首席执行官内部债务,资产有形性和投资

Ran Lu-Andrews, Yin Yu-Thompson
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引用次数: 14

摘要

目的——作者拟通过实证分析检验Edmans和Liu(2011)提出的“债务类薪酬越高的ceo越关心公司的清算价值”的理论。本文的目的是研究CEO内部负债率与有形资产(即资产有形性、清算价值和固定资产投资)之间的关系。设计/方法论/方法——作者使用普通最小二乘(OLS)同期和领先滞后回归分析。他们还使用两阶段最小二乘(2SLS)回归分析进行稳健性检查。研究发现:第一,CEO内部负债对公司资产有形性有正向影响;第二,CEO内部负债对公司清算价值有正向影响;第三,CEO内部负债对公司有形资产投资(以资本支出衡量)有正向影响;第四,这些积极影响在同期和随后的年份以及OLS和2SLS框架中都存在。该研究进一步证明,内部债务持有量较高的ceo表现出寻求安全的行为。作者为Edmans和Liu(2011)提出的理论提供了直接证据,即这些首席执行官与任何债权人一样,非常关心公司的资产有形性和清算价值。原创性/价值——本研究通过提供进一步的经验证据来支持CEO内部债务持有对公司投资决策和资本配置的影响,从而对现有文献做出了贡献。内部债务确实有助于调整高管的个人激励与公司价值,并缓解经理人与债权人之间的代理冲突。本研究为Edmans和Liu(2011)的理论提供了重要的经验证据,即内部债务持有量较高的ceo更关心企业的资产清算价值,并且这些企业倾向于更多地投资于有形资产以保持清算价值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
CEO Inside Debt, Asset Tangibility, and Investment
Purpose - – The authors intend to perform empirical analysis to test the theory proposed by Edmans and Liu (2011) that CEOs with more debt-like compensations care more about the liquidation value of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relations between CEO inside debt ratios and tangible assets (i.e. asset tangibility, liquidation value, and fixed asset investment). Design/methodology/approach - – The authors use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) contemporaneous and lead-lag regression analyses. They also use two-stage least-square (2SLS) regression analysis for robustness check. Findings - – The findings are fourfold: first, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on asset tangibility of the firm; second, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on the liquidation value of the firm; third, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on the tangible asset investment (as measured by capital expenditures) of the firm; and fourth, these positive effects are found in both the contemporaneous year and the subsequent year and in both OLS and 2SLS frameworks. The research provides further evidence that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings exhibit safety-seeking behavior. The authors document direct proof for the theory proposed by Edmans and Liu (2011) that these CEOs, like any creditors, care a great deal of the asset tangibility and liquidation value of the firm. Originality/value - – This study contributes to the existing literature by providing further empirical evidence to support that CEO inside debt holdings have impacts on firm investment decisions and capital allocations. Inside debt does help align the executive managers’ personal incentive with firms’ value, and mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and debt holders. This study provides significant empirical evidence to support the theory suggested by Edmans and Liu (2011) that CEOs with higher level of inside debt holdings do care a greater deal about the asset liquidation value of the firm, and these firms tend to invest more in tangible assets to preserve the liquidation value.
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