{"title":"University President Compensation: Evidence from the United States","authors":"Ge Bai","doi":"10.5539/HES.V4N6P1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I examine whether compensation of the university president is a function of university type (i.e., top, research, master’s, bachelor’s/specialized). Using a panel dataset containing 761 private universities in the United States, I find that (i) the president’s pay is linked to the university's performance in the previous period and (ii) the pattern of pay for performance varies across universities of different types. Specifically, top universities’ presidents are incentivized to enhance research activities and private contributions; research universities’ presidents are incentivized to increase tuition revenue but not enrollment; master’s and bachelor’s/specialized universities’ presidents are incentivized to increase tuition revenue and expand enrollment. I do not find evidence that presidents’ pay is linked to relative performance evaluation, measured by the institution's US News & World Report ranking. I obtain these results after using a university-president pair fixed effects model that controls for unobservable university and president characteristics.","PeriodicalId":228319,"journal":{"name":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: CEO & Executive Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5539/HES.V4N6P1","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
I examine whether compensation of the university president is a function of university type (i.e., top, research, master’s, bachelor’s/specialized). Using a panel dataset containing 761 private universities in the United States, I find that (i) the president’s pay is linked to the university's performance in the previous period and (ii) the pattern of pay for performance varies across universities of different types. Specifically, top universities’ presidents are incentivized to enhance research activities and private contributions; research universities’ presidents are incentivized to increase tuition revenue but not enrollment; master’s and bachelor’s/specialized universities’ presidents are incentivized to increase tuition revenue and expand enrollment. I do not find evidence that presidents’ pay is linked to relative performance evaluation, measured by the institution's US News & World Report ranking. I obtain these results after using a university-president pair fixed effects model that controls for unobservable university and president characteristics.
我考察了大学校长的薪酬是否与大学类型(即顶尖、研究型、硕士、学士/专业)有关。使用包含美国761所私立大学的面板数据集,我发现(I)校长的薪酬与大学在前一时期的表现有关,(ii)不同类型大学的绩效薪酬模式各不相同。具体来说,顶尖大学的校长被激励加强研究活动和私人捐款;研究型大学的校长受到激励,只增加学费收入,而不增加招生人数;硕士和本科/专业大学的校长被激励增加学费收入和扩大招生。我没有找到证据表明,校长的薪酬与相对绩效评估(由该机构的《美国新闻与世界报道》(US News & World Report)排名衡量)有关。我在使用大学校长对固定效应模型后得到了这些结果,该模型控制了不可观察的大学和校长特征。