":"From molecules to mindfulness: How vertically convergent fractal time fluctuations unify cognition and emotion*","authors":"C. Anderson","doi":"10.1075/CE.1.2.02AND","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.1.2.02AND","url":null,"abstract":"Fractal time fluctuations of the spectral “1/f” form are universal in natural self-organizing systems. Neurobiology is uniquely infused with fractal fluctuations in the form of statistically self-similar clusters or bursts on all levels of description from molecular events such as protein chain fluctuations, ion channel currents and synaptic processes to the behaviors of neural ensembles or the collective behavior of Internet users. It is the thesis of this essay that the brain self-organizes via a vertical collation of these spontaneous events in order to perceive the world and generate adaptive behaviors. REM sleep, which coalesces from self-similar clusters of burst-within-burst behavior during ontogeny, is essential to cognitive-emotional function, and has recurrent fractal organization. Empirical fMRI observations further support the association of fractal fluctuations in the temporal lobes, brainstem and cerebellum during the expression of emotional memory, spontaneous fluctuations of thought and meditative practice. Cognitive-emotional integration arises as amygdaloid-brainstem-cerebellar systems harmonize the vertical “1/f” symphony of coupled isochronous cortical oscillations in the pursuit of mindfulness.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127093412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
ERPs (event-related potentials), semantic attribution, and facial expression of emotions 事件相关电位、语义归因和情绪的面部表达
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.4.1.05BAL
M. Balconi, U. Pozzoli
{"title":"ERPs (event-related potentials), semantic attribution, and facial expression of emotions","authors":"M. Balconi, U. Pozzoli","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.1.05BAL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.1.05BAL","url":null,"abstract":"ERPs (event-related potentials) correlates are largely used in cognitive psychology and specifically for analysis of semantic information processing. Previous research has underlined a strong correlation between a negative-ongoing wave (N400), more frontally distributed, and semantic linguistic or extra-linguistic anomalies. With reference to the extra-linguistic domain, our experiment analyzed ERP variation in a semantic task of comprehension of emotional facial expressions. The experiment explored the effect of expectancy violation when subjects observed congruous or incongruous emotional facial patterns. Four prototypical (anger, sadness, happiness and surprise) and four morphed faces were presented. Moreover, two distinct cognitive tasks (an implicit vs an explicit elaboration) were analyzed in order to evaluate the influence of spontaneous decoding in N400-like effects. An automatic, high-order cognitive process was found, elicited by a negative ERP variation similar to the linguistic N400 effect, which allows us to explain the congruous/incongruous decoding in semantic extra-linguistic comprehension.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126652704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
How are the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of emotion related? 情绪的认知方面和非认知方面是如何关联的?
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.3.2.05ADA
M. Adamos
{"title":"How are the cognitive and non-cognitive aspects of emotion related?","authors":"M. Adamos","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.2.05ADA","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.2.05ADA","url":null,"abstract":"Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of emotions. In particular, both views face the problem of fortuitous connection, and, as a result, they fail to identify and distinguish an emotion from other mental states. Consequently, they fail to account for our first person authority over our emotions. I finally argue that only an internal, conceptual relation between the cognitive/evaluative and affective/physiological aspects of emotion can avoid such problems, and suggest that the Aristotelian distinction of form and matter can provide such internal relation.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"174 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126946895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Intentionality and feelings in theories of emotions 情绪理论中的意向性和感觉
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.3.2.10BEN
A. Ben-Ze'ev
{"title":"Intentionality and feelings in theories of emotions","authors":"A. Ben-Ze'ev","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.2.10BEN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.2.10BEN","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122290204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can mental representations be triggering causes 心理表征是触发原因吗
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.4.1.04FIG
Carrie Figdor
{"title":"Can mental representations be triggering causes","authors":"Carrie Figdor","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.1.04FIG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.1.04FIG","url":null,"abstract":"Fred Dretske’s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account of behavior can be extended to the case of intentional states, and that this extension provides a way to show how intentional properties play the causal role that we wanted explained.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128313267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Basic emotions and their biological substrates: A nominalistic interpretation 基本情绪及其生物基质:一种唯名论的解释
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.2.02ZAC
P. Zachar, Scott Bartlett
{"title":"Basic emotions and their biological substrates: A nominalistic interpretation","authors":"P. Zachar, Scott Bartlett","doi":"10.1075/CE.2.2.02ZAC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.2.2.02ZAC","url":null,"abstract":"The thesis of this article is that an attitude akin to pragmatism is internal to the scientific enterprise itself, and as a result many scientists will make the same types of non-essentialistic interpretations of their subject matter that are made by pragmatists. This is demonstrably true with respect to those scientists who study the biological basis of emotion such as Panksepp, LeDoux, and Damasio. Even though these scientists are also influenced by what cognitive psychologists call the essentialist bias, their research programs are coherent with Peter Zachar’s rejection of natural kinds in favor of practical kinds. When the confrontation with complexity leads a scientist to offer non-essentialist interpretations, two popular options are to go eliminativist or go nominalist. Pragmatists prefer the nominalistic option, and we provide reasons for suggesting that scientists should as well.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116255058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Emotion and the growth of consciousness: Gaining insight through a phenomenology of rage 情感和意识的成长:通过愤怒的现象学获得洞察力
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.4.2.05COG
J. Cogan
{"title":"Emotion and the growth of consciousness: Gaining insight through a phenomenology of rage","authors":"J. Cogan","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.2.05COG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.2.05COG","url":null,"abstract":"Some attempts to understand emotion have failed to account for important features of our emotional experience — notably, the experience of gaining insight when we express our emotions. In this essay I will hold that if we properly understand emotions, then we see that the expression of emotion contributes to the growth of consciousness by providing a process wherein consciousness can recognize and reclaim its inherent wholeness, and thereby overcome fragmentation. Hence, in this essay I will strive to: (1) demonstrate that we do get insight when we express our emotions, (2) offer a suggestion as to why this feature is often overlooked, (3) propose a model for understanding the emotions that helps to explain this holistic feature of emotion, and (4) show how this insight into the nature of emotion contributes to our understanding of the growth of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132324885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Consciousness, affect and objectifying in Cassirer's conception of symbolizing 卡西尔符号化概念中的意识、情感和物化
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.2.1.06WOR
Evelyn Wortsman Deluty
{"title":"Consciousness, affect and objectifying in Cassirer's conception of symbolizing","authors":"Evelyn Wortsman Deluty","doi":"10.1075/CE.2.1.06WOR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.2.1.06WOR","url":null,"abstract":"An examination of Cassirer’s conception of symbolizing, which is born in his critique of Kant, will show that objectifying human experience without external absolutes is grounded in affect, not cognition. When there is no external absolute to guide objectifying, then the roots of objectifying begin with how we are affected by experience and led to reflect. Affect formulates how we become conscious of what there is and express this consciousness so as to objectify it. Affect thus has an indirect influence on consciousness and objectifying. Cassirer expands the scope of the free play of the imagination, which Kant restricted to aesthetic judgments, to account for how order arises through any modality when a rule is not given. He anchors this generative source in human expression itself, and thereby prevents objectifying from sinking into relativism. Affect is thus shown to play a regulative role in consciousness when we objectify human experience without external absolutes.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134278715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
“When Self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts” by G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham 《当自我意识崩溃:外来的声音和插入的想法》，作者:g·林恩·斯蒂芬斯和乔治·格雷厄姆
Consciousness & Emotion Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1075/CE.3.2.12ZAC
P. Zachar
{"title":"“When Self-consciousness breaks: Alien voices and inserted thoughts” by G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham","authors":"P. Zachar","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.2.12ZAC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.2.12ZAC","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133152488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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