2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium最新文献_第3页

A Hybrid Approach for Proving Noninterference of Java Programs 证明Java程序不干扰性的混合方法

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.28

Ralf Küsters, Tomasz Truderung, Bernhard Beckert, Daniel Grahl, Michael Kirsten, Martin Mohr

{"title":"A Hybrid Approach for Proving Noninterference of Java Programs","authors":"Ralf Küsters, Tomasz Truderung, Bernhard Beckert, Daniel Grahl, Michael Kirsten, Martin Mohr","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.28","url":null,"abstract":"Several tools and approaches for proving non-interference properties for Java and other languages exist. Some of them have a high degree of automation or are even fully automatic, but over approximate the actual information flow, and hence, may produce false positives. Other tools, such as those based on theorem proving, are precise, but may need interaction, and hence, analysis is time-consuming. In this paper, we propose a hybrid approach that aims at obtaining the best of both approaches: We want to use fully automatic analysis as much as possible and only at places in a program where, due to over approximation, the automatic approaches fail, we resort to more precise, but interactive analysis, where the latter involves the verification only of specific functional properties in certain parts of the program, rather than checking more intricate non-interference properties for the whole program. To illustrate the hybrid approach, in a case study we use this approach - along with the fully automatic tool Joana for checking non-interference properties for Java programs and the theorem prover KeY for the verification of Java programs - as well as the CVJ framework proposed by Kuesters, Truderung, and Graf to establish cryptographic privacy properties for a non-trivial Java program, namely an e-voting system. The CVJ framework allows one to establish cryptographic indistinguishability properties for Java programs by checking (standard) non-interference properties for such programs.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"132 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123166796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 30

On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining 论分布式计算中的权力分裂博弈:以比特币池挖矿为例

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.34

Loi Luu, R. Saha, Inian Parameshwaran, P. Saxena, Aquinas Hobor

{"title":"On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining","authors":"Loi Luu, R. Saha, Inian Parameshwaran, P. Saxena, Aquinas Hobor","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.34","url":null,"abstract":"Several new services incentivize clients to compete in solving large computation tasks in exchange for financial rewards. This model of competitive distributed computation enables every user connected to the Internet to participate in a game in which he splits his computational power among a set of competing pools -- the game is called a computational power splitting game. We formally model this game and show its utility in analyzing the security of pool protocols that dictate how financial rewards are shared among the members of a pool. As a case study, we analyze the Bitcoin crypto currency which attracts computing power roughly equivalent to billions of desktop machines, over 70% of which is organized into public pools. We show that existing pool reward sharing protocols are insecure in our game-theoretic analysis under an attack strategy called the \"block withholding attack\". This attack is a topic of debate, initially thought to be ill-incentivized in today's pool protocols: i.e., causing a net loss to the attacker, and later argued to be always profitable. Our analysis shows that the attack is always well-incentivized in the long-run, but may not be so for a short duration. This implies that existing pool protocols are insecure, and if the attack is conducted systematically, Bitcoin pools could lose millions of dollars worth in months. The equilibrium state is a mixed strategy -- that is -- in equilibrium all clients are incentivized to probabilistically attack to maximize their payoffs rather than participate honestly. As a result, the Bitcoin network is incentivized to waste a part of its resources simply to compete.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131303267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 152

Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-party Computation Protocols against Active Adversaries 针对主动对手的安全多方计算协议的隐私性自动证明

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.13

Martin Pettai, Peeter Laud

引用次数: 28

Cryptographic Enforcement of Language-Based Information Erasure 基于语言的信息擦除的加密执行

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.30

Aslan Askarov, Scott Moore, Christos Dimoulas, Stephen Chong

{"title":"Cryptographic Enforcement of Language-Based Information Erasure","authors":"Aslan Askarov, Scott Moore, Christos Dimoulas, Stephen Chong","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.30","url":null,"abstract":"Information erasure is a formal security requirement that stipulates when sensitive data must be removed from computer systems. In a system that correctly enforces erasure requirements, an attacker who observes the system after sensitive data is required to have been erased cannot deduce anything about the data. Practical obstacles to enforcing information erasure include: (1) correctly determining which data requires erasure, and (2) reliably deleting potentially large volumes of data, despite untrustworthy storage services. In this paper, we present a novel formalization of language-based information erasure that supports cryptographic enforcement of erasure requirements: sensitive data is encrypted before storage, and upon erasure, only a relatively small set of decryption keys needs to be deleted. This cryptographic technique has been used by a number of systems that implement data deletion to allow the use of untrustworthy storage services. However, these systems provide no support to correctly determine which data requires erasure, nor have the formal semantic properties of these systems been explained or proven to hold. We address these shortcomings. Specifically, we study a programming language extended with primitives for public-key cryptography, and demonstrate how information-flow control mechanisms can automatically track data that requires erasure and provably enforce erasure requirements even when programs employ cryptographic techniques for erasure.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130531688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

A Mechanized Proof of Security for Searchable Symmetric Encryption 可搜索对称加密的机械化安全性证明

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.36

Adam Petcher, Greg Morrisett

引用次数: 11

Android Permissions Unleashed Android权限释放

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.29

A. Armando, R. Carbone, Gabriele Costa, A. Merlo

引用次数: 15

Policy Privacy in Cryptographic Access Control 密码访问控制中的策略隐私

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.11

A. L. Ferrara, G. Fuchsbauer, Bin Liu, B. Warinschi

{"title":"Policy Privacy in Cryptographic Access Control","authors":"A. L. Ferrara, G. Fuchsbauer, Bin Liu, B. Warinschi","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.11","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptographic access control offers selective access to encrypted data via a combination of key management and functionality-rich cryptographic schemes, such as attribute-based encryption. Using this approach, publicly available meta-data may inadvertently leak information on the access policy that is enforced by cryptography, which renders cryptographic access control unusable in settings where this information is highly sensitive. We begin to address this problem by presenting rigorous definitions for policy privacy in cryptographic access control. For concreteness we set our results in the model of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), where we identify and formalize several different flavors of privacy, however, our framework should serve as inspiration for other models of access control. Based on our insights we propose a new system which significantly improves on the privacy properties of state-of-the-art constructions. Our design is based on a novel type of privacy-preserving attribute-based encryption, which we introduce and show how to instantiate. We present our results in the context of a cryptographic RBAC system by Ferrara et al. (CSF'13), which uses cryptography to control read access to files, while write access is still delegated to trusted monitors. We give an extension of the construction that permits cryptographic control over write access. Our construction assumes that key management uses out-of-band channels between the policy enforcer and the users but eliminates completely the need for monitoring read/write access to the data.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127420259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

A Game-Theoretic Study on Non-monetary Incentives in Data Analytics Projects with Privacy Implications 涉及隐私的数据分析项目中非货币激励的博弈论研究

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-05-10 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.14

Michela Chessa, Jens Grossklags, P. Loiseau

{"title":"A Game-Theoretic Study on Non-monetary Incentives in Data Analytics Projects with Privacy Implications","authors":"Michela Chessa, Jens Grossklags, P. Loiseau","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.14","url":null,"abstract":"The amount of personal information contributed by individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers unprecedented opportunities for data analytics research in various domains of societal importance including medicine and public policy. The results of these analyses can be considered a public good which benefits data contributors as well as individuals who are not making their data available. At the same time, the release of personal information carries perceived and actual privacy risks to the contributors. Our research addresses this problem area. In our work, we study a game-theoretic model in which individuals take control over participation in data analytics projects in two ways: 1) individuals can contribute data at a self-chosen level of precision, and 2) individuals can decide whether they want to contribute at all (or not). From the analyst's perspective, we investigate to which degree the research analyst has flexibility to set requirements for data precision, so that individuals are still willing to contribute to the project, and the quality of the estimation improves. We study this tradeoffs scenario for populations of homogeneous and heterogeneous individuals, and determine Nash equilibrium that reflect the optimal level of participation and precision of contributions. We further prove that the analyst can substantially increase the accuracy of the analysis by imposing a lower bound on the precision of the data that users can reveal.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"24 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132089942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 37

Picking vs. Guessing Secrets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 挑选与猜测秘密:博弈论分析

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-05-09 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.24

M. Khouzani, Piotr (Peter) Mardziel, C. Cid, M. Srivatsa

{"title":"Picking vs. Guessing Secrets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis","authors":"M. Khouzani, Piotr (Peter) Mardziel, C. Cid, M. Srivatsa","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.24","url":null,"abstract":"Choosing a hard-to-guess secret is a prerequisite in many security applications. Whether it is a password for user authentication or a secret key for a cryptographic primitive, picking it requires the user to trade-off usability costs with resistance against an adversary: a simple password is easier to remember but is also easier to guess, likewise, a shorter cryptographic key may require fewer computational and storage resources but it is also easier to attack. A fundamental question is how one can optimally resolve this trade-off. A big challenge is the fact that an adversary can also utilize the knowledge of such usability vs. security trade-offs to strengthen its attack. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework for analyzing the optimal trade-offs in the face of strategic adversaries. We consider two types of adversaries: those limited in their number of tries, and those that are ruled by the cost of making individual guesses. For each type, we derive the mutually-optimal decisions as Nash Equilibria, the strategically pessimistic decisions as maximin, and optimal commitments as Strong Stackelberg Equilibria of the game. We establish that when the adversaries are faced with a capped number of guesses, the user's optimal trade-off is a uniform randomization over a subset of the secret domain. On the other hand, when the attacker strategy is ruled by the cost of making individual guesses, Nash Equilibria may completely fail to provide the user with any level of security, signifying the crucial role of credible commitment for such cases. We illustrate our results using numerical examples based on real-world samples and discuss some policy implications of our work.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115700083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

The Anatomy and Facets of Dynamic Policies 动态策略的剖析和方面

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-05-08 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.16

Niklas Broberg, B. V. Delft, David Sands

引用次数: 23