Corporate Governance, Board Responsibilities, and Financial Performance: The National Bank of Australia

Ameeta Jain, Dianne Thomson
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

This paper examines board responsibilities and accountability by management and Board of Directors in relation to the National Australia Bank’s (NABs) performance. The NAB, an international financial service provider within the top thirty most profitable banks in the world, is compared with the Australian major banks. The evidence suggests that NABs poor performance was consistent with a lack of accountability, poor corporate governance and board dysfunction associated with fraudulent currency trading and the subsequent AUD360 million foreign currency losses. The NAB’s performance is investigated by utilizing accounting-based measures of profitability and cost efficiency as proxies for performance. Following the foreign currency trading losses in 2004 the NAB under-performed the other major Australian banks in terms of profits, cost to income ratio and growth in assets. In terms of profitability and cost efficiency NAB had the lowest ROE and ROA with a 19.7% fall in net profit and the highest cost to income ratio of 57.4% of any of the five largest banks. This case study provides an Australian example of poor corporate governance and suggests that financial institutions and regulators can learn from the NAB’s experience. Failure to have top-down accountability can have significant impact on over-all performance, profitability and reputation. In particular, it suggests that management and Boards need to review their risk management procedures and regulators need to be more pro-active in their prudential oversight of financial institutions.
公司治理、董事会责任和财务绩效:澳大利亚国家银行
本文考察了与澳大利亚国民银行(nab)绩效相关的管理层和董事会的职责和问责制。NAB是世界上最赚钱的30家银行中的一家国际金融服务提供商,与澳大利亚主要银行进行了比较。有证据表明,nab业绩不佳与缺乏问责制、公司治理不善和董事会功能失调有关,这些都与欺诈性货币交易和随后的3.6亿澳元外汇损失有关。NAB的绩效是通过利用基于会计的盈利能力和成本效率指标作为绩效的代理来调查的。继2004年外汇交易亏损之后,NAB在利润、成本收入比和资产增长方面的表现都落后于澳大利亚其他主要银行。在盈利能力和成本效率方面,NAB的净资产收益率(ROE)和资产收益率(ROA)最低,净利润下降19.7%,成本收入比(cost to income ratio)在五大银行中最高,为57.4%。这个案例研究提供了一个澳大利亚糟糕的公司治理的例子,并建议金融机构和监管机构可以从NAB的经验中学习。未能实行自上而下的问责制可能会对整体业绩、盈利能力和声誉产生重大影响。报告特别指出,管理层和董事会需要审查其风险管理程序,监管机构需要更积极主动地对金融机构进行审慎监督。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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