Embedded Epistemic Instrumentalism: An Account of Epistemic Normativity

IF 1.4 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
J. Willoughby
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

We are bombarded with epistemic norms. Respect your evidence. Don’t believe in contradictions. Don’t arbitrarily change beliefs. But how do such norms get their normative force? Why should we respect our evidence, for example?  In this paper I offer a familiar type of answer, epistemic instrumentalism. Epistemic instrumentalism holds that epistemic norms get their normative force by being useful. You should respect your evidence because it will help you achieve some valuable ends. This answer, while familiar, is not very popular. There is a widely accepted objection to epistemic instrumentalism, the too few reasons objection. The objection looms so large that standard developments of instrumentalism have become bloated with philosophical machinery to respond to it. This does a disservice to epistemic instrumentalism. Rather than focusing completely on the objection, I focus on describing a simple model for how conforming to the epistemic norms is broadly useful. Once I describe the simple model, the too few reasons objection becomes much easier to answer. This strategy results in a well-motivated philosophical theory based on uncontroversial facts that has many advantages over rival theories.   
嵌入的认识工具主义:对认识规范性的一种解释
我们被认知规范轰炸。尊重你的证据。不要相信矛盾。不要随意改变信仰。但这些规范是如何获得其规范力的呢?例如,我们为什么要尊重我们的证据?在这篇论文中,我提供了一种熟悉的答案,即认识工具主义。认识工具主义认为,认识规范是通过有用而获得规范力的。你应该尊重你的证据,因为它会帮助你达到一些有价值的目的。这个答案虽然很熟悉,但并不太受欢迎。人们普遍反对认识工具主义,反对的理由太少。反对声音如此之大,以至于工具主义的标准发展已经膨胀为哲学机器来回应它。这对认识工具主义是有害的。我没有完全关注反对意见,而是专注于描述一个简单的模型,说明遵守认识规范是如何广泛有用的。一旦我描述了这个简单的模型,反对理由太少就更容易回答了。这种策略产生了一种基于无争议事实的积极性很高的哲学理论,与竞争对手的理论相比有很多优势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Philosophers' Imprint
Philosophers' Imprint PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
审稿时长
20 weeks
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