Philosophy of Science and Technology最新文献_第4页

“Pure” or “useful”: the cultural status of science and the prospects for its change “纯粹”或“有用”:科学的文化地位及其变化的前景

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-52-67

S. Pirozhkova

{"title":"“Pure” or “useful”: the cultural status of science and the prospects for its change","authors":"S. Pirozhkova","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-52-67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-52-67","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the evolution of the cultural status of science by considering its history through the prism of the opposition to the ideal of pure and useful science. The purpose of the study is not to propose a new periodization of the development of the scientific tradition, but to identify the dynamics of its relationship with the cultural whole and to correct on this basis the previously obtained scenarios of the development of science as a cultural phenomenon. It is shown that science arises as a separate social practice, opposed to another type of normalized activity. The way out from under such rationing is fixed by the idea of scientific leisure as a necessary condition for scientific and philosophical knowledge. This is a model of pure science, the practical usefulness of which is not questioned. However, the very fact of the appearance of a new type of activity entails its socialization, transformation into a profession and the gradual emergence of the principle of the social utility of science. The accumulated historical experience leads to the formation in modern times of a strategy for justifying science as both existentially and ideologically valuable (through its integration into religious discourse) and practically useful. Secularization, scientific and technological progress and economic development lead to a non-religious interpretation of human history. This interpretation is characterized by the dominance of two socio-cultural myths – technological and economic. The future of science depends on whether it will be absorbed by these myths (largely generated by itself) or will be able to offer, primarily through the efforts of socio-humanitarian disciplines, an alternative project for the development of culture.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127049181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn 康德转向哥白尼的一些后果

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-46-60

T. Rockmore

引用次数: 1

Comments on the Tom Rockmore’s article “Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn” 对Tom Rockmore文章《康德哥白尼转向的一些后果》的评论

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-69-71

V. Przhilenskiy

引用次数: 0

Philosophy as a scientific discipline: subject, functions and tasks in modern context 哲学作为一门科学学科:现代语境中的主体、功能和任务

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-84-98

S. Pirozhkova

{"title":"Philosophy as a scientific discipline: subject, functions and tasks in modern context","authors":"S. Pirozhkova","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-84-98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-84-98","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes philosophy as a part of the modern system of scientific knowledge in Russia, reconstructs basic arguments against the recognizing philosophy as a scientific discipline, distinguishes between philosophers and non-philosophers criticism of philosophy scientificity, shows that while the former consider philosophy as an intellectual activity which is superior to science in its functionality, the latter, by contrast, regard it as unable to meet the basic criteria of scientific knowledge. Based on the reconstruction of the evolution of theoretical knowledge, it is shown that if the core and model of modern science is theoretical natural science, which allows to obtain universal theoretical knowledge, providing it with empirical content through procedures of empirical interpretation and testing, then philosophy is a form of theoretical knowledge, that cannot be subjected to the same rigorous procedures of establishing empirical content. However, this fact only proves to be a problem if philosophy claims to study the same objects that empirical disciplines study. Such a claim was proclaimed by the program of Soviet scientific philosophy, and it was questioned in Soviet philosophy as well. It is argued that the subject of philosophy as a scientific discipline is thinking and its forms, tools, and results – not cognitive activity, but human activity, objectified in language, conceptual and figurative representations, cultural and social practices, and institutions, including science. Thus, science incorporating philosophy into its structure acquires the possibility to make not just itself (it is also possible within, for example, the framework of science studies), but its own boundaries and foundations the object of cognition. This opens the prospect for science to design its own development more effectively, while understanding science as a human enterprise and ensuring its humanistic orientation.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115583474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Philosophy, activity, life 哲学，活动，人生

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45

D. Bakhurst

{"title":"Philosophy, activity, life","authors":"D. Bakhurst","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, written to honor Prof. Vladislav Lektorsky on the occasion of his 90th birthday, addresses a subject to which Lektorsky has returned many times in the course of his long and distinguished career: the concept of activity. I begin with the distinction between activity and action, arguing against the view, associated with Leontiev, that actions are components of activities. In my view, the distinction between activity and action is an aspectual rather than ontological or mereological one. I then draw on the analysis of intentional action offered by G.E.M. Anscombe to argue that her understanding of action, intention and practical knowledge, when supplemented by insights from MacIntyre, McDowell and others, provides grounds to endorse three theses central to the activity approach (theses I find in Prof. Lektorsky’s recent summation of the tradition): that (i) consciousness, the inner plane of our mental lives, can be understood only in relation to the forms of our activity as embodied beings; (ii) human agency and behavior cannot be described or explained without essential reference to the social, cultural and historical context; and (iii) selves or persons are constituted in and through their activity. I then consider the objection that my analysis is too focused on the intentional activities of the individual, at the expense of the collective. I reply that the unit of analysis is neither the individual nor the collective, but the human life form. There is plenty of room, as there must be, for countenancing joint, shared and collective intentionality, and for recognizing that individuals and collectives do many things unintentionally. But no sense can be made of any of that without a robust account of intentional action. I believe my findings are congenial to three themes that characterize the legacy of Vladislav Lektorsky: (i) respect for the phenomenology of everyday thought and experience; (ii) humanism; and (iii) the belief that much is to be gained by bringing Russian philosophy into constructive dialogue with fruitful trends in Anglo-American philosophy.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114753310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Scientific activity of the State Optical Institute during the war years (Yoshkar-Ola period): from the history of physics science 战争年代(尤什卡尔-奥拉时期)国家光学研究所的科学活动:从物理学科学史看

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-149-162

I. V. Krechetova, L. V. Tselishcheva

引用次数: 0

Beyond the coincidental fine-tuning of the universe: The ontology of Essential Time 超越宇宙的巧合微调:基本时间的本体论

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-145-158

Ahmed Siddiqui Naseeb

{"title":"Beyond the coincidental fine-tuning of the universe: The ontology of Essential Time","authors":"Ahmed Siddiqui Naseeb","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-145-158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-145-158","url":null,"abstract":"The first part of this research discussed a theoretical framework of a new theory of time which was systematically proposed, developed and defended. Time was exposed to a natural categorization that calls forth two different real times; Existential and Essential. The current paper which is the conclusion of the research deals with the ontological dimension of Essential time. Contrary to the fine-tuning of physical constants of the universe by coincidence, this article tries to establish that “coincidence” in itself depends on time. The Essential time provides a timeline of creation which starts from absolute uniformity to dis-uniform universe and coincidence is planned. Hence, essential time is uniform, formless and powerful to facilitate the creation of the universe by forming dis-uniformity to everything that was uniform. The question that why essential time is able to do that and what is the source to trigger dis-uniformity brings the discussion to the ontology of essential time. This ontological being in essential time will be proved by two premises. The article argues that why the interpretation based on essential time must be considered instead of “coincidences” of modern science, “Demiurge” of Plato and “unmoved mover” of Aristotle to explain the final cause of the universe. By doing so the fundamental flaw in the anthropic principle is revealed and argued that it does not present a convincing answer to the “why” question of the universe. The combinations of scientific, philosophical and metaphysical arguments establish a conclusive interpretation about the ontological being in essential time without any deviation from the universal facts of the universe. This might end the creation dilemma which is, why did the universe come into existence.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123222758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Nikolay N. Semyonov: a prophet and a tamer of fire and atom energy 尼古拉·n·谢苗诺夫:先知，火与原子能的驯服者

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-151-158

K. Dolgov

引用次数: 0

The collective subject in complex human-dimensional systems: intelligence or the sum of technologies? 复杂的人类维度系统中的集体主体:智能还是技术的总和?

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-122-130

E. Nikitina

引用次数: 1

Page from the history of philosophical problems of physics in the USSR: Eduard Fritsevich Lepin (1893‒1937) 苏联物理学哲学问题史上的一页:爱德华·弗里茨维奇·勒平(1893-1937)

Philosophy of Science and Technology Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-76-89

S. Korsakov

引用次数: 0