The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Executive Compensation

Samuel Liu
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) on July 21, 2010, which became effective for shareholder meetings held on, or after January 21, 2011. The Dodd-Frank Act requires U.S. public companies to conduct an initial advisory, non-binding vote on executive compensation called say-on-pay and a subsequent vote on the frequency of say-on-pay. This study investigates the voting pattern of the say-on-pay and the say-on-frequency and examines the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on the amount and structure of executive compensation. The say-on-pay and say-on-frequency patterns of over 1,700 companies from the ExecuComp database are investigated using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Forms DEF 14A, 8-K, and 10-Q. A further study of S&P 500 companies, from 1992 – 2009, found in the Wharton Research Data Services is used in the regression analysis to forecast executive compensation. Results show that 98% of the sample firms are supported by a majority of shareholders who voted on executive compensation, while 2% of the sample firms failed the say-on-pay. Preliminary results show that 60% of companies initially recommended every three years as the preferred say-on-frequency, while the shareholders voted in favor of every one year (90% of the companies). However, company recommendations for say-on-frequency have grown from 60% in favor of every three years in March 2011 to 63% in favor of every one year in December 2011, suggesting that companies are responding to shareholder pressure. Further results indicate that executive total cash compensation (salary plus bonus) has been decreasing since 2006. Additional analyses, comparing 2010 to 2009 total cash compensation, show that firms reduced total cash compensation in 2010 prior to the advisory vote on executive compensation.
多德-弗兰克法案对高管薪酬的影响
国会于2010年7月21日通过了《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革与消费者保护法案》(Dodd-Frank Act),该法案对2011年1月21日或之后举行的股东大会生效。多德-弗兰克法案(Dodd-Frank Act)要求美国上市公司对高管薪酬进行初步咨询性、不具约束力的投票,即“薪酬决定权”(say-on-pay),随后对高管薪酬决定权的频率进行投票。本研究考察了薪酬话语权和频率话语权的投票模式,并考察了多德-弗兰克法案对高管薪酬数量和结构的影响。使用美国证券交易委员会表格DEF 14A、8-K和10-Q,对execcomp数据库中1700多家公司的薪酬话语权和频率话语权模式进行了调查。沃顿研究数据服务(Wharton Research Data Services)对1992年至2009年标准普尔500指数成份股公司的进一步研究,被用于回归分析,以预测高管薪酬。结果显示,98%的样本公司得到了多数股东对高管薪酬投票的支持,而2%的样本公司未能获得高管薪酬投票权。初步结果显示,60%的公司最初建议每三年一次作为首选频率,而股东投票赞成每一年一次(90%的公司)。然而,公司对“频率汇报”的建议已经从2011年3月的60%赞成每三年一次增加到2011年12月的63%赞成每一年一次,这表明公司正在回应股东的压力。进一步的结果表明,自2006年以来,高管总现金薪酬(工资加奖金)一直在下降。对2010年和2009年总现金薪酬进行比较的其他分析显示,在对高管薪酬进行咨询投票之前,2010年公司减少了总现金薪酬。
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