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Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation 管理层薪酬与股价操纵
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-06-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2232923
Josef Schroth
{"title":"Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation","authors":"Josef Schroth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2232923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2232923","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short‐term stock price to push for higher powered and more short‐term‐focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and manipulate more, but may not generate higher firm profits. The model is consistent with existing empirical findings about the relationship between manipulation and equity pay, suggesting that heterogeneity in manager manipulation propensities may be an important driver of heterogeneity in pay. Novel testable predictions are developed.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117306193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
How Organizational Hierarchy Affects Information Production 组织层级如何影响信息生产
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3169911
J. Skrastins, Vikrant Vig
{"title":"How Organizational Hierarchy Affects Information Production","authors":"J. Skrastins, Vikrant Vig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3169911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169911","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit a variation in organizational hierarchy induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank branches in India. We do so to investigate how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit. We find that increased hierarchization of a branch induces credit rationing, reduces loan performance, and generates standardization in loan contracts. Additionally, we find that hierarchical structures perform better in environments characterized by a high degree of corruption, highlighting the benefits of hierarchies in restraining rent-seeking activities. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that valuable information may be lost in hierarchical structures.Received May 4, 2018; editorial decision April 30, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127056807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 50
Can the Design of CEO Rewards Be Relied upon to Overcome the Agency Problem Created by the Separation of Ownership and Control? CEO薪酬设计能否克服所有权与控制权分离带来的代理问题?
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3063336
Ibrahim Mammakkanakath
{"title":"Can the Design of CEO Rewards Be Relied upon to Overcome the Agency Problem Created by the Separation of Ownership and Control?","authors":"Ibrahim Mammakkanakath","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3063336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063336","url":null,"abstract":"The structure and design of executive compensation arrangements has become a very sensitive and diverse topic in recent years. The pressure to get executive pay right is attracting great attention higher than before especially in the UK, due to the current political environment triggered by the Brexit (Lang, 2016). This article is the brief analysis on the CEO rewards to overcome the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and control. The analysis carries forward through the agency theory, human theory and expectancy theory. Additionally, this article answering the agency problem due to the separation of ownership and control. After the extensive analysis identified in this journal, even though the design of executive remuneration is a partial remedy to this menace, it is apparent that the performance-related pay is considered as the solution to mitigate the principal-agency conflicts.Additionally, an extra layer monitoring at executive board level may ensure the goal congruence of a firm.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134045750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
CEO Long-Term Incentive Pay in Mergers and Acquisitions 并购中的CEO长期激励薪酬
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-10-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2622738
Randy Beavers
{"title":"CEO Long-Term Incentive Pay in Mergers and Acquisitions","authors":"Randy Beavers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2622738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622738","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M&A decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in an M&A. When firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater portion of stock. The evidence indicates that inside debt incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132814280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Compensation Contagion: The Role of Peer Benchmarking 薪酬传染:同伴基准的作用
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3030174
Gonul Colak, Jun Yang, Pengfei Ye
{"title":"Compensation Contagion: The Role of Peer Benchmarking","authors":"Gonul Colak, Jun Yang, Pengfei Ye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3030174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3030174","url":null,"abstract":"We show that increases in CEO compensation at new S&P 500 members affect CEO compensation at other firms through compensation peer benchmarking. This compensation contagion propagates via three channels. Direct competition for managerial talent forces firms to respond to peers’ pay increases. Star chasing, which involves adding new S&P 500 members to compensation peer groups to justify higher pay, is associated with weak corporate governance. The peer-of-peer channel relies on indirect compensation peers and is most influential overall. Interestingly, we find minimal downward pressure on CEO compensation from companies removed from the S&P 500, confirming the asymmetric nature of contagion.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128215072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
The Interdependence between Company Departments: The Economist's Role and Importance in Management 公司部门之间的相互依赖:经济学人在管理中的作用和重要性
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3029148
C. Lazăr
{"title":"The Interdependence between Company Departments: The Economist's Role and Importance in Management","authors":"C. Lazăr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3029148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3029148","url":null,"abstract":"In these few lines, the author aims at providing an insight into the meaning of a company structure, with an emphasis on the organizational component/link known as \"department\" and on the connections between such components/links. At the same time, the role/importance of the economist specialized in management is also emphasized. To this end, reference is made to the significant literature – books, treatises and articles published in scientific journals – devoted to the issues addressed.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125218792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Are Profit-Based Incentives Compatible with a Risk Culture? 以利润为基础的激励与风险文化相容吗?
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3028769
Elizabeth Sheedy, Le Zhang, K. Tam
{"title":"Are Profit-Based Incentives Compatible with a Risk Culture?","authors":"Elizabeth Sheedy, Le Zhang, K. Tam","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3028769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3028769","url":null,"abstract":"Our study is focused on compliance with risk policy - the minimum standard required of finance professionals.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130541331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence 高管薪酬:理论与证据综述
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2992287
Alex Edmans, X. Gabaix, Dirk Jenter
{"title":"Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence","authors":"Alex Edmans, X. Gabaix, Dirk Jenter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2992287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2992287","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public firms to private and non-U.S. firms. We then critically analyze three non-exclusive explanations for what drives executive pay - shareholder value maximization by boards, rent extraction by executives, and institutional factors such as regulation, taxation, and accounting policy. We confront each hypothesis with the evidence. While shareholder value maximization is consistent with many practices that initially seem inefficient, no single explanation can account for all facts and historical trends; we highlight major gaps for future research. We discuss evidence on the effects of executive pay, highlighting recent identification strategies, and suggest policy implications grounded in theoretical and empirical research. Our survey has two main goals. First, we aim to tightly link the theoretical literature to the empirical evidence, and combine the insights contributed by all three views on the drivers of pay. Second, we aim to provide a user-friendly guide to executive compensation, presenting shareholder value theories using a simple unifying model, and discussing the challenges and methodological issues with empirical research.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132798271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 288
Messaging without a Message: Executive Value and Social Media Activity 没有信息的信息:执行价值和社会媒体活动
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-05-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2966559
R. Gao, G. Hilary, Rencheng Wang
{"title":"Messaging without a Message: Executive Value and Social Media Activity","authors":"R. Gao, G. Hilary, Rencheng Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2966559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2966559","url":null,"abstract":"We show that executives who start tweeting benefit from better career options. We motivate this finding using the well-established theory of limited attention. Consistent with this explanation, we find that content is irrelevant. Comparative statics are also consistent with our framework. In particular, the effect of Twitter is greater for executives who were largely unrecognized and who were underpaid before they started tweeting, who garner greater public attention from their social media activity, who enjoy higher professional mobility, and who operate in environments where compensation setting is less structured.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114170451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Are All Analysts Created Equal? Industry Expertise and Monitoring Effectiveness of Financial Analysts 所有分析师都是平等的吗?金融分析师的行业专长和监测有效性
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2517502
D. Bradley, Sinan Gokkaya, Xi Liu, Feixue Xie
{"title":"Are All Analysts Created Equal? Industry Expertise and Monitoring Effectiveness of Financial Analysts","authors":"D. Bradley, Sinan Gokkaya, Xi Liu, Feixue Xie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2517502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517502","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether analysts’ prior industry experience influences their ability to serve as effective external firm monitors. Our analyses of firms’ financial disclosure quality, executive compensation and CEO turnover decisions portray a consistent picture that related pre-analyst industry experience is of critical importance for analysts to play an effective monitoring role. Coverage by analysts with such experience is associated with reduced earnings management, lower probability of committing financial misrepresentation, less CEO excess compensation, and higher performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. We also provide evidence on several plausible mechanisms through which industry expert analysts exert monitoring efforts and limit managerial opportunism.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124700505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 72
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