薪酬传染:同伴基准的作用

Gonul Colak, Jun Yang, Pengfei Ye
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引用次数: 6

摘要

我们通过薪酬同行基准分析表明,标准普尔500指数新成份股公司CEO薪酬的增加会影响其他公司CEO薪酬。这种补偿传染通过三个渠道传播。对管理人才的直接竞争迫使公司对同行的加薪做出回应。追星行为与公司治理薄弱有关。追星行为包括将新的标准普尔500指数成份股纳入薪酬同行群体,以证明提高薪酬是合理的。对等渠道依赖于间接补偿对等体,总体上影响最大。有趣的是,我们发现从标准普尔500指数中剔除的公司对CEO薪酬的下行压力最小,这证实了传染的不对称性质。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Compensation Contagion: The Role of Peer Benchmarking
We show that increases in CEO compensation at new S&P 500 members affect CEO compensation at other firms through compensation peer benchmarking. This compensation contagion propagates via three channels. Direct competition for managerial talent forces firms to respond to peers’ pay increases. Star chasing, which involves adding new S&P 500 members to compensation peer groups to justify higher pay, is associated with weak corporate governance. The peer-of-peer channel relies on indirect compensation peers and is most influential overall. Interestingly, we find minimal downward pressure on CEO compensation from companies removed from the S&P 500, confirming the asymmetric nature of contagion.
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