哲学,活动,人生

D. Bakhurst
{"title":"哲学,活动,人生","authors":"D. Bakhurst","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper, written to honor Prof. Vladislav Lektorsky on the occasion of his 90th birthday, addresses a subject to which Lektorsky has returned many times in the course of his long and distinguished career: the concept of activity. I begin with the distinction between activity and action, arguing against the view, associated with Leontiev, that actions are components of activities. In my view, the distinction between activity and action is an aspectual rather than ontological or mereological one. I then draw on the analysis of intentional action offered by G.E.M. Anscombe to argue that her understanding of action, intention and practical knowledge, when supplemented by insights from MacIntyre, McDowell and others, provides grounds to endorse three theses central to the activity approach (theses I find in Prof. Lektorsky’s recent summation of the tradition): that (i) consciousness, the inner plane of our mental lives, can be understood only in relation to the forms of our activity as embodied beings; (ii) human agency and behavior cannot be described or explained without essential reference to the social, cultural and historical context; and (iii) selves or persons are constituted in and through their activity. I then consider the objection that my analysis is too focused on the intentional activities of the individual, at the expense of the collective. I reply that the unit of analysis is neither the individual nor the collective, but the human life form. There is plenty of room, as there must be, for countenancing joint, shared and collective intentionality, and for recognizing that individuals and collectives do many things unintentionally. But no sense can be made of any of that without a robust account of intentional action. I believe my findings are congenial to three themes that characterize the legacy of Vladislav Lektorsky: (i) respect for the phenomenology of everyday thought and experience; (ii) humanism; and (iii) the belief that much is to be gained by bringing Russian philosophy into constructive dialogue with fruitful trends in Anglo-American philosophy.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"184 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Philosophy, activity, life\",\"authors\":\"D. Bakhurst\",\"doi\":\"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper, written to honor Prof. Vladislav Lektorsky on the occasion of his 90th birthday, addresses a subject to which Lektorsky has returned many times in the course of his long and distinguished career: the concept of activity. I begin with the distinction between activity and action, arguing against the view, associated with Leontiev, that actions are components of activities. In my view, the distinction between activity and action is an aspectual rather than ontological or mereological one. I then draw on the analysis of intentional action offered by G.E.M. Anscombe to argue that her understanding of action, intention and practical knowledge, when supplemented by insights from MacIntyre, McDowell and others, provides grounds to endorse three theses central to the activity approach (theses I find in Prof. Lektorsky’s recent summation of the tradition): that (i) consciousness, the inner plane of our mental lives, can be understood only in relation to the forms of our activity as embodied beings; (ii) human agency and behavior cannot be described or explained without essential reference to the social, cultural and historical context; and (iii) selves or persons are constituted in and through their activity. I then consider the objection that my analysis is too focused on the intentional activities of the individual, at the expense of the collective. I reply that the unit of analysis is neither the individual nor the collective, but the human life form. There is plenty of room, as there must be, for countenancing joint, shared and collective intentionality, and for recognizing that individuals and collectives do many things unintentionally. But no sense can be made of any of that without a robust account of intentional action. I believe my findings are congenial to three themes that characterize the legacy of Vladislav Lektorsky: (i) respect for the phenomenology of everyday thought and experience; (ii) humanism; and (iii) the belief that much is to be gained by bringing Russian philosophy into constructive dialogue with fruitful trends in Anglo-American philosophy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":227944,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Science and Technology\",\"volume\":\"184 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Science and Technology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-31-45","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇论文是为了纪念弗拉迪斯拉夫·列克托尔斯基教授90岁生日而写的,它涉及了列克托尔斯基在其漫长而杰出的职业生涯中多次回归的主题:活动的概念。我从活动和行动的区别开始,反驳莱昂惕夫的观点,即行动是活动的组成部分。在我看来,活动和行动之间的区别是一个方面,而不是本体论或流变论的区别。然后,我借鉴了G.E.M. Anscombe对有意行为的分析,认为她对行为、意图和实践知识的理解,加上麦金太尔、麦克道尔和其他人的见解,为支持活动方法的三个核心论点提供了依据(我在Lektorsky教授最近对传统的总结中找到了这些论点):(1)意识,即我们精神生活的内在层面,只能与我们作为具体存在的活动形式联系起来理解;(ii)人类的能动性和行为不能在没有社会、文化和历史背景的情况下被描述或解释;(iii)自我或个人在其活动中并通过其活动而构成。然后我考虑反对意见,即我的分析过于关注个人的有意活动,而牺牲了集体。我回答说,分析的单位既不是个人也不是集体,而是人类的生命形式。在支持共同的、共有的和集体的意向性,以及承认个人和集体无意地做许多事情方面,有很大的空间,这是必须有的。但是,如果没有对有意行为的有力解释,这些都是没有意义的。我相信我的发现与弗拉季斯拉夫·列克托斯基遗产的三个主题是一致的:(1)尊重日常思想和经验的现象学;(2)人文主义;(三)相信将俄国哲学与富有成果的英美哲学趋势进行建设性对话将大有裨益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Philosophy, activity, life
This paper, written to honor Prof. Vladislav Lektorsky on the occasion of his 90th birthday, addresses a subject to which Lektorsky has returned many times in the course of his long and distinguished career: the concept of activity. I begin with the distinction between activity and action, arguing against the view, associated with Leontiev, that actions are components of activities. In my view, the distinction between activity and action is an aspectual rather than ontological or mereological one. I then draw on the analysis of intentional action offered by G.E.M. Anscombe to argue that her understanding of action, intention and practical knowledge, when supplemented by insights from MacIntyre, McDowell and others, provides grounds to endorse three theses central to the activity approach (theses I find in Prof. Lektorsky’s recent summation of the tradition): that (i) consciousness, the inner plane of our mental lives, can be understood only in relation to the forms of our activity as embodied beings; (ii) human agency and behavior cannot be described or explained without essential reference to the social, cultural and historical context; and (iii) selves or persons are constituted in and through their activity. I then consider the objection that my analysis is too focused on the intentional activities of the individual, at the expense of the collective. I reply that the unit of analysis is neither the individual nor the collective, but the human life form. There is plenty of room, as there must be, for countenancing joint, shared and collective intentionality, and for recognizing that individuals and collectives do many things unintentionally. But no sense can be made of any of that without a robust account of intentional action. I believe my findings are congenial to three themes that characterize the legacy of Vladislav Lektorsky: (i) respect for the phenomenology of everyday thought and experience; (ii) humanism; and (iii) the belief that much is to be gained by bringing Russian philosophy into constructive dialogue with fruitful trends in Anglo-American philosophy.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信