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CEO Perquisites in Canada, 1971-2008: Certainly Not 'Pure' Managerial Excess 加拿大CEO的特权，1971-2008:当然不是“纯粹的”管理过剩
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-01-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2900476
Lisa Baillargeon, Patrice Gélinas
{"title":"CEO Perquisites in Canada, 1971-2008: Certainly Not 'Pure' Managerial Excess","authors":"Lisa Baillargeon, Patrice Gélinas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2900476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900476","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores Canadian market data on CEO perquisites gathered by a large consulting firm over the period from 1971 to 2008. Perquisites are one of the least documented total compensation components in the academic literature on executive pay. Scant existing literature may be due to the relatively recent and limited corporate disclosures on CEO perquisites, as well as to the comparatively modest monetary value of perquisites relative to other total CEO compensation components. Meanwhile, CEO perquisites regularly capture the public’s imagination in the media because of some perceived excesses, such as immoderate personal use of corporate aircraft (see Rajan & Wulf, 2006). We document a significant evolution in CEO perquisites practices over the period. Consistent with a nascent body of literature, this paper supports empirically hypotheses arguing that CEO perquisites do not uniquely occur as a result of an agency problem, the main theoretical explanation for their existence as of yet, but that they can also serve a legitimate, value-creating, business purpose for the benefit of shareholders.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121110318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Wolves of Wall Street? Managerial Attributes and Bank Risk 华尔街之狼?管理属性与银行风险
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-11-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2670525
Jens Hagendorff, A. Saunders, Sascha Steffen, Francesco Vallascas
{"title":"The Wolves of Wall Street? Managerial Attributes and Bank Risk","authors":"Jens Hagendorff, A. Saunders, Sascha Steffen, Francesco Vallascas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2670525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2670525","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the role of executive-specific attributes (or ‘styles’) in explaining bank business models beyond pay-per-performance incentives. We decompose the variation in business models and document that the ‘style’ of members of a bank’s top management team is reflected in key bank policy choices. Manager styles far outrank executive compensation and other observable manager variables in terms of their ability to describe variation in bank business models. Bank manager styles also explain differences in risk and performance across banks. Finally, we combine manager styles from various bank policies to derive manager profiles that are associated with manager’s personal risk preferences, board characteristics and whether or not managers will be appointed as CEO during their careers.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130367796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
The Effects of Short-Selling Threats on Incentive Contracts: Evidence from an Experiment 卖空威胁对激励契约的影响:来自实验的证据
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2238236
David De Angelis, Gustavo Grullon, S. Michenaud
{"title":"The Effects of Short-Selling Threats on Incentive Contracts: Evidence from an Experiment","authors":"David De Angelis, Gustavo Grullon, S. Michenaud","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2238236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2238236","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the effects of a shock to the stock-price formation process on the design of executive incentive contracts. We find that an exogenous removal of short-selling constraints causes firms to convexify compensation payoffs by granting relatively more stock options to their managers. We also find that treated firms adopt new antitakeover provisions. These results suggest that when firms face the threat of bear raids, they incentivize managers to take actions that mitigate the adverse effects of unrestrained short selling. Overall, this paper provides causal evidence that financial markets affect incentive contract design.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133694317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 118
Knighthoods, Damehoods, and CEO Behaviour 爵位、夫人和首席执行官的行为
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2420066
Konrad Raff, Linus Siming
{"title":"Knighthoods, Damehoods, and CEO Behaviour","authors":"Konrad Raff, Linus Siming","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2420066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2420066","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether and how politicians can influence the behaviour of CEOs and firm performance with prestigious government awards. We present a simple model to develop the hypothesis that government awards have a negative effect on firm performance. The empirical analysis uses two legal reforms in New Zealand for identification: Knighthoods and damehoods were abolished in April 2000 but reinstated in March 2009. The findings are consistent with the predictions of the model. The results suggest that government awards serve as an incentive tool through which politicians influence firms in favour of employees to the detriment of shareholders.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133784846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt 内部债务的直接和间接风险承担激励
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2336039
Stefano Colonnello, G. Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang
{"title":"Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt","authors":"Stefano Colonnello, G. Curatola, Ngoc Giang Hoang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2336039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2336039","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are decreasing in inside debt only if it is unsecured. Second, the relation between credit spreads and equity incentives varies depending on the features of inside debt. We show that credit spreads are increasing in equity incentives. This relation becomes stronger as the seniority of inside debt increases. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with traded credit default swap contracts, we provide evidence supportive of the model's predictions.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133384492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
The Break of the Linkage between Monetary Incentives and Effort 货币激励与努力之间联系的断裂
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2801228
Miki Malul, Mosi Rosenboim, Daniel Shapira
{"title":"The Break of the Linkage between Monetary Incentives and Effort","authors":"Miki Malul, Mosi Rosenboim, Daniel Shapira","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2801228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2801228","url":null,"abstract":"The average worker in the US needs to work more than a year to earn his or her CEO’s daily wage. The well-accepted justification among economists for these huge wage gaps is the necessity to achieve economic efficiency, in terms of efficient allocation in the labor market and incentivizing employees to put forth maximum effort. Building on the idea that the level of effort any individual can invest is bounded, we provide a compact mathematical proof that challenges the well-accepted economic notion that extremely high gaps in net wages and wealth distribution are the lesser evil because they ensure economic efficiency. We conclude suggesting an economically efficient solution that does not limit gross wages, but still reduces socioeconomic inequalities.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114953963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Love or Money: The Effect of CEO Divorce on Firm Risk and Compensation 爱还是钱:CEO离婚对公司风险和薪酬的影响
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2140668
Jordan B. Neyland
{"title":"Love or Money: The Effect of CEO Divorce on Firm Risk and Compensation","authors":"Jordan B. Neyland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2140668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2140668","url":null,"abstract":"I find lower firm risk in the year of a CEO divorce. This lower volatility is consistent with a reduction in risk incentives, as CEOs pay large divorce settlements and are less able to diversify firm-specific risk from their portfolios. Divorce has a larger impact on firms with cash-poor CEOs who lack diversification. The sensitivity of compensation to both price and volatility is significantly higher after divorce, suggesting compensation incentives adjust to portfolio incentives; increasing total compensation by over $2 million on average. I find no evidence the results relate to increased distraction or alternative explanations.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125475686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Non-compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: The Brazilian Experience 高管薪酬披露中的违规行为:巴西的经验
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2326865
C. M. Costa, Fernando Caio Galdi, F. Motoki, J. M. Sánchez
{"title":"Non-compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: The Brazilian Experience","authors":"C. M. Costa, Fernando Caio Galdi, F. Motoki, J. M. Sánchez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2326865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326865","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security-related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm-specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security-related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid-ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127388449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Recent Trends in Executive Compensation: Are They Pareto Improving? 高管薪酬的最新趋势:是否在帕累托改善?
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-12-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2700632
Igor Salitskiy
{"title":"Recent Trends in Executive Compensation: Are They Pareto Improving?","authors":"Igor Salitskiy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2700632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2700632","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years firms have been shifting their executive compensation packages from plain stock and option grants to grants with accounting-based performance vesting provisions and awards that benchmark firm performance against those of a designated peer group. One potential explanation for this trend is that firms want to improve the signal-noise ratio of performance measures. This paper directly tests this hypothesis. It estimates the statistical relationship between various performance measures and computes the optimal combination of awards. It finds that the observed trend is consistent with compensation optimization. It also finds that firms with higher potential gains from switching to alternative performance characteristics have increased their usage more than other firms.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114575724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Structural and Relational Influences on the Role of Reward Interdependence in Product Innovation 产品创新中报酬相互依赖作用的结构与关系影响
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-11-01 DOI: 10.1111/radm.12090
D. De Clerq, N. Thongpapanl, D. Dimov
{"title":"Structural and Relational Influences on the Role of Reward Interdependence in Product Innovation","authors":"D. De Clerq, N. Thongpapanl, D. Dimov","doi":"10.1111/radm.12090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/radm.12090","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between reward interdependence, or the extent to which managers' rewards are tied to the performance of colleagues in other functions, and product innovation. It also considers how structural and relational features of the organizational context might moderate this relationship. Our analysis of a sample of Canadian-based firms reveals a positive relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation that is invigorated at higher levels of job rotation, social interaction, and interactional fairness, but we find no evidence of a moderating effect of decision autonomy. Consistent with a systems approach to organizational contingencies, we also find that the reward interdependence–product innovation relationship is stronger when the organization's context comes closer to an ‘ideal’ holistic configuration that is most conducive to knowledge exchange within the organization, with a more prominent role played by the relational sub-context (social interaction and interactional fairness) than the structural sub-context (job rotation and decision autonomy). The findings have important implications for innovation research as they shed light on how the extent to which individual rewards are tied to collective performance can be channeled to enhance innovation pursuits.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129508680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
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