愤怒和同理心的界限

IF 1.4 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Sukaina Hirji
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引用次数: 6

摘要

通常,当我们生气的时候,我们会对伤害我们的人感到愤怒。我们的愤怒是对被认为是虐待的抗议,它的作用是让那个人对自己的罪行负责。愤怒包括要求某种改变或回应:承认伤害,修复关系,冒犯的政党以某种方式进行改革。称之为“改革”的愤怒。另一种不同的态度是仇恨,通常与改革的愤怒形成对比。仇恨也是对被感知的虐待的回应,它也需要某种改变。然而,与改革的愤怒不同,它的目标不是修复这种关系。相反,它的目标是摧毁,清除冒犯的一方。在这篇论文中,我发展并捍卫了第三种态度,我称之为“愤怒”的愤怒,这与改革的愤怒和仇恨不同。我认为,愤怒在政治不公正的背景下发挥着重要作用,但它也会带来巨大的成本。在§1中,我介绍了愤怒愤怒,并将其与改革愤怒进行了对比。在第2节中,我借鉴了玛丽亚·卢戈内斯的作品,将愤怒描述为一种二阶态度,针对的是侵犯行为并不像侵犯行为那样完全可理解的情况。我认为它的核心功能是一种心理边界设置:它关闭了受害者对施虐者感同身受的能力。在§3中,我表明愤怒的好处伴随着严重的成本,既有认识上的,也有谨慎上的。在第4节中,我提出了一些建议,说明愤怒在何时以及对谁来说,好处大于代价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy
Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us. Our anger is a protest against a perceived mistreatment, and its function is to hold the person accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. Call this “reform” anger. A different sort of attitude, often contrasted with reform anger, is hatred. Hatred is also a response to a perceived mistreatment, and it also demands some sort of change. Unlike reform anger, however, its goal is not to repair the relationship. Instead, its goal is destruction, to remove the offending party. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a third sort of attitude, which I call “outrage” anger, that is distinct from both reform anger and hatred. I argue that outrage anger has an important role to play in the context of political injustice, but that it also comes with significant costs. In §1, I introduce outrage anger, and contrast it with reform anger. In §2, drawing on the work of Maria Lugones, I develop an account of outrage anger as a second-order attitude directed at the state of affairs in which a violation is not fully intelligible as the violation it is. I argue its central function is a kind of psychological boundary setting: it closes off the victim’s ability to feel empathy for their abuser. In §3, I show that the benefits of outrage come with serious costs, both epistemic and prudential. In §4, I make some suggestions about when, and for whom, the benefits of outrage outweigh the costs.
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来源期刊
Philosophers' Imprint
Philosophers' Imprint PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
审稿时长
20 weeks
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