Anupam Datta, D. Garg, D. Kaynar, Divya Sharma, Arunesh Sinha
{"title":"Program Actions as Actual Causes: A Building Block for Accountability","authors":"Anupam Datta, D. Garg, D. Kaynar, Divya Sharma, Arunesh Sinha","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.25","url":null,"abstract":"Protocols for tasks such as authentication, electronic voting, and secure multiparty computation ensure desirable security properties if agents follow their prescribed programs. However, if some agents deviate from their prescribed programs and a security property is violated, it is important to hold agents accountable by determining which deviations actually caused the violation. Motivated by these applications, we initiate a formal study of program actions as actual causes. Specifically, we define in an interacting program model what it means for a set of program actions to be an actual cause of a violation. We present a sound technique for establishing program actions as actual causes. We demonstrate the value of this formalism in two ways. First, we prove that violations of a specific class of safety properties always have an actual cause. Thus, our definition applies to relevant security properties. Second, we provide a cause analysis of a representative protocol designed to address weaknesses in the current public key certification infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131248309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decomposing, Comparing, and Synthesizing Access Control Expressiveness Simulations","authors":"W. C. Garrison, Adam J. Lee","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.9","url":null,"abstract":"Access control is fundamental to computer security, and has thus been the subject of extensive formal study. In particular, relative expressiveness analysis techniques have used formal mappings called simulations to explore whether one access control system is capable of emulating another, thereby comparing the expressive power of these systems. Unfortunately, the notions of expressiveness simulation that have been explored vary widely, which makes it difficult to compare results in the literature, and even leads to apparent contradictions between results. Furthermore, some notions of expressiveness simulation make use of non-determinism, and thus cannot be used to define mappings between access control systems that are useful in practical scenarios. In this work, we define the minimum set of properties for an implementable access control simulation, i.e., a deterministic \"recipe\" for using one system in place of another. We then define a wide range of properties spread across several dimensions that can be enforced on top of this minimum definition. These properties define a taxonomy that can be used to separate and compare existing notions of access control simulation, many of which were previously incomparable. We position existing notions of simulation within our properties lattice by formally proving each simulation's equivalence to a corresponding set of properties. Lastly, we take steps towards bridging the gap between theory and practice by exploring the systems implications of points within our properties lattice. This shows that relative expressive analysis is more than just a theoretical tool, and can also guide the choice of the most suitable access control system for a specific application or scenario.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121396662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, Yisroel Mirsky, Y. Elovici
{"title":"BitWhisper: Covert Signaling Channel between Air-Gapped Computers Using Thermal Manipulations","authors":"Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, Yisroel Mirsky, Y. Elovici","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.26","url":null,"abstract":"It has been assumed that the physical separation ('air-gap') of computers provides a reliable level of security, such that should two adjacent computers become compromised, the covert exchange of data between them would be impossible. In this paper, we demonstrate BitWhisper, a method of bridging the air-gap between adjacent compromised computers by using their heat emissions and built-in thermal sensors to create a covert communication channel. Our method is unique in two respects: it supports bidirectional communication, and it requires no additional dedicated peripheral hardware. We provide experimental results based on the implementation of the Bit-Whisper prototype, and examine the channel's properties and limitations. Our experiments included different layouts, with computers positioned at varying distances from one another, and several sensor types and CPU configurations (e.g., Virtual Machines). We also discuss signal modulation and communication protocols, showing how BitWhisper can be used for the exchange of data between two computers in a close proximity (positioned 0-40 cm apart) at an effective rate of 1-8 bits per hour, a rate which makes it possible to infiltrate brief commands and exfiltrate small amount of data (e.g., passwords) over the covert channel.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128564740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Cut Principle for Information Flow","authors":"J. Guttman, Paul D. Rowe","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.15","url":null,"abstract":"We view a distributed system as a graph of active locations with unidirectional channels between them, through which they pass messages. In this context, the graph structure of a system constrains the propagation of information through it. Suppose a set of channels is a cut set between an information source and a potential sink. We prove that, if there is no disclosure from the source to the cut set, then there can be no disclosure to the sink. We introduce a new formalization of partial disclosure, called blur operators, and show that the same cut property is preserved for disclosure to within a blur operator. A related compositional principle ensures limited disclosure for a class of systems that differ only beyond the cut.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122046080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Carl Tschantz, Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Jeannette M. Wing
{"title":"A Methodology for Information Flow Experiments","authors":"Michael Carl Tschantz, Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Jeannette M. Wing","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.40","url":null,"abstract":"Information flow analysis has largely focused on methods that require access to the program in question or total control over an analyzed system. We consider the case where the analyst has neither control over nor a white-box model of the analyzed system. We formalize such limited information flow analyses and study an instance of it: detecting the usage of data by websites. We reduce these problems to ones of causal inference by proving a connection between non-interference and causation. Leveraging this connection, we provide a systematic black-box methodology based on experimental science and statistical analysis. Our systematic study leads to practical advice for detecting web data usage, a previously normalized area. We illustrate these concepts with a series of experiments collecting data on the use of information by websites.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133725187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}