在新兴市场,CEO薪酬差异是否重要?来自中国上市公司的证据

Hu Fang, Xiaofei Pan, G. Tian
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引用次数: 37

摘要

本文考察了新兴经济体的制度特征(即政府所有权、政治关系和市场改革)如何影响CEO薪酬分散激励。与我们的预期一致,我们发现,在中国新兴市场,CEO薪酬差异通常提供了一种竞赛激励,因为它与公司绩效呈正相关。此外,在政府控制的公司和CEO有政治关系的公司,比赛激励较弱,但在中国股权分置改革后,比赛激励变得更强。进一步,我们发现,在国有企业中,通过满足多个经济和社会目标而获得的满足感在很大程度上降低了比赛激励的有效性,而私营企业固有的管理代理问题可能会缓解这种有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does CEO Pay Dispersion Matter in an Emerging Market? Evidence from China's Listed Firms
This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.
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