Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Alex Edmans, X. Gabaix, Dirk Jenter
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引用次数: 288

Abstract

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public firms to private and non-U.S. firms. We then critically analyze three non-exclusive explanations for what drives executive pay - shareholder value maximization by boards, rent extraction by executives, and institutional factors such as regulation, taxation, and accounting policy. We confront each hypothesis with the evidence. While shareholder value maximization is consistent with many practices that initially seem inefficient, no single explanation can account for all facts and historical trends; we highlight major gaps for future research. We discuss evidence on the effects of executive pay, highlighting recent identification strategies, and suggest policy implications grounded in theoretical and empirical research. Our survey has two main goals. First, we aim to tightly link the theoretical literature to the empirical evidence, and combine the insights contributed by all three views on the drivers of pay. Second, we aim to provide a user-friendly guide to executive compensation, presenting shareholder value theories using a simple unifying model, and discussing the challenges and methodological issues with empirical research.
高管薪酬:理论与证据综述
本文回顾了有关高管薪酬的理论和实证文献。我们首先展示了CEO和其他高管薪酬水平的数据,以及各公司薪酬构成的变化;以及高管激励的力度。我们比较了美国上市公司与私营和非美国公司的薪酬。公司。然后,我们批判性地分析了驱动高管薪酬的三种非排他性解释——董事会的股东价值最大化,高管的租金提取,以及监管、税收和会计政策等制度因素。我们用证据来反驳每一个假设。虽然股东价值最大化与许多最初看起来效率低下的做法是一致的,但没有一个单一的解释可以解释所有的事实和历史趋势;我们强调了未来研究的主要空白。我们讨论了高管薪酬影响的证据,强调了最近的识别策略,并在理论和实证研究的基础上提出了政策建议。我们的调查有两个主要目标。首先,我们的目标是将理论文献与实证证据紧密联系起来,并将这三种观点对薪酬驱动因素的见解结合起来。其次,我们的目标是为高管薪酬提供一个用户友好的指南,使用一个简单的统一模型来呈现股东价值理论,并通过实证研究讨论挑战和方法问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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