J. Panksepp, J. Burgdorf, Nakia S. Gordon, Cortney A. Turner
{"title":"Treatment of ADHD with methylphenidate may sensitize brain substrates of desire: Implications for changes in drug abuse potential from an animal model","authors":"J. Panksepp, J. Burgdorf, Nakia S. Gordon, Cortney A. Turner","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.1.03PAN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.1.03PAN","url":null,"abstract":"Aims. Currently, methylphenidate (MPH, trade name Ritalin) is the most widely prescribed medication for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). We examined the ability of repeated MPH administration to produce a sensitized appetitive eagerness type response in laboratory rats, as indexed by 50-kHz ultrasonic vocalizations (50-kHz USVs). We also examined the ability of MPH to reduce play behavior in rats which may be partially implicated in the clinical efficacy of MPH in ADHD. Design. 56 adolescent rats received injections of either 5.0 mg/kg MPH, or vehicle each day for 8 consecutive days, and a week later received a challenge injection of either MPH or vehicle. Measurements. Both play behavior (pins) and 50-kHz USVs were recorded after each drug or vehicle administration. Results. MPH challenge produced a substantial 73% reduction in play behavior during the initial treatment phase, and during the last test (1 week post drug), 50-kHz USVs were elevated approximately threefold only in animals with previous MPH experience. Conclusions. These data suggest that MPH treatment may lead to psychostimulant sensitization in young animals, perhaps by increasing future drug-seeking tendencies due to an elevated eagerness for positive incentives. Further, we hypothesize that MPH may be reducing ADHD symptoms, in part, by blocking playful tendencies, whose neuro-maturational and psychological functions remain to be adequately characterized.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131723434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"ADHD and the neural consequences of play and joy: A framing essay for the following empirical paper","authors":"J. Panksepp","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.1.02PAN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.1.02PAN","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127951750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intentionality and feeling in emotions: A reply to Ben-Ze’ev","authors":"M. Salmela","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.2.09SAL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.2.09SAL","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117126089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Internalism and the part-time moralist: An essay about the objectivity of moral judgments","authors":"M. Bagaric","doi":"10.1075/CE.2.2.05BAG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.2.2.05BAG","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contends that internalism with respect moral motivation (the view that we are always moved to act in accordance with our moral judgments) is wrong. While internalism can accommodate amoralists, it cannot explain the phenomenon of ‘part-time moralists’ — the person who is (ostensibly at least) moved by some of his or her moral judgments but not others — and hence should be rejected. This suggests that moral judgments are beliefs (or conscious representations) as opposed to desires. It is contended that morality consists of the set of principles which will maximise happiness and that our moral consciousness is motivated when a desire to maximise happiness is copresent with such a belief. Finally, it is argued that this does not entail that morality is a subjective or relative concept.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131406314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Some notes on internal and external relations and representation","authors":"M. Bickhard","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.1.08BIC","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.1.08BIC","url":null,"abstract":"Internal Relations Internal relations are those relations that are intrinsic to the nature of one or more of the relata. They are a kind of essential relation, rather than an essential property. For example, an arc of a circle is internally related to the center of that circle in the sense that it could not be that arc of that circle without having that relation to that center of the circle. A classic example is that of part to whole: this X could not be a part of Y unless it had an appropriate \" part of \" relationship to Y. (I like my \" arc of circle \" example better.) The Idealists of the 19 th century made massive use of internal relations. The universe was supposed to be a whole united by internal relations among everything. Russell reacted strongly against internal relations (although some of his reasons were based more on the fact that the Idealists Green and Bradley supposed all internal relations to be symmetric than on internal relations per se), but was unable to do away with all of them (Hylton, 1990). E.g., the relations among his logical types are internal. Quine has ushered in a period in which all things intensional or modal or normative are under grave suspicion, and to be rejected if at all possible. Internal relations have mostly disappeared from the scene because of their 'essentialism'. All relations are assumed to be external, except that most people, including most philosophers, today don't know what an internal relation is, and, therefore, don't know what an external relation is either. Representation The relation of an encoding to its content is external. The \" … \" of Morse code would be exactly the same set of dots even if it were not paired with the character \" S \". Because the relationship of an encoding to its content is external, that content must be specified explicitly in order for the encoding to have any content, and, therefore, for the encoding to be a representation at all. It must be specified explicitly because there is no other way in which any content is determined. Having representational content be internally related to a representation is necessary in order to be able to avoid the problem of an infinite regress of interpreters. If the relation between the representation and its content is external, then there is nothing in …","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127386348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: The interdependence of consciousness and emotion","authors":"R. Ellis, Natika Newton","doi":"10.1075/CE.1.1.01ELL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.1.1.01ELL","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130083769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Phenomenal, access and reflexive consciousness: The missing “blocks” in Ned Block’s typology","authors":"Bill Faw","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.2.03FAW","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.2.03FAW","url":null,"abstract":"This paper adds five “blocks” (cells) to Ned Block’s 2-by-2 P- and A-Consciousness typology, by converting “phenomenal” and “access” into two orthogonal dimensions of Primary Conscious, and by introducing gradations along each dimension, with P0 (no phenomenal experience), P1 (attenuated phenomenal experience), and P2 (full phenomenal experience); and A0 (no access of mental content to either involuntary or voluntary cognitive/behavioral responses), A1 (access of mental content to involuntary responses), and A2 (access of mental content also to voluntary responses). This leads to a 3x3, 9-block grid, with Phenomenality on the X-axis and Access on the Y-axis. Each combination of P and A is examined for known conscious states. It is concluded that there are no known phenomenal states without at least A1 or A2 access. Neither are there states with A2 access without P2 phenomenality. At the end of the paper, Block’s concept of Reflexive Consciousness is introduced tantalizingly as a third (Z) dimension for consciousness in humans.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116700107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emotional trauma and childhood amnesia","authors":"R. Joseph","doi":"10.1075/CE.4.2.02JOS","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.4.2.02JOS","url":null,"abstract":"It has been reported that, on average, most adults recall first memories formed around age 3.5. In general, most first memories are positive. However, whether these first memories tend to be visual or verbal and whether the period for childhood amnesia (CA) is greater for visual or verbal or for positive versus negative memories has not been determined. Because negative, stressful experiences disrupt memory and can injure memory centers such as the hippocampus and amygdala, and since adults who were traumatized or abused during childhood (TA) reportedly suffer memory disturbances, it was hypothesized that those with a history of early trauma might suffer from a lengthier childhood amnesia and form their first recallable memories at a later age as compared to the general population (GP). Because the right hemisphere matures earlier than the language-dominant left hemisphere, and is dominant for visual and emotional memory, as well as the stress reponse, it was hypothesized that first recallable memories would be visual rather than verbal. Lastly, since stress can injure the brain and disrupt memory, it was hypothesized that the traumatized group would demonstrate memory and intellectual disturbances associated with right hemisphere injury as based on WAIS-R, Wechsler Memory Scale, and facial-memory testing. All hypotheses were supported. Positive and visual memories are formed before negative and verbal memories. TA CA offset, on average, is at age 6.1 versus 3.5 for GPs. TA PIQ (performance IQ), short-term visual memory, and facial memory were significantly reduced.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"1393 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126833498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emotions are not feelings","authors":"A. Ben-Ze'ev","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.1.08BEN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.1.08BEN","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130350936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intentionality and the inside/outside distinction in sensitive systems","authors":"H. Preester","doi":"10.1075/CE.3.1.06DEP","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/CE.3.1.06DEP","url":null,"abstract":"Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background, the conditions under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. To start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived.","PeriodicalId":256052,"journal":{"name":"Consciousness & Emotion","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133827875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}