{"title":"ceo绩效是否影响公司决策?来自可转换债券发行的证据","authors":"Chaoli Guo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2264907","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A firm’s convertible debt issues are not only determined by the fundamentals of the firm such as past stock performance, but also related to whether this performance is realized during the tenure of current CEO who decides the issues. I define the performance that the current CEO achieves in the firm ever since the CEO comes to the helm as CEO-specific performance. Higher CEO-specific performance leads to (1) a higher probability of convertible issues, and (2) a less negative abnormal stock return in response to the convertible issue announcements, controlling for other firm characteristics. These evidences show that CEO-specific performance serves as a credible information signal to influence the adverse selection costs between the firm and outside investors in convertible debt financing.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does CEO-Specific Performance Impact Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Convertible Debt Issues\",\"authors\":\"Chaoli Guo\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2264907\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A firm’s convertible debt issues are not only determined by the fundamentals of the firm such as past stock performance, but also related to whether this performance is realized during the tenure of current CEO who decides the issues. I define the performance that the current CEO achieves in the firm ever since the CEO comes to the helm as CEO-specific performance. Higher CEO-specific performance leads to (1) a higher probability of convertible issues, and (2) a less negative abnormal stock return in response to the convertible issue announcements, controlling for other firm characteristics. These evidences show that CEO-specific performance serves as a credible information signal to influence the adverse selection costs between the firm and outside investors in convertible debt financing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":228319,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"136 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2264907\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2264907","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does CEO-Specific Performance Impact Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Convertible Debt Issues
A firm’s convertible debt issues are not only determined by the fundamentals of the firm such as past stock performance, but also related to whether this performance is realized during the tenure of current CEO who decides the issues. I define the performance that the current CEO achieves in the firm ever since the CEO comes to the helm as CEO-specific performance. Higher CEO-specific performance leads to (1) a higher probability of convertible issues, and (2) a less negative abnormal stock return in response to the convertible issue announcements, controlling for other firm characteristics. These evidences show that CEO-specific performance serves as a credible information signal to influence the adverse selection costs between the firm and outside investors in convertible debt financing.
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