ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)最新文献_第6页

The Effects of Forecast Type and Performance-Based Incentives on the Quality of Management Forecasts 预测类型与绩效激励对管理预测质量的影响

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-12-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2310870

Clara Xiaoling Chen, Kristina Rennekamp, F. H. Zhou

{"title":"The Effects of Forecast Type and Performance-Based Incentives on the Quality of Management Forecasts","authors":"Clara Xiaoling Chen, Kristina Rennekamp, F. H. Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2310870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2310870","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding forecasts is important because of their pervasiveness in business decisions such as budgeting, production, and financial reporting. In this study we use an abstract experiment to examine how the preparation of disaggregated forecasts interacts with performance-based incentives to influence the accuracy and optimism of forecasts. We manipulate two factors between subjects at two levels each: forecast type (disaggregated or aggregated) and performance-based incentives (present or absent). Consistent with our predictions, we find that (1) preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to greater improvements in forecast accuracy (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the absence of performance-based incentives than in the presence of performance-based incentives, and (2) preparing disaggregated forecasts leads to greater increases in forecast optimism (compared to preparing aggregated forecasts) in the presence of performance-based incentives than in the absence of performance-based incentives. Our study contributes to our understanding of unintentional biases in the forecasting process. Our results have important practical implications for designers of management control systems who elicit internal forecasts from managers. Finally, our results also have important practical implications for those who either prepare or use external management forecasts.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"273 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123366876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

Integrative Research Paper: Swiss Referendum Say on Pay 综合研究论文:瑞士公民对薪酬的看法

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2359159

D. Albrecht

引用次数: 0

Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? 独立董事激励:优秀董事如何利用有限的时间和精力?

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2017977

Ronald W. Masulis, Shawn Mobbs

引用次数: 378

Does CEO Pay Dispersion Matter in an Emerging Market? Evidence from China's Listed Firms 在新兴市场，CEO薪酬差异是否重要?来自中国上市公司的证据

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2492884

Hu Fang, Xiaofei Pan, G. Tian

引用次数: 37

Is the Evidence Sufficient to Take Action on Executive Pay? Reply to Commentators 对高管薪酬采取行动的证据是否足够?回复评论员

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2289555

Philippe Jacquart, J. Armstrong

引用次数: 0

Executive Compensation and Compensation Risk: Evidence from Technology Firms 高管薪酬与薪酬风险:来自科技公司的证据

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2266168

Jimmy Yu, Samir Trabelsi, P. Dunn, Zhongzhi He

{"title":"Executive Compensation and Compensation Risk: Evidence from Technology Firms","authors":"Jimmy Yu, Samir Trabelsi, P. Dunn, Zhongzhi He","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2266168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2266168","url":null,"abstract":"PurposeThe purpose of this research is to investigate factors that contribute to technology firms paying higher compensation than non-technology firms, and why the mix of compensation at technology firms is different than the compensation packages at non-technology firms.Design/methodology/approachThis research used a sample of 1,009 firm-year observations for the five-year period from 2001 to 2005 and random-effects regression models.FindingsIt was found that the total compensation paid to the CEOs of technology firms is higher than the total compensation paid to the CEOs of non-technology firms, and that the value of the stock options granted to the former is greater than the value of the stock options granted to the latter.Research limitations/implicationsThe results are largely consistent with the labour market efficiency perspective. The higher compensation paid to CEOs in technology firms seems to be commensurate with the higher compensation risk that CEOs in technology firms bear.Practical implicationsCompensation designers should consider both the benefits and costs of granting stock and stock options to executives. An increased portion of stock options definitely aligns the interests of shareholders and CEOs together, and could maximize the retentive effect if CEOs have a significant amount of their wealth in unvested in-the-money options.Social implicationsConsistent with the literature, a CEO could earn much higher pay if he or she also serves as the chair of the board of directors. Practically, firms do not require all governance mechanisms. They just require one set of suitable governance mechanisms.Originality/valueThis paper is the first to investigate factors that contribute to technology firms paying higher compensation than non-technology firms, and that do explain why the mix of compensation at technology firms is different than the compensation packages at non-technology firms.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"269-270 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117142056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts 编制高管薪酬合同索引

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-04-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1876765

Ernst Maug, Ingolf Dittmann, Oliver Spalt

引用次数: 43

Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate-Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement 薪酬与暴动:权利时代公司治理改革的再思考

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2207682

A. Dignam

{"title":"Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate-Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement","authors":"A. Dignam","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2207682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2207682","url":null,"abstract":"The question this paper addresses is whether the corporate-governance reforms of the past 30 years have actually made our elite-remuneration problems worse. This article posits that, over time, corporate-governance initiatives have created a regulatory edifice that has neutered executives and distanced shareholders from important internal governance matters, such as remuneration, while at the same time considering disclosure of elite salaries a legitimising tool in itself. In the public sector, the mimicking of private-sector agency-cost-reducing norms and transparency initiatives has had a similar accelerating effect on the salaries of the elite. The price of this edifice in all sectors has been high elite pay, as neutered executives and public servants have sought out remuneration as a proxy for power, prestige and service. In turn, there has been a steady increase in public awareness of and unhappiness about elite remuneration. The paper concludes that the answer lies in giving executives and public servants back their discretionary power to manage, by removing many agency-cost-reducing initiatives. Real solutions are likely to be found by: ending quarterly financial disclosure; exempting public-sector salaries from Freedom of Information (FOI) requests; ceasing to use performance-related targets; reducing the influence of Non-Executive Directors (NED); increasing the cost of exit for shareholders; allowing boards to use their powers to defend takeovers; utilising average-pay ratios and employee say-on-pay rights; and removing remuneration-disclosure requirements.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121334810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

UK Pay-for-Performance Analysis FTSE100 Companies, 2008-2010 2008-2010年英国富时100指数成分股公司绩效薪酬分析

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-05-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2055747

Hermann J. Stern

引用次数: 1

The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive Compensation 薪酬话语权对高管薪酬的影响

ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2026121

S. Balsam, Jennifer Yin

引用次数: 82