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Pay for Performance: An Empirical Review 绩效薪酬:实证研究
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-04 DOI: 10.22495/COCV12I4P5
Yusuf Mohammed Nulla
{"title":"Pay for Performance: An Empirical Review","authors":"Yusuf Mohammed Nulla","doi":"10.22495/COCV12I4P5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/COCV12I4P5","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigated the relationship between the CEO cash compensation and firm performance of the large New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies from 2005 to 2010. The quantitative research method was selected for this research study. The forty large companies were selected through a stratified sampling method. The research question for this research study was: among the NYSE companies, what relationship is there between CEO cash compensation and firm performance. The results found that, there was a relationship between CEO salary, bonus, and firm performance, among the NYSE companies. The correlations between CEO salary, CEO bonus, return on assets, return on equity, earnings per share, cash flow per share, net profit margin, common stock outstanding, book value of common stock outstanding, and market value of common stocks outstanding, were characterized as weak ratios respectively.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128782007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Causal Effect of Option Pay on Corporate Risk Management 期权报酬对公司风险管理的因果效应
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2614212
Tor-Erik Bakke, Hamed Mahmudi, Chitru S. Fernando, Jesus M. Salas
{"title":"The Causal Effect of Option Pay on Corporate Risk Management","authors":"Tor-Erik Bakke, Hamed Mahmudi, Chitru S. Fernando, Jesus M. Salas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2614212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2614212","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides strong evidence of a causal effect of risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation on corporate risk management. We utilize the passage of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R, which required firms to expense options, to investigate how chief executive officer option compensation affects the hedging behavior of oil and gas firms. Firms that did not expense options before FAS 123R significantly reduced option pay, which resulted in a large increase in their hedging intensity compared with firms that did not use options or expensed their options voluntarily prior to FAS 123R.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115506753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 124
Wealth Inequality and CEO Compensation 财富不平等与CEO薪酬
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-04-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2599740
Calvin Blackwell, Rachel Graefe-Anderson, Frank Hefner, Dyanne Vaught
{"title":"Wealth Inequality and CEO Compensation","authors":"Calvin Blackwell, Rachel Graefe-Anderson, Frank Hefner, Dyanne Vaught","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2599740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2599740","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past twenty years there has been a dramatic increase in both CEO pay and the wealth of the richest Americans. We examine three hypotheses regarding the relationship between wealth inequality and CEO compensation: first, that the increase in CEO income inequality helped cause increased wealth inequality; second, that increases in wealth inequality helped cause increased CEO income inequality; and third, that both types of inequality are caused by a third factor. We test these hypotheses by using ExecuComp and Forbes 400 data to estimate power law distributions and compare the behavior of these distributions over time. We find no support for any of the three hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133543555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Political Determinants of Executive Compensation: Evidence from an Emerging Economy 高管薪酬的政治决定因素:来自新兴经济体的证据
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-04-20 DOI: 10.1016/J.EMEMAR.2015.04.008
Hao Liang, L. Renneboog, S. L. Sun
{"title":"The Political Determinants of Executive Compensation: Evidence from an Emerging Economy","authors":"Hao Liang, L. Renneboog, S. L. Sun","doi":"10.1016/J.EMEMAR.2015.04.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EMEMAR.2015.04.008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117584799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk CEO过度自信与股价崩盘风险
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2331189
Jeong‐Bon Kim, Zheng Wang, Liandong Zhang
{"title":"CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk","authors":"Jeong‐Bon Kim, Zheng Wang, Liandong Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2331189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331189","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133389838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 445
The Impact of Trade on Managerial Incentives and Productivity 贸易对管理激励和生产率的影响
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2676803
Cristina Tello-Trillo
{"title":"The Impact of Trade on Managerial Incentives and Productivity","authors":"Cristina Tello-Trillo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2676803","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2676803","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the importance of trade-induced managerial incentives as a source of productivity gains. I introduce a principal-agent problem in a trade model with monopolistic competition and firm level heterogeneity, in which firms provide incentives to their managers to reduce costs. The model shows that trade liberalization, given by a reduction in trade costs, induces stronger managerial incentives among firms productive enough to export and weaker incentives for firms not productive enough to export. Among the exporters, the increase in incentives is higher for low-productive exporters than high-productive exporters. Examination of U.S. manufacturing firms yields evidence consistent with the model. I find that between 5% and 8% of the industry productivity growth during the 1993-1998 period can be attributed to productivity gains through managerial incentives.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131256773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
CEO Inside Debt, Asset Tangibility, and Investment 首席执行官内部债务，资产有形性和投资
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-12 DOI: 10.1108/IJMF-10-2014-0163
Ran Lu-Andrews, Yin Yu-Thompson
{"title":"CEO Inside Debt, Asset Tangibility, and Investment","authors":"Ran Lu-Andrews, Yin Yu-Thompson","doi":"10.1108/IJMF-10-2014-0163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-10-2014-0163","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose - – The authors intend to perform empirical analysis to test the theory proposed by Edmans and Liu (2011) that CEOs with more debt-like compensations care more about the liquidation value of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relations between CEO inside debt ratios and tangible assets (i.e. asset tangibility, liquidation value, and fixed asset investment). Design/methodology/approach - – The authors use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) contemporaneous and lead-lag regression analyses. They also use two-stage least-square (2SLS) regression analysis for robustness check. Findings - – The findings are fourfold: first, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on asset tangibility of the firm; second, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on the liquidation value of the firm; third, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on the tangible asset investment (as measured by capital expenditures) of the firm; and fourth, these positive effects are found in both the contemporaneous year and the subsequent year and in both OLS and 2SLS frameworks. The research provides further evidence that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings exhibit safety-seeking behavior. The authors document direct proof for the theory proposed by Edmans and Liu (2011) that these CEOs, like any creditors, care a great deal of the asset tangibility and liquidation value of the firm. Originality/value - – This study contributes to the existing literature by providing further empirical evidence to support that CEO inside debt holdings have impacts on firm investment decisions and capital allocations. Inside debt does help align the executive managers’ personal incentive with firms’ value, and mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and debt holders. This study provides significant empirical evidence to support the theory suggested by Edmans and Liu (2011) that CEOs with higher level of inside debt holdings do care a greater deal about the asset liquidation value of the firm, and these firms tend to invest more in tangible assets to preserve the liquidation value.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132875697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Project Characteristics, Incentives and Team Production 项目特征、激励与团队生产
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-11-19 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2137
Richard Fu, Ajay Subramanian, Anand Venkateswaran
{"title":"Project Characteristics, Incentives and Team Production","authors":"Richard Fu, Ajay Subramanian, Anand Venkateswaran","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2014.2137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2137","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model to show how agency conflicts, free-rider effects, and monitoring costs interact to affect optimal team size and workers’ incentive contracts. Team size increases with project risk, decreases with profitability, and decreases with monitoring costs as a proportion of output. Our predictions are consistent with empirical evidence that firm-specific risk has increased over time, average corporate earnings have declined, and firms’ organizational structures have also flattened. The predicted effects of monitoring costs on team size are supported by evidence that improvements in information technology likely to lower monitoring costs lead to larger teams. Further, firms with relatively more intangible assets, where monitoring costs are likely to be higher, are smaller. Optimal incentive intensities decrease with risk and increase with profitability. The endogenous determination of team size accentuates the positive effects of a decline in risk and an increase in profitability on incentives. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"287 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114548747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
University President Compensation: Evidence from the United States 大学校长薪酬:来自美国的证据
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-10-03 DOI: 10.5539/HES.V4N6P1
Ge Bai
{"title":"University President Compensation: Evidence from the United States","authors":"Ge Bai","doi":"10.5539/HES.V4N6P1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5539/HES.V4N6P1","url":null,"abstract":"I examine whether compensation of the university president is a function of university type (i.e., top, research, master’s, bachelor’s/specialized). Using a panel dataset containing 761 private universities in the United States, I find that (i) the president’s pay is linked to the university's performance in the previous period and (ii) the pattern of pay for performance varies across universities of different types. Specifically, top universities’ presidents are incentivized to enhance research activities and private contributions; research universities’ presidents are incentivized to increase tuition revenue but not enrollment; master’s and bachelor’s/specialized universities’ presidents are incentivized to increase tuition revenue and expand enrollment. I do not find evidence that presidents’ pay is linked to relative performance evaluation, measured by the institution's US News & World Report ranking. I obtain these results after using a university-president pair fixed effects model that controls for unobservable university and president characteristics.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124563691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
A Review of Earnings Manipulation Literature and the Implications on Management Compensation 盈余操纵文献综述及其对管理层薪酬的启示
ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-09-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2500314
M. Wayo
{"title":"A Review of Earnings Manipulation Literature and the Implications on Management Compensation","authors":"M. Wayo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2500314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500314","url":null,"abstract":"The growth of corporations resulted in the owners (shareholders) ceding the responsibility of running these corporations under the ambit of Management. The Management is responsible for implementing the policies and decisions of the corporations taken by the owners. The paper reviewed earnings manipulation perpetrated by Management as a result of their compensation. The reviewed dealt with what earnings are, the components and measurement of earnings, what constitutes quality earnings, and the meaning of earnings manipulation.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123915248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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