Tianwei Gong, M Pacer, Thomas L Griffiths, Neil R Bramley
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We work within the Bayesian rational analysis tradition, starting by considering how causal relations induce dependence between events in continuous time and how this can be modeled by stochastic processes from the Poisson-Gamma distribution family. We derive the qualitative signatures of causal influence and the general computations needed to infer structure from temporal patterns. We show that this rational account can parsimoniously explain the human preference for causal models that invoke shorter, more reliable, and more predictable causal influences. Furthermore, we show this provides a unifying explanation for human judgments across a wide variety of tasks in the reanalysis of seven experimental data sets. We anticipate the framework will help researchers better understand the many manifestations of continuous-time causal learning across human cognition and the tasks that probe it, from explicit causal structure induction settings to implicit associative or reinforcement learning settings. 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We anticipate the framework will help researchers better understand the many manifestations of continuous-time causal learning across human cognition and the tasks that probe it, from explicit causal structure induction settings to implicit associative or reinforcement learning settings. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
长期以来,因果学习文献的焦点一直是从偶然事件中推断因果关系,这些偶然事件通过整理独立的实例或通过定期划分的试验汇总来抽象时间。相反,个体因果学习者在日常生活中遇到的事件发生在一个连续的时间流中,没有这样的界限。因此,在自然环境中学习因果关系的过程相对较少被理解。在这篇文章中,我们提出了一个合理的框架,突出了时间在因果学习中的作用。我们在贝叶斯理性分析传统中工作,首先考虑因果关系如何诱导连续时间事件之间的依赖关系,以及如何通过泊松-伽马分布族的随机过程来建模。我们推导出因果影响的定性特征和从时间模式推断结构所需的一般计算。我们表明,这种理性的解释可以简洁地解释人类对因果模型的偏好,这些因果模型调用更短、更可靠、更可预测的因果影响。此外,我们表明,这为重新分析七个实验数据集的各种任务中的人类判断提供了统一的解释。我们预计该框架将帮助研究人员更好地理解人类认知中连续时间因果学习的许多表现形式,以及探究它的任务,从显性因果结构归纳设置到内隐联想或强化学习设置。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA,版权所有)。
A longstanding focus in the causal learning literature has been on inferring causal relations from contingencies, where these abstract away from time by collating independent instances or by aggregating over regularly demarcated trials. In contrast, individual causal learners encounter events in their daily lives that occur in a continuous temporal flow with no such demarcation. Consequently, the process of learning causal relationships in naturalistic environments is comparatively less understood. In this article, we lay out a rational framework that foregrounds the role of time in causal learning. We work within the Bayesian rational analysis tradition, starting by considering how causal relations induce dependence between events in continuous time and how this can be modeled by stochastic processes from the Poisson-Gamma distribution family. We derive the qualitative signatures of causal influence and the general computations needed to infer structure from temporal patterns. We show that this rational account can parsimoniously explain the human preference for causal models that invoke shorter, more reliable, and more predictable causal influences. Furthermore, we show this provides a unifying explanation for human judgments across a wide variety of tasks in the reanalysis of seven experimental data sets. We anticipate the framework will help researchers better understand the many manifestations of continuous-time causal learning across human cognition and the tasks that probe it, from explicit causal structure induction settings to implicit associative or reinforcement learning settings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍:
Psychological Review publishes articles that make important theoretical contributions to any area of scientific psychology, including systematic evaluation of alternative theories.