ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献_第7页

The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Executive Compensation 多德-弗兰克法案对高管薪酬的影响

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1996257

Samuel Liu

{"title":"The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Executive Compensation","authors":"Samuel Liu","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1996257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1996257","url":null,"abstract":"Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) on July 21, 2010, which became effective for shareholder meetings held on, or after January 21, 2011. The Dodd-Frank Act requires U.S. public companies to conduct an initial advisory, non-binding vote on executive compensation called say-on-pay and a subsequent vote on the frequency of say-on-pay. This study investigates the voting pattern of the say-on-pay and the say-on-frequency and examines the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on the amount and structure of executive compensation. The say-on-pay and say-on-frequency patterns of over 1,700 companies from the ExecuComp database are investigated using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Forms DEF 14A, 8-K, and 10-Q. A further study of S&P 500 companies, from 1992 – 2009, found in the Wharton Research Data Services is used in the regression analysis to forecast executive compensation. Results show that 98% of the sample firms are supported by a majority of shareholders who voted on executive compensation, while 2% of the sample firms failed the say-on-pay. Preliminary results show that 60% of companies initially recommended every three years as the preferred say-on-frequency, while the shareholders voted in favor of every one year (90% of the companies). However, company recommendations for say-on-frequency have grown from 60% in favor of every three years in March 2011 to 63% in favor of every one year in December 2011, suggesting that companies are responding to shareholder pressure. Further results indicate that executive total cash compensation (salary plus bonus) has been decreasing since 2006. Additional analyses, comparing 2010 to 2009 total cash compensation, show that firms reduced total cash compensation in 2010 prior to the advisory vote on executive compensation.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"101 39","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113945842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Does CEO-Specific Performance Impact Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Convertible Debt Issues ceo绩效是否影响公司决策?来自可转换债券发行的证据

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2264907

Chaoli Guo

引用次数: 1

Joint Determination of Leverage and Managerial Incentive Compensation: Theory and Evidence 杠杆与管理层激励薪酬的共同决定:理论与证据

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2152178

Ryoonhee Kim

引用次数: 0

Earnings Management, Time Preferences, and Long Term Decisions 盈余管理，时间偏好和长期决策

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-06-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1603464

Wolfgang Schultze, Andreas Weiler

引用次数: 0

Investor Protection and Capital Expenditures Under Endogenous Time Inconsistency 内生时间不一致性下的投资者保护与资本支出

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-03-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1802539

R. Gregory

引用次数: 0

CEO Compensation Among Firms Controlled by Large Shareholders: Evidence from Emerging Markets 大股东控制公司的CEO薪酬:来自新兴市场的证据

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1718704

Francisco A. Gallego, B. Larrain

引用次数: 0

CEO Education, CEO Turnover, and Firm Performance CEO教育、CEO离职与企业绩效

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1670219

Sanjai Bhagat, B. Bolton, Ajay Subramanian

{"title":"CEO Education, CEO Turnover, and Firm Performance","authors":"Sanjai Bhagat, B. Bolton, Ajay Subramanian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1670219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1670219","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the relationship between CEO education, CEO turnover and firm performance. Our primary interest is on the role that CEO education plays in a firm's decision to replace its current CEO, the role that it plays in selecting a new CEO, and on whether CEO education significantly affects performance. We use six main measures of CEO education: whether or not the CEO attended a Top-20 undergraduate school, whether or not the CEO has an MBA, law or masters‟ degree, and whether or not the MBA or law degree is from a Top-20 program. Our study includes more than 14,500 CEO-years and more than 2,600 cases of CEO turnover from 1993-2007. Our results show that CEO education does not play a large role in the decision by a firm to replace its current CEO; poorly performing CEOs are replaced, regardless of their education. Education, however, does play a significant role in the selection of the replacement CEO; there is a significantly positive correlation between the education levels of new CEOs and those of the CEOs they replace. Further, hiring new CEOs with MBA degrees leads to short-term improvements in operating performance. We, however, do not find a significant systematic relationship between CEO education and long-term firm performance. CEO education does not seem to be an appropriate proxy for CEO ability. Our results lead to the puzzling implication that, while CEO education appears to play an important role in the hiring of CEOs, it does not affect the long-term performance of firms.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130292951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 174

Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance 战略灵活性和行业绩效薪酬的最优性

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-09-17 DOI: 10.1093/RFS/HHP118

R. Gopalan, Todd Milbourn, Fenghua Song

{"title":"Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance","authors":"R. Gopalan, Todd Milbourn, Fenghua Song","doi":"10.1093/RFS/HHP118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/RFS/HHP118","url":null,"abstract":"While standard contract theory suggests that a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effects of sector performance, there is evidence that CEO pay is strongly and positively related to such sector performance. In this article, we offer an explanation. We model a CEO charged with selecting the firm's strategy that determines the firm's exposure to sector performance. To incentivize the CEO to choose optimally, pay contracts will be positively and sometimes asymmetrically related to sector performance. Consistent with our predictions, the empirical analysis indicates that the observed sensitivity of pay to sector performance is almost fully confined to multisegment firms and is greater in firms that offer greater strategic flexibility to alter sector exposure, for more talented CEOs and for CEOs as compared to their subordinate executives. Our evidence is robust to alternate explanations such as CEO entrenchment. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122694858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 139

Dividends, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs: Empirical Evidence from Germany 股利、高管薪酬与代理成本:来自德国的经验证据

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-03-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1362024

Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, J. Elston

引用次数: 9

Corporate Governance, Board Responsibilities, and Financial Performance: The National Bank of Australia 公司治理、董事会责任和财务绩效:澳大利亚国家银行

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-04-02 DOI: 10.22495/COCV6I2P9

Ameeta Jain, Dianne Thomson

{"title":"Corporate Governance, Board Responsibilities, and Financial Performance: The National Bank of Australia","authors":"Ameeta Jain, Dianne Thomson","doi":"10.22495/COCV6I2P9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/COCV6I2P9","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines board responsibilities and accountability by management and Board of Directors in relation to the National Australia Bank’s (NABs) performance. The NAB, an international financial service provider within the top thirty most profitable banks in the world, is compared with the Australian major banks. The evidence suggests that NABs poor performance was consistent with a lack of accountability, poor corporate governance and board dysfunction associated with fraudulent currency trading and the subsequent AUD360 million foreign currency losses. The NAB’s performance is investigated by utilizing accounting-based measures of profitability and cost efficiency as proxies for performance. Following the foreign currency trading losses in 2004 the NAB under-performed the other major Australian banks in terms of profits, cost to income ratio and growth in assets. In terms of profitability and cost efficiency NAB had the lowest ROE and ROA with a 19.7% fall in net profit and the highest cost to income ratio of 57.4% of any of the five largest banks. This case study provides an Australian example of poor corporate governance and suggests that financial institutions and regulators can learn from the NAB’s experience. Failure to have top-down accountability can have significant impact on over-all performance, profitability and reputation. In particular, it suggests that management and Boards need to review their risk management procedures and regulators need to be more pro-active in their prudential oversight of financial institutions.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128753800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7