2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium最新文献

A Complete Characterization of Secure Human-Server Communication 安全人-服务器通信的完整表征

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.21

D. Basin, S. Radomirovic, Michael Schläpfer

引用次数: 18

Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers Du-Vote:用不受信任的计算机进行远程电子投票

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.18

Gurchetan S. Grewal, M. Ryan, Liqun Chen, Michael R. Clarkson

引用次数: 51

Probabilistic Program Modeling for High-Precision Anomaly Classification 高精度异常分类的概率程序建模

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.37

Kui Xu, D. Yao, B. Ryder, K. Tian

引用次数: 33

Decidability of Trace Equivalence for Protocols with Nonces 带有随机数的协议的迹等价的可判定性

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.19

Rémy Chrétien, V. Cortier, S. Delaune

引用次数: 31

Flow-Limited Authorization Flow-Limited授权

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.42

Owen Arden, Jed Liu, A. Myers

{"title":"Flow-Limited Authorization","authors":"Owen Arden, Jed Liu, A. Myers","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.42","url":null,"abstract":"Because information flow control mechanisms often rely on an underlying authorization mechanism, their security guarantees can be subverted by weaknesses in authorization. Conversely, the security of authorization can be subverted by information flows that leak information or that influence how authority is delegated between principals. We argue that interactions between information flow and authorization create security vulnerabilities that have not been fully identified or addressed in prior work. We explore how the security of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) is affected by three aspects of its underlying authorization mechanism: first, delegation of authority between principals, second, revocation of previously delegated authority, third, information flows created by the authorization mechanisms themselves. It is no surprise that revocation poses challenges, but we show that even delegation is problematic because it enables unauthorized downgrading. Our solution is a new security model, the Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM), which offers a new, integrated approach to authorization and information flow control. FLAM ensures robust authorization, a novel security condition for authorization queries that ensures attackers cannot influence authorization decisions or learn confidential trust relationships. We discuss our prototype implementation and its algorithm for proof search.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121822094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 35

Rational Protection against Timing Attacks 合理防范定时攻击

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.39

Goran Doychev, Boris Köpf

{"title":"Rational Protection against Timing Attacks","authors":"Goran Doychev, Boris Köpf","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.39","url":null,"abstract":"Timing attacks can effectively recover keys from cryptosystems. While they can be defeated using constant-time implementations, this defensive approach comes at the price of a performance penalty. One is hence faced with the problem of striking a balance between performance and security against timing attacks. In this paper, we propose a systematic approach for determining the optimal protection against timing attacks, on the example of cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms. Our model includes a resource-bounded timing adversary who strives to maximize the probability of key recovery, and a defender who strives to reduce the cost while maintaining a certain degree of security. We obtain the optimal protection as an equilibrium in a game between the defender and the adversary. At the heart of the equilibrium computation are novel bounds for the probability of key recovery, which are expressed as a function of the applied protection and the attack strategy of a timing adversary. We put our techniques to work in a case study in which we identify optimal protections for libgcrypt's ElGamal implementation. We determine situations in which the optimal choice is to use a defensive, constant-time implementation and a small key, and situations in which the optimal choice is a more aggressively tuned (but leaky) implementation with a longer key.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131660055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17

Value-Sensitive Hybrid Information Flow Control for a JavaScript-Like Language 用于类javascript语言的值敏感混合信息流控制

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.31

Daniel Hedin, Luciano Bello, A. Sabelfeld

{"title":"Value-Sensitive Hybrid Information Flow Control for a JavaScript-Like Language","authors":"Daniel Hedin, Luciano Bello, A. Sabelfeld","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.31","url":null,"abstract":"Secure integration of third-party code is one of the prime challenges for securing today's web. Recent empirical studies give evidence of pervasive reliance on and excessive trust in third-party JavaScript, with no adequate security mechanism to limit the trust or the extent of its abuse. Information flow control is a promising approach for controlling the behavior of third-party code and enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies. While much progress has been made on static and dynamic approaches to information flow control, only recently their combinations have received attention. Purely static analysis falls short of addressing dynamic language features such as dynamic objects and dynamic code evaluation, while purely dynamic analysis suffers from inability to predict side effects in non-performed executions. This paper develops a value-sensitive hybrid mechanism for tracking information flow in a JavaScript-like language. The mechanism consists of a dynamic monitor empowered to invoke a static component on the fly. This enables us to achieve a sound yet permissive enforcement. We establish formal soundness results with respect to the security policy of non-interference. In addition, we demonstrate permissiveness by proving that we subsume the precision of purely static analysis and by presenting a collection of common programming patterns that indicate that our mechanism has potential to provide more permissiveness than dynamic mechanisms in practice.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128670006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 35

Compositional Typed Analysis of ARBAC Policies ARBAC策略的组合类型分析

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.10

Stefano Calzavara, Alvise Rabitti, M. Bugliesi

{"title":"Compositional Typed Analysis of ARBAC Policies","authors":"Stefano Calzavara, Alvise Rabitti, M. Bugliesi","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.10","url":null,"abstract":"Model-checking is a popular approach to the security analysis of ARBAC policies, but its effectiveness is hindered by the exponential explosion of the ways in which different users can be assigned to different role combinations. In this paper we propose a paradigm shift, based on the observation that, while verifying ARBAC by exhaustive state search is complex, realistic policies often have rather simple security proofs, and we propose to use types as an effective tool to leverage this simplicity. Concretely, we present a static type system to verify the security of ARBAC policies, along with a sound and complete type inference algorithm used to automate the verification process. We then introduce compositionality results, which identify sufficient conditions to preserve the security guarantees obtained by the verification of different sub-policies when these sub-policies are combined together: this compositional reasoning is crucial when policy administration is highly distributed and naturally supports the security analysis of evolving ARBAC policies. We evaluate our approach by implementing TAPA, a static analyser for ARBAC policies based on our theory, which we test on a number of relatively large, publicly available policies from the literature.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116909738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Location Privacy via Differential Private Perturbation of Cloaking Area 隐身区域的不同私隐扰动对位置隐私的影响

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.12

Hoa T. B. Ngo, Jong Kim

{"title":"Location Privacy via Differential Private Perturbation of Cloaking Area","authors":"Hoa T. B. Ngo, Jong Kim","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.12","url":null,"abstract":"The increasing use of mobile devices has triggered the development of location based services (LBS). By providing location information to LBS, mobile users can enjoy variety of useful applications utilizing location information, but might suffer the troubles of private information leakage. Location information of mobile users needs to be kept secret while maintaining utility to achieve desirable service quality. Existing location privacy enhancing techniques based on K-anonymity and Hilbertcurve cloaking area generation showed advantages in privacy protection and service quality but disadvantages due to the generation of large cloaking areas that makes query processing and communication less effective. In this paper we propose a novel location privacy preserving scheme that leverages some differential privacy based notions and mechanisms to publish the optimal size cloaking areas from multiple rotated and shifted versions of Hilbert curve. With experimental results, we show that our scheme significantly reduces the average size of cloaking areas compared to previous Hilbert curve method. We also show how to quantify adversary's ability to perform an inference attack on user location data and how to limit adversary's success rate under a designed threshold.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115789994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 32

A Definitional Framework for Functional Encryption 功能加密的定义框架

2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium Pub Date : 2015-07-13 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2015.22

Christian Matt, U. Maurer

{"title":"A Definitional Framework for Functional Encryption","authors":"Christian Matt, U. Maurer","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2015.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2015.22","url":null,"abstract":"Functional encryption (FE) is a powerful generalization of various types of encryption. We investigate how FE can be used by a trusted authority to enforce access-control policies to data stored in an untrusted repository. Intuitively, if (functionally) encrypted data items are put in a publicly-readable repository, the effect of the encryption should be that every user has access to exactly (and only) those functions of the data items for which he has previously received the corresponding decryption key. That is, in an ideal-world view, the key authority can flexibly manage read access of users to the repository. This appears to be exactly what FE is supposed to achieve, and most natural applications of FE can be understood as specific uses of such a repository with access control. However, quite surprisingly, it is unclear whether known security definitions actually achieve this goal and hence whether known FE schemes can be used in such an application. In fact, there seems to be agreement in the cryptographic community that identifying the right security definitions for FE remains open. To resolve this problem, we treat FE in the constructive cryptography framework and propose a new conventional security definition, called composable functional encryption security (CFE-security), which exactly matches the described ideal-world interpretation. This definition (and hence the described application) is shown to be unachievable in the standard model but achievable in the random oracle model. Moreover, somewhat weaker definitions, which are achievable in the standard model, can be obtained by certain operational restrictions of the ideal-world repository, making explicit how schemes satisfying such a definition can (and cannot) meaningfully be used. Finally, adequate security definitions for generalizations of FE (such as multi-input, randomized functions, malicious cipher text generation, etc.) can be obtained by straight-forward operational extensions of the repository and extracting the corresponding security definitions. This leads towards a unified treatment of the security of FE.","PeriodicalId":210917,"journal":{"name":"2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127497436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10