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Mechanisms for Hume's Skepticism 休谟怀疑论的机制
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2026-10-05 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.9316
Charles Goldhaber
{"title":"Mechanisms for Hume's Skepticism","authors":"Charles Goldhaber","doi":"10.3998/phimp.9316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.9316","url":null,"abstract":"What happens to a mind that embraces skepticism? On familiar classical and contemporary accounts, it suspends judgment about the matters skepticism calls into question. For Hume, such suspension can occur only temporarily. He claims that skepticism's more enduring effect is weaker: it lowers the vivacity of, and thus our confidence in, beliefs, typically leaving commonplace ones intact. Hume's associationism offers at least two explanatory mechanisms for this effect, one doxastic and one emotional. In the doxastic mechanism, causal reasoning about our failures in reasoning decreases the vivacity of beliefs formed through reasoning. In the emotional mechanism, appreciating our cognitive failures diminishes certain passions, and with them the vivacity of beliefs otherwise augmented by those passions, especially pride. Understanding these mechanisms not only resolves exegetical puzzles about Hume's apparently flippant attitudes toward skepticism, but also provides a psychologically rich picture of how minds might self-correct without exaggeration.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"484 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose His Mind-Dependence 伯克利如何走向准思维并失去对思维的依赖
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2026-10-05 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.7876
Bart Streumer
{"title":"How Berkeley Can Go Quasi and Lose His Mind-Dependence","authors":"Bart Streumer","doi":"10.3998/phimp.7876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.7876","url":null,"abstract":"Berkeley defends idealism partly by taking ordinary objects such as tables and stones to consist of ideas. Materialists reject this account of ordinary objects. I argue that Berkeley can undermine this rejection by making quasi-realist moves of the kind that many expressivists about normativity make. This ultimately results in a version of idealism that we cannot believe, since trying to believe it will make us believe materialism. But I argue that this version of idealism may nevertheless be true.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"78 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Practitioner's Guide to Pragmatic Humeanism 《实用人文主义实践者指南》
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2026-10-05 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.2968
Michael Townsen Hicks
{"title":"A Practitioner's Guide to Pragmatic Humeanism","authors":"Michael Townsen Hicks","doi":"10.3998/phimp.2968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2968","url":null,"abstract":"All Humeans hold, roughly, that laws are informative summaries of non-lawful matters of fact. Pragmatic Humeans go further: for them, what makes these summaries the laws is their usefulness to agents like us. By adding elements of our specific epistemic interests and constraints, pragmatists contend, we can arrive at satisfying explanations of otherwise surprising features of our actual laws and our actual scientific practice. But the pragmatic shift is not without problems. The more elements of our particular psychology we add to our nomic formula, the more susceptible we are to idealistic ratbaggery. Intuitively, what can or must happen does not depend on our particular cognitive architecture: we cannot change the laws by changing us. But if laws are distinguished from accidents by features of our psychology, then changes in our psychology might lead to differences in what the laws of nature allow. My aim here is to clarify the role of pragmatic constraints, and thereby respond to this challenge from creeping idealism. My strategy has two parts. First, I argue that pragmatic constraints determine the laws only indirectly, by generating a nomic formula that itself makes no reference to agents. Second, I discuss what sorts of agents are agents like us. I argue that pragmatists should appeal to a particular sort of idealized agent, one whose specific limitations and interests have been idealized away.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Art of Work in Kant’s Critique of Judgment 康德《判断批判》中的劳动艺术
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2026-10-05 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.5822
Tyler Colby Re
{"title":"The Art of Work in Kant’s Critique of Judgment","authors":"Tyler Colby Re","doi":"10.3998/phimp.5822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.5822","url":null,"abstract":"There is a general impression among Kant scholars that Kant has no robust theory of work. Most of his references to the topic appear in his historical and anthropological writings, where he tells us that work is burdensome, and valuable only for the sake of whatever we produce. In this paper, I argue that Kant has an under-explored theory of work in the third Critique. This theory bears little resemblance to his depiction of work in the historical and anthropological writings. The third Critique will depict work as self-expressive, creative, and free, features Kant will go on to associate with art. Kant's contention is that when work resembles art, it is both agreeable and something we enjoy for its own sake. However, when work fails to resemble art – when it is, in Kant's words, natural, scientific, and mercenary – it is both disagreeable and constrained, and begins to sound like his description of work from the historical and anthropological writings. Kant's theory of work in the third Critique has a number of important implications. The first is that it provides a new foundation for a contemporary philosophy of work that places freedom and creativity at the center of the labor process. My analysis also engages a part of Kant scholarship that has, until recently, been largely neglected. It is only in the last decade that the English-language Kant literature has taken up the question of how to make sense of Kant's remarks about work. However, the focus is rarely on Kant's aesthetic theory of work, but rather on the place of work in his moral and political philosophy. I discuss the implications of Kant's third Critique theory of work for these other debates, as well as for our understanding of the third Critique as a whole. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149092872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fear and Loathing in Silicon Valley: Does AI Threaten our Valuing Practices? 硅谷的恐惧与厌恶：人工智能会威胁到我们的估值实践吗？
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2026-10-05 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.7153
Jordan MacKenzie
{"title":"Fear and Loathing in Silicon Valley: Does AI Threaten our Valuing Practices?","authors":"Jordan MacKenzie","doi":"10.3998/phimp.7153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.7153","url":null,"abstract":"We often have a visceral negative reaction to the prospect of AI taking over our creative activities or being used to demonstrate care and concern. What justifies this reaction? In this paper, I argue that AI raises two existential threats to our valuing practices. The first existential threat is forward-looking—when we offload our labor onto AI, we risk flattening our valuing landscape, turning activities and products that could have once been valued for the meaningful processes that resulted in their creation into things that can only be valued for their functionality. The second threat is backward-looking—AI forces us to reckon with the valuing discord that already exists in our lives. When we see that other people don’t care about whether the art or writing they’re consuming is AI-produced, we must reckon with the fact that they never shared in our valuing practices.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Desire 欲望
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.2116
Kyle Blumberg, J. Hawthorne
{"title":"Desire","authors":"Kyle Blumberg, J. Hawthorne","doi":"10.3998/phimp.2116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2116","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present two puzzles involving desire reports concerning series of events. What does a person want to happen in the first event – is it the event with the highest expected return, or the event that is the initial part of the best series? We show that existing approaches fail to resolve the puzzles around this question and develop a novel account of our own. Our semantics is built around three ideas. First, we propose that desire ascriptions are evaluated relative to a contextually supplied set of propositions, or alternatives. The semantic value of an ascription ‘S wants p’ is determined by S's preference ordering over these alternatives. Second, we propose that desire reports carry a requirement to the effect that the prejacent of the ascription must be suitably related to the background set of alternatives. Finally, we suggest that desire reports carry a dominance condition concerning the subject's ranking of the alternatives. Overall, we argue that our theory provides us with an elegant resolution of our puzzles, and yields a promising approach to desire.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48386102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Embedded Epistemic Instrumentalism: An Account of Epistemic Normativity 嵌入的认识工具主义：对认识规范性的一种解释
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2022-08-29 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.745
J. Willoughby
{"title":"Embedded Epistemic Instrumentalism: An Account of Epistemic Normativity","authors":"J. Willoughby","doi":"10.3998/phimp.745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.745","url":null,"abstract":"We are bombarded with epistemic norms. Respect your evidence. Don’t believe in contradictions. Don’t arbitrarily change beliefs. But how do such norms get their normative force? Why should we respect our evidence, for example?  In this paper I offer a familiar type of answer, epistemic instrumentalism. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that epistemic norms get their normative force by being useful. You should respect your evidence because it will help you achieve some valuable ends. This answer, while familiar, is not very popular. There is a widely accepted objection to epistemic instrumentalism, the too few reasons objection. The objection looms so large that standard developments of instrumentalism have become bloated with philosophical machinery to respond to it. This does a disservice to epistemic instrumentalism. Rather than focusing completely on the objection, I focus on describing a simple model for how conforming to the epistemic norms is broadly useful. Once I describe the simple model, the too few reasons objection becomes much easier to answer. This strategy results in a well-motivated philosophical theory based on uncontroversial facts that has many advantages over rival theories.   ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44922171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Hume on Temporal Experience and the Fiction of Time Without Change 休谟论时间经验与时间不变的小说
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2022-07-08 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1626
Miren Boehm, Maité Cruz
{"title":"Hume on Temporal Experience and the Fiction of Time Without Change","authors":"Miren Boehm, Maité Cruz","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1626","url":null,"abstract":"Hume identifies the idea of time with the idea of succession and denies that we have or even can have an idea of time without change.  He argues that our idea of time is not applicable to unchanging objects and that unchanging objects cannot be said to endure.  At the center of Hume’s treatment of time is a fiction that is supposed to explain how we falsely believe that we can form an idea of time without change and how we consider unchanging objects to endure. The literature has struggled to make sense of Hume’s riddled arguments and obscure claims.  Against the background of Hume’s intention to establish a new foundation for the sciences, we consider the most important and controversial texts from the perspective of Hume’s likely target: the idea of absolute time.  From this perspective, we offer important insights into the questions that have dominated the literature.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43813469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Darwin's Causal Argument Against Creationism 达尔文反对神创论的因果论证
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2022-07-08 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.930
Hayley Clatterbuck
{"title":"Darwin's Causal Argument Against Creationism","authors":"Hayley Clatterbuck","doi":"10.3998/phimp.930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.930","url":null,"abstract":"In the Origin, Darwin forwards two incompatible lines of attack on special creationism. First, he argues that imperfect or functionless traits are evidence against design. Second, he argues that since special creationism can be made compatible with any observation, it is unscientific and explanatorily vacuous. In later works, Darwin shifts to an argument that he finds much more persuasive and which would undermine theistic evolutionism as well. He argues that variation is random with respect to selection and that this demonstrates that there is no design in the biological world. I examine why Darwin found the argument from independence of variation and selection more compelling than the argument from imperfection. I argue that Darwin utilized general principles of causal inference, akin to those used in modern causal modeling, to rule out any unified cause behind the evolutionary process. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47017883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Too Easy, Too Good, Too Late? 太容易，太好，太迟?
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1336
A. Dietz
{"title":"Too Easy, Too Good, Too Late?","authors":"A. Dietz","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1336","url":null,"abstract":"Plausibly, one important part of a good life is doing work that makes a contribution, or a positive difference to the world. In this paper, however, I explore contribution pessimism, the view that people will not always have adequate opportunities for making contributions. I distinguish between three interestingly different and at least initially plausible reasons why this view might be true: in slogan form, things might become too easy, they might become too good, or we might be too late. Now, one response to these problems might be to deliberately attempt to undo them. However, I claim that this solution is intuitively misguided, and argue that explaining this supports a holistic approach to the value of contributions. Finally, I argue that if contribution pessimism is correct, it could provide an explanation of some widely held intuitions about issues in population ethics, with implications about the practical issue of how much priority we should give to addressing risks of human extinction.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48430721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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