Psychological review最新文献

{"title":"Referential retrieval and integration in language comprehension: An electrophysiological perspective.","authors":"Noortje J Venhuizen, Harm Brouwer","doi":"10.1037/rev0000530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000530","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Referential processing is part and parcel of language comprehension, but in neurocognitive theories and models of comprehension it typically does not take center stage. Models informed by event-related potentials focus on semantic and syntactic processing in terms of the two most salient event-related potentials components, the N400 and P600, while experimental findings have implicated the Nref component-a frontal, sustained negativity-in referential processing. Extant accounts of the Nref assume it reflects processes involved in establishing reference or association at a distance, but an important open question remains how these mechanisms can be reconciled with existing neurocognitive models. We here offer a mechanistic account of referential processing grounded in retrieval-integration (RI) theory, an integrated theory of language comprehension with broad empirical coverage. On RI theory, the conceptual knowledge associated with an incoming word in context is retrieved from long-term memory (N400), and accordingly integrated into the unfolding utterance representation (P600). We here argue that word meaning is not only defined by the conceptual knowledge associated with a word, but also by its referential knowledge (its presuppositions). Whenever this referential knowledge is inconsistent with what is anticipated given the context, increased referential retrieval effort ensues (Nref). In contrast to extant accounts, we do thus not implicate the Nref in the establishment of reference itself, but instead attribute referential resolution to the integrative processes underlying the P600. The resultant referential RI theory integrates the N400, Nref, and P600 in a single model, and its predictions are consistent with extant empirical evidence on referential processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143080913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The disencapsulated mind: A premotor theory of human imagination.","authors":"Peter Ulric Tse","doi":"10.1037/rev0000535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000535","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Our premodern ancestors had perceptual, motoric, and cognitive functional domains that were modularly encapsulated. Some of these came to interact through a new type of cross-modular binding in our species. This allowed previously domain-dedicated, encapsulated motoric and sensory operators to operate on operands for which they had not evolved. Such operators could at times operate nonvolitionally, while at other times they could be governed volitionally. In particular, motoric operations that derive from the same circuits that compute hand motions for object manipulation could now be retooled for virtual manipulation in a mental workspace in the absence of any physical hand or other effector movements. I hypothesize that the creativity of human imagination and mental models is rooted in premotor simulation of sequential manipulations of objects and symbols in the mental workspace, in analogy with the premotor theory of attention, which argues that attention evolved from \"internalized\" eye movement circuitry. Overall, operator \"disencapsulation\" led to a bifurcation of consciousness in humans: a concrete form centered on perception of the body in the physical world and an abstract form focused on explanatory mental models. One of the consequences of these new abilities was the advent of psychotic disorders that do not exist in species possessed solely of the concrete type of consciousness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142954132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The theory of mind hypothesis of autism: A critical evaluation of the status quo.","authors":"Emily L Long, Caroline Catmur, Geoffrey Bird","doi":"10.1037/rev0000532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000532","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The theory of mind (ToM) hypothesis of autism is the idea that difficulties inferring the mental states of others may explain social communication difficulties in autism. In the present article, we critically evaluate existing theoretical accounts, concluding that none provides a sufficient explanation of ToM in autism. We then evaluate existing tests of ToM, identifying problems that limit the validity of the conclusions that may be drawn from them. Finally, as an example of how the identified issues may be resolved, we describe work developing a psychological account of ToM (the Mind-space framework) and a new test of ToM accuracy (the Interview Task). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142954134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"As different as fear and anxiety: Introducing the fear and anxiety model of placebo hypoalgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia.","authors":"Daryna Rubanets, Julia Badzińska, Sofiia Honcharova, Przemysław Bąbel, Elżbieta A Bajcar","doi":"10.1037/rev0000521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000521","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Research suggests that negative affective states, such as fear and anxiety that accompany placebo treatment may be considered predictors of placebo hypoalgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia. There is also data showing that the likelihood of developing nocebo hyperalgesia is related to the relatively stable tendency to experience these negative emotions. We aimed to summarize the current state-of-the-art in studies and theoretical models on the role of fear and anxiety in placebo hypoalgesia/nocebo hyperalgesia, with a clear differentiation between these emotions. The role of fear and anxiety accompanying placebo treatment in shaping placebo effects is often studied, but less attention has been given to pretreatment emotional states. We propose a model that combines knowledge from the emotional and pain paradigms with the current research on placebo hypoalgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia to present the involvement of fear and anxiety as traits, as well as pretreatment and posttreatment states of fear and anxiety to placebo effects. The main assumption of the model is that trait fear, trait anxiety, and related pretreatment affective states impact pain perception differently. Heightened fear is associated with decreased pain perception, while heightened anxiety is linked to increased pain perception. Consequently, heightened pretreatment fear may lead to reduced nocebo hyperalgesia and enhanced placebo hypoalgesia, while heightened pretreatment anxiety may result in decreased placebo hypoalgesia and increased nocebo hyperalgesia. In conclusion, we propose future research directions and clinical applications of the model. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142932153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grounding computational cognitive models.","authors":"Casimir J H Ludwig, Erik Stuchlý, Gaurav Malhotra","doi":"10.1037/rev0000533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000533","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cognitive scientists and neuroscientists are increasingly deploying computational models to develop testable theories of psychological functions and make quantitative predictions about cognition, brain activity, and behavior. Computational models are used to explain target phenomena such as experimental effects, individual, and/or population differences. They do so by relating these phenomena to the underlying components of the model that map onto distinct cognitive mechanisms. These components make up a \"cognitive state space,\" where different positions correspond to different cognitive states that produce variation in behavior. We examine the rationale and practice of such model-based inferences and argue that model-based explanations typically miss a key ingredient: They fail to explain <i>why</i> and <i>how</i> agents occupy specific positions in this space. A critical insight is that the agent's position in the state space is not fixed, but that the behavior they produce is the result of a <i>trajectory</i>. Therefore, we discuss (a) the constraints that limit movement in the state space; (b) the reasons for moving around at all (i.e., agents' objectives); and (c) the information and cognitive mechanisms that guide these movements. We review existing research practices, from experimental design to the model-based analysis of data, and through simulations we demonstrate some of the inferential pitfalls that arise when we ignore these dynamics. By bringing the agent's perspective into sharp focus, we stand to gain better and more complete explanations of the variation in cognition and behavior over time, between different environmental conditions, and between different populations or individuals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142932103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A unified neurocomputational model of prospective and retrospective timing.","authors":"Joost de Jong, Aaron R Voelker, Terrence C Stewart, Elkan G Akyürek, Chris Eliasmith, Hedderik van Rijn","doi":"10.1037/rev0000519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000519","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Time is a central dimension against which perception, action, and cognition play out. From anticipating when future events will happen to recalling how long ago previous events occurred, humans and animals are exquisitely sensitive to temporal structure. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that estimating time prospectively (i.e., in passing) is qualitatively different from estimating time in retrospect (i.e., after the event is over). Indeed, computational models that attempt to explain both prospective and retrospective timing assume a fundamental separation of their underlying processes. We, in contrast, propose a new neurocomputational model of timing, the unified temporal coding (UTC) model that unifies prospective and retrospective timing through common principles. The UTC model assumes that both stimulus and timing information are represented inside the same rolling window of input history. As a consequence, the UTC model explains a wide range of phenomena typically covered by specialized models, such as conformity to and violations of the scalar property, one-shot learning of intervals, neural responses underlying timing, timing behavior under normal and distracting conditions, common capacity limits in timing and working memory, and how timing depends on attention. Strikingly, by assuming that prospective and retrospective timing rely on the same principles and are implemented in the same neural network, a simple attentional gain mechanism can resolve the apparently paradoxical effect of cognitive load on prospective and retrospective timing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142931560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Emotion understanding as third-person appraisals: Integrating appraisal theories with developmental theories of emotion.","authors":"Tiffany Doan, Desmond C Ong, Yang Wu","doi":"10.1037/rev0000507","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000507","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Emotion understanding goes beyond recognizing emotional displays-it also involves reasoning about how people's emotions are affected by their subjective evaluations of what they experienced. Inspired by work in adults on cognitive appraisal theories of emotion, we propose a framework that can guide systematic investigations of how an adult-like, sophisticated understanding of emotion develops from infancy to adulthood. We integrate basic concepts of appraisal theories with developmental theories of emotion understanding and suggest that over development, young children construct an intuitive, theory-like understanding of other people's emotions that is structurally similar to appraisal theories. That is, children are increasingly able to evaluate other people's situations from those people's perspectives along various appraisal dimensions and use such third-person appraisals to understand those people's emotional responses to events. This \"third-person-appraisal\" framework can not only incorporate existing empirical findings but can also identify gaps in the literature, providing a guiding framework for systematically investigating the development of emotion understanding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"130-153"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An entropy modulation theory of creative exploration.","authors":"Thomas T Hills, Yoed N Kenett","doi":"10.1037/rev0000511","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000511","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Compared to individuals who are rated as less creative, higher creative individuals tend to produce ideas more quickly and with more novelty-what we call faster-and-further phenomenology. This has traditionally been explained either as supporting an associative theory-based on differences in the structure of cognitive representations-or as supporting an executive theory-based on the principle that higher creative individuals utilize cognitive control to navigate their cognitive representations differently. Though extensive research demonstrates evidence of differences in semantic structure, structural explanations are limited in their ability to formally explain faster-and-further phenomenology. At the same time, executive abilities also correlate with creativity, but formal process models explaining how they contribute to faster-and-further phenomenology are lacking. Here, we introduce entropy modulation theory which integrates structure and process-based creativity accounts. Relying on a broad set of evidence, entropy modulation theory assumes that the difference between lower and higher creative individuals lies in the executive modulation of entropy during cognitive search (e.g., memory retrieval). With retrieval targets racing to reach an activation threshold, activation magnitude and variance both independently enhance the entropy of target retrieval and increase retrieval speed, reproducing the faster-and-further phenomenology. Thus, apparent differences in semantic structure can be produced via an entropy modulating retrieval process, which tunes cognitive entropy to mediate cognitive flexibility and the exploration-exploitation trade-off. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"239-251"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142294106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Learners restrict their linguistic generalizations using preemption but not entrenchment: Evidence from artificial-language-learning studies with adults and children.","authors":"Anna Samara, Elizabeth Wonnacott, Gaurav Saxena, Ramya Maitreyee, Judit Fazekas, Ben Ambridge","doi":"10.1037/rev0000463","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000463","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A central goal of research into language acquisition is explaining how, when learners generalize to new cases, they appropriately restrict their generalizations (e.g., to avoid producing ungrammatical utterances such as <i>*the clown laughed the man;</i> \"*\" indicates an ungrammatical form). The past 30 years have seen an unresolved debate between statistical preemption and entrenchment as explanations. Under preemption, the use of a verb in a particular construction (e.g., <i>*the clown laughed the man</i>) is probabilistically blocked by hearing that other verb constructions with similar meanings only (e.g., <i>the clown made the man laugh</i>). Under entrenchment, such errors (e.g., *<i>the clown laughed the man</i>) are probabilistically blocked by hearing any utterance that includes the relevant verb (e.g., by <i>the clown made the man laugh</i> and <i>the man laughed</i>). Across five artificial-language-learning studies, we designed a training regime such that learners received evidence for the (by the relevant hypothesis) ungrammaticality of a particular unattested verb/noun + particle combination (e.g., *<i>chila</i> + <i>kem</i>; *<i>squeako</i> + <i>kem</i>) via either preemption only or entrenchment only. Across all five studies, participants in the preemption condition (as per our preregistered prediction) rated unattested verb/noun + particle combinations as less acceptable for restricted verbs/nouns, which appeared during training, than for unrestricted, novel-at-test verbs/nouns, which did not appear during training, that is, strong evidence for preemption. Participants in the entrenchment condition showed no evidence for such an effect (and in 3/5 experiments, positive evidence for the null). We conclude that a successful model of learning linguistic restrictions must instantiate competition between different forms only where they express the same (or similar) meanings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141261274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to \"One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence\" by Sarin and Cushman (2024).","authors":"","doi":"10.1037/rev0000539","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000539","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Reports an error in \"One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence\" by Arunima Sarin and Fiery Cushman (<i>Psychological Review</i>, 2024[Apr], Vol 131[3], 812-824). In the original article, the copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is \"© 2024 The Author(s),\" and the omitted disclaimer is present as: Open Access funding provided by University College London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0; http://creativecommons.org/li censes/by/4.0). This license permits copying and redistributing the work in any medium or format, as well as adapting the material for any purpose, even commercially. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2024-74001-001). Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"153"},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142971962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}