{"title":"The Fragmentation of Felt Time","authors":"Carla Merino-Rajme","doi":"10.3998/phimp.2121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2121","url":null,"abstract":"Why does time seem to fly by when we are absorbed? The case of listening to music is of particular interest, given that listening to music itself requires experiencing time. In this paper, I argue that neither the prevailing psychological model nor some initially appealing alternative explanations can account for the experience of time flying by in cases where, like listening to music, the activity we are absorbed in itself requires experiencing time. I then put forward a novel view on which the fragmentation of felt time is what best explains these cases. More specifically, I develop a view on which attentive engagement fragments felt time such that we experience the activity we are engaged in as if it is located in a temporally isolated branch or fragment of the main timeline. Time then seems to pass only in this branch, creating the sensation — upon integration — that less time has passed in the main timeline. In support of this proposal, I draw upon ideas in the empirical literature, and I suggest some underlying neuropsychological mechanisms that might serve to implement the model. I then extend the fragmentation model to cases where thinking about time makes it feel as though more of it passes. I end the paper by examining the possibility that an analogous model holds for the case of space.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44543609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"My Delicate Taste: Aesthetic Deference Revisited","authors":"Iskra Fileva","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1523","url":null,"abstract":"Pessimistsabout aesthetic testimony argue that it is inappropriate to rely on otherpeople’s aesthetic judgments in forming our own aesthetic beliefs. Some suggestthat such reliance violates an epistemic norm, others – that it violates anon-epistemic norm. In making their case, pessimists offer several arguments.They also put forward cases meant to elicit pessimist intuitions. In thispaper, I claim that none of the main pessimist arguments succeeds against aplausible version of optimism, that is, the view that reliance on testimony inaesthetic matters is appropriate. However, I suggest also that pessimistintuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second taskis to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on theirsource. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47886417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cavendish’s Aesthetic Realism","authors":"Daniel Whiting","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1538","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1538","url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a new interpretation of Margaret Cavendish’s remarks on beauty. According to it, Cavendish takes beauty to be a real, response-independent quality of objects. In this sense, Cavendish is an aesthetic realist. In broad outline, I argue, this position remains constant throughout her writings. While there are passages in Cavendish’s work that might seem to count against this reading—specifically, passages on disagreement in aesthetic judgement, on the power of beauty to elicit the passions, and on our inability to specify the nature of beauty—I show that, when situated against the background of Cavendish’s broader metaphysical views, those passages in fact support the realist interpretation.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46510849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trouble on the Horizon for Presentism","authors":"Sam Baron, B. Le Bihan","doi":"10.3998/phimp.823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.823","url":null,"abstract":"Surface presentism is the combination of a general relativistic physics with a presentist metaphysics. In this paper, we provide an argument against this combination based on black holes. The problem focuses on the notion of an event horizon. We argue that the present locations of event horizons are ontologically dependent on future black hole regions, and that this dependence is incompatible with presentism. We consider five responses to the problem available to the surface presentist, and argue that none succeed. Surface presentism thus faces the prospect of empirical refutation based on the evidence available for the existence of black holes.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42931950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Just As Planned: Bayesianism, Externalism, and Plan Coherence","authors":"Pablo Zendejas Medina","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1300","url":null,"abstract":"Two of the most influential arguments for Bayesian updating (\"Conditionalization\") -- Hilary Greaves' and David Wallace's Accuracy Argumentand David Lewis' Diachronic Dutch Book Argument-- turn out to imose a strong and surprising limitation on rational uncertainty: that one can never be rationally uncertain of what one's evidence is. Many philosophers (\"externalists\") reject that claim, and now seem to face a difficult choice: either to endorse the arguments and give up Externalism, or to reject the arguments and lose some of the best justifications of Bayesianism. The author argues that the key to resolving this conflict lies in recognizing that both arguments are plan-based, in that they argue for Conditionalization by first arguing that one should planto conditionalize. With this in view, we can identify the culprit common to both arguments: for an externalist, they misconceive the requirement to carry out a plan made at an earlier time. They should therefore not persuade us to reject Externalism. Furthermore, rethinking the nature of this requirement allows us to give two new arguments for Conditionalization that do not rule out rational uncertainty about one's evidence and that can thus serve as common ground in the debate between externalists and their opponents.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46564184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"WHO’S AFRAID OF MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS?","authors":"Silvia De Toffoli","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1348","url":null,"abstract":"Mathematical diagrams are frequently used in contemporary mathematics. They are, however, widely seen as not contributing to the justificatory force of proofs: they are considered to be either mere illustrations or shorthand for non-diagrammatic expressions. Moreover, when they are used inferentially, they are seen as threatening the reliability of proofs. In this paper, I examine certain examples of diagrams that resist this type of dismissive characterization. By presenting two diagrammatic proofs, one from topology and one from algebra, I show that diagrams form genuine notational systems, and I argue that this explains why they can play a role in the inferential structure of proofs without undermining their reliability. I then consider whether diagrams can be essential to the proofs in which they appear.@font-face{font-family:\"Cambria Math\";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:swiss;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536859905 -1073697537 9 0 511 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:\"\";margin:0in;line-height:200%;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:\"Calibri\",sans-serif;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:\"Calibri\",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoPapDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;line-height:200%;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47756842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on Intelligent Perception","authors":"Marc Gasser-wingate","doi":"10.3998/phimp.660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.660","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers allow us to develop a reflective understanding of the knowledge we acquire by purely perceptual means—a reflective understanding that can then affect what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41436406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unfinished Business","authors":"J. Knutzen","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1441","url":null,"abstract":"According to an intriguing though somewhat enigmatic line of thought first proposed by Jonathan Bennett, if humanity went extinct any time soon this would be unfortunate because important business would be left unfinished. This line of thought remains largely unexplored. I offer an interpretation of the idea that captures its intuitive appeal, is consistent with plausible constraints, and makes it non-redundant to other views in the literature. The resulting view contrasts with a welfare-promotion perspective, according to which extinction would be bad because it would come at a massive opportunity cost in terms of feasibly achievable welfare over the lifetime of our species.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48131145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Remembering objects","authors":"James Openshaw","doi":"10.3998/phimp.699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.699","url":null,"abstract":"Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve ‘episodically’ recalling experienced events in one’s personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being about events in which they featured)? This question has broad implications, not least for understanding the nature and role of imagery in remembering, the requirements of memory-based singular thought about objects, and the sense in which remembering involves ‘mental time travel’ through which one ‘relives’ past events. In this paper, I argue that we sometimes do recall objects from our past without remembering events in which they featured. The positive view of such cases I go on to propose draws on a wide body of empirical work in its support and accommodates a more nuanced picture of the role of imagery in remembering. Succinctly, remembering might essentially involve a kind of ‘re-experiencing’, but it need not involve ‘reliving’.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43951425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy","authors":"Sukaina Hirji","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1296","url":null,"abstract":"Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us. Our anger is a protest against a perceived mistreatment, and its function is to hold the person accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. Call this “reform” anger. A different sort of attitude, often contrasted with reform anger, is hatred. Hatred is also a response to a perceived mistreatment, and it also demands some sort of change. Unlike reform anger, however, its goal is not to repair the relationship. Instead, its goal is destruction, to remove the offending party. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a third sort of attitude, which I call “outrage” anger, that is distinct from both reform anger and hatred. I argue that outrage anger has an important role to play in the context of political injustice, but that it also comes with significant costs. In §1, I introduce outrage anger, and contrast it with reform anger. In §2, drawing on the work of Maria Lugones, I develop an account of outrage anger as a second-order attitude directed at the state of affairs in which a violation is not fully intelligible as the violation it is. I argue its central function is a kind of psychological boundary setting: it closes off the victim’s ability to feel empathy for their abuser. In §3, I show that the benefits of outrage come with serious costs, both epistemic and prudential. In §4, I make some suggestions about when, and for whom, the benefits of outrage outweigh the costs.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47913410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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