Psychological review最新文献

{"title":"Correction to \"One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence\" by Sarin and Cushman (2024).","authors":"","doi":"10.1037/rev0000539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000539","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Reports an error in \"One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence\" by Arunima Sarin and Fiery Cushman (<i>Psychological Review</i>, 2024[Apr], Vol 131[3], 812-824). In the original article, the copyright attribution was incorrectly listed, and the Creative Commons CC BY license disclaimer was incorrectly omitted from the author note. The correct copyright is \"© 2024 The Author(s),\" and the omitted disclaimer is present as: Open Access funding provided by University College London: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0; http://creativecommons.org/li censes/by/4.0). This license permits copying and redistributing the work in any medium or format, as well as adapting the material for any purpose, even commercially. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2024-74001-001). Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142971962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The disencapsulated mind: A premotor theory of human imagination.","authors":"Peter Ulric Tse","doi":"10.1037/rev0000535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000535","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Our premodern ancestors had perceptual, motoric, and cognitive functional domains that were modularly encapsulated. Some of these came to interact through a new type of cross-modular binding in our species. This allowed previously domain-dedicated, encapsulated motoric and sensory operators to operate on operands for which they had not evolved. Such operators could at times operate nonvolitionally, while at other times they could be governed volitionally. In particular, motoric operations that derive from the same circuits that compute hand motions for object manipulation could now be retooled for virtual manipulation in a mental workspace in the absence of any physical hand or other effector movements. I hypothesize that the creativity of human imagination and mental models is rooted in premotor simulation of sequential manipulations of objects and symbols in the mental workspace, in analogy with the premotor theory of attention, which argues that attention evolved from \"internalized\" eye movement circuitry. Overall, operator \"disencapsulation\" led to a bifurcation of consciousness in humans: a concrete form centered on perception of the body in the physical world and an abstract form focused on explanatory mental models. One of the consequences of these new abilities was the advent of psychotic disorders that do not exist in species possessed solely of the concrete type of consciousness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142954132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The theory of mind hypothesis of autism: A critical evaluation of the status quo.","authors":"Emily L Long, Caroline Catmur, Geoffrey Bird","doi":"10.1037/rev0000532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000532","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The theory of mind (ToM) hypothesis of autism is the idea that difficulties inferring the mental states of others may explain social communication difficulties in autism. In the present article, we critically evaluate existing theoretical accounts, concluding that none provides a sufficient explanation of ToM in autism. We then evaluate existing tests of ToM, identifying problems that limit the validity of the conclusions that may be drawn from them. Finally, as an example of how the identified issues may be resolved, we describe work developing a psychological account of ToM (the Mind-space framework) and a new test of ToM accuracy (the Interview Task). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142954134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grounding computational cognitive models.","authors":"Casimir J H Ludwig, Erik Stuchlý, Gaurav Malhotra","doi":"10.1037/rev0000533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000533","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cognitive scientists and neuroscientists are increasingly deploying computational models to develop testable theories of psychological functions and make quantitative predictions about cognition, brain activity, and behavior. Computational models are used to explain target phenomena such as experimental effects, individual, and/or population differences. They do so by relating these phenomena to the underlying components of the model that map onto distinct cognitive mechanisms. These components make up a \"cognitive state space,\" where different positions correspond to different cognitive states that produce variation in behavior. We examine the rationale and practice of such model-based inferences and argue that model-based explanations typically miss a key ingredient: They fail to explain <i>why</i> and <i>how</i> agents occupy specific positions in this space. A critical insight is that the agent's position in the state space is not fixed, but that the behavior they produce is the result of a <i>trajectory</i>. Therefore, we discuss (a) the constraints that limit movement in the state space; (b) the reasons for moving around at all (i.e., agents' objectives); and (c) the information and cognitive mechanisms that guide these movements. We review existing research practices, from experimental design to the model-based analysis of data, and through simulations we demonstrate some of the inferential pitfalls that arise when we ignore these dynamics. By bringing the agent's perspective into sharp focus, we stand to gain better and more complete explanations of the variation in cognition and behavior over time, between different environmental conditions, and between different populations or individuals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142932103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"As different as fear and anxiety: Introducing the fear and anxiety model of placebo hypoalgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia.","authors":"Daryna Rubanets, Julia Badzińska, Sofiia Honcharova, Przemysław Bąbel, Elżbieta A Bajcar","doi":"10.1037/rev0000521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000521","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Research suggests that negative affective states, such as fear and anxiety that accompany placebo treatment may be considered predictors of placebo hypoalgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia. There is also data showing that the likelihood of developing nocebo hyperalgesia is related to the relatively stable tendency to experience these negative emotions. We aimed to summarize the current state-of-the-art in studies and theoretical models on the role of fear and anxiety in placebo hypoalgesia/nocebo hyperalgesia, with a clear differentiation between these emotions. The role of fear and anxiety accompanying placebo treatment in shaping placebo effects is often studied, but less attention has been given to pretreatment emotional states. We propose a model that combines knowledge from the emotional and pain paradigms with the current research on placebo hypoalgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia to present the involvement of fear and anxiety as traits, as well as pretreatment and posttreatment states of fear and anxiety to placebo effects. The main assumption of the model is that trait fear, trait anxiety, and related pretreatment affective states impact pain perception differently. Heightened fear is associated with decreased pain perception, while heightened anxiety is linked to increased pain perception. Consequently, heightened pretreatment fear may lead to reduced nocebo hyperalgesia and enhanced placebo hypoalgesia, while heightened pretreatment anxiety may result in decreased placebo hypoalgesia and increased nocebo hyperalgesia. In conclusion, we propose future research directions and clinical applications of the model. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142932153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A unified neurocomputational model of prospective and retrospective timing.","authors":"Joost de Jong, Aaron R Voelker, Terrence C Stewart, Elkan G Akyürek, Chris Eliasmith, Hedderik van Rijn","doi":"10.1037/rev0000519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000519","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Time is a central dimension against which perception, action, and cognition play out. From anticipating when future events will happen to recalling how long ago previous events occurred, humans and animals are exquisitely sensitive to temporal structure. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that estimating time prospectively (i.e., in passing) is qualitatively different from estimating time in retrospect (i.e., after the event is over). Indeed, computational models that attempt to explain both prospective and retrospective timing assume a fundamental separation of their underlying processes. We, in contrast, propose a new neurocomputational model of timing, the unified temporal coding (UTC) model that unifies prospective and retrospective timing through common principles. The UTC model assumes that both stimulus and timing information are represented inside the same rolling window of input history. As a consequence, the UTC model explains a wide range of phenomena typically covered by specialized models, such as conformity to and violations of the scalar property, one-shot learning of intervals, neural responses underlying timing, timing behavior under normal and distracting conditions, common capacity limits in timing and working memory, and how timing depends on attention. Strikingly, by assuming that prospective and retrospective timing rely on the same principles and are implemented in the same neural network, a simple attentional gain mechanism can resolve the apparently paradoxical effect of cognitive load on prospective and retrospective timing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142931560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The role of expectancy in Pavlovian conditioning.","authors":"Peter F Lovibond, R Frederick Westbrook","doi":"10.1037/rev0000516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000516","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A review of Pavlovian conditioning in animals and humans reveals a critical role for expectancy in the learning of an association between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US), as well as in the expression of this association in a conditioned response (CR). The automatic and involuntary nature of CRs has traditionally been explained in terms of the formation of excitatory or inhibitory links between representations of the CS and US. However, this view has difficulty accounting for the variety of CRs that are observed, some qualitatively different from those elicited by the US, depending on the imminence of the predicted US and the nature of the CS. Furthermore, in humans, the same anticipatory responses are seen when the CS-US relationship is instructed rather than experienced and when the imminent occurrence of the US is directly instructed, without a mediating CS. These findings suggest an alternative explanation in which CRs are anticipatory responses elicited automatically by a specific state of expectancy of the US. The similarity between Pavlovian conditioning in animals and humans in turn suggests a continuity of core mechanisms for learning and performance. We conclude that research and theory in Pavlovian conditioning should go beyond the search for direct CS-US connections and seek to understand the mechanisms that underlie CS-US contingency knowledge, expectancy states, and the generation of anticipatory responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A spiking neural model of decision making and the speed-accuracy trade-off.","authors":"Peter Duggins, Chris Eliasmith","doi":"10.1037/rev0000520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000520","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) is the tendency for fast decisions to come at the expense of accurate performance. Evidence accumulation models such as the drift diffusion model can reproduce a variety of behavioral data related to the SAT, and their parameters have been linked to neural activities in the brain. However, our understanding of how biological neural networks realize the associated cognitive operations remains incomplete, limiting our ability to unify neurological and computational accounts of the SAT. We address this gap by developing and analyzing a biologically plausible spiking neural network that extends the drift diffusion approach. We apply our model to both perceptual and nonperceptual tasks, investigate several contextual manipulations, and validate model performance using neural and behavioral data. Behaviorally, we find that our model (a) reproduces individual response time distributions; (b) generalizes across experimental contexts, including the number of choice alternatives, speed- or accuracy-emphasis, and task difficulty; and (c) predicts accuracy data, despite being fit only to response time data. Neurally, we show that our model (a) recreates observed patterns of spiking neural activity and (b) captures age-related deficits that are consistent with the behavioral data. More broadly, our model exhibits the SAT across a variety of tasks and contexts and explains how individual differences in speed and accuracy arise from synaptic weights within a spiking neural network. Our work showcases a method for translating mathematical models into functional neural networks and demonstrates that simulating such networks permits analyses and predictions that are outside the scope of purely mathematical models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Object substitution pretense reflects a general capacity to interpret objects as symbols.","authors":"Barbu Revencu","doi":"10.1037/rev0000523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000523","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Nonlinguistic external representations, such as diagrams, animations, or puppet shows, involve local relations between a perceptually available object (a symbol) and an entity that is relevant in the current communicative context (a discourse referent). By analyzing the empirical evidence on early pretend play, I argue that object substitution pretense can be fully accounted for if it is conceived of as a subspecies of external representation. This implies that the capacity to interpret objects as symbols emerges early and reliably in human ontogeny. I discuss several accounts of pretend play and related phenomena and argue that the current proposal provides a better and more general account of early symbolic understanding than alternative views. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The development of kind concepts: Insights from object individuation.","authors":"Jenna Croteau, Erik Cheries, Fei Xu","doi":"10.1037/rev0000527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000527","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Object individuation studies have been a valuable tool in understanding the development of kind concepts. In this article, we review evidence from object individuation paradigms to argue that by their first birthday, infants represent at least three superordinate-level sortal kinds: OBJECT, ANIMATE, and AGENT (possibly also ARTIFACT). These superordinate sortal-kind concepts share key characteristics of adult kind concepts, such as prioritizing causal properties and having inductive potential. We then discuss the implications of this body of research. First, we discuss how the early development of these sortal-kind concepts (i.e., OBJECT, ANIMATE, and AGENT) relate to the two major theories of concepts: core knowledge and psychological essentialism. Second, we suggest that superordinate kind concepts set the stage for later development of basic-level kind concepts and present evidence that human communication, either in the form of language or pedagogical demonstration, plays a key role in constructing basic-level kinds. Third, we compare feature-based versus kind-based object individuation studies and put forth the hypothesis that they may reflect two modes of construal theory. Last, we discuss several open theoretical and empirical questions about sortal-kind concepts and suggest directions for future research. Overall, our review underscores the importance of object individuation methods as a powerful research tool for investigating the development of kind concepts, mechanisms of learning, and the relationship between language and thoughts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142818980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}