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Philosophers' Imprint最新文献

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Market Exchange and Alienation 市场交换与转让
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.545
B. Maguire
{"title":"Market Exchange and Alienation","authors":"B. Maguire","doi":"10.3998/phimp.545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.545","url":null,"abstract":"Efficient markets are alienating if they inhibit us from caring about one another inour productive activities. I argue that efficient market behaviour is bothexclusionary and fetishistic. As exclusionary, the efficient marketeer cannotmanifest care alongside their market behaviour. As fetishistic, the efficientmarketeer cannot manifest care in their market behaviour. The conjunction entailsthat efficient market behavior inhibits care. It doesn’t follow that efficient marketbehavior is vicious: individuals might justifiably commit to efficiency becausedoing so serves the common good. But efficient market systems nevertheless havesignificant opportunity costs. This serves as a corrective to the prevailingassumption amongst welfare state capitalists, liberal egalitarians and marketsocialists that resolving distributive objections to markets will resolve thisrelational objection. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45602009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking the Straight Path. P.F. Strawson's Later Work on Freedom and Responsibility 走正道。斯特劳森后期关于自由与责任的著作
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-09-27 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.782
Benjamin De Mesel
{"title":"Taking the Straight Path. P.F. Strawson's Later Work on Freedom and Responsibility","authors":"Benjamin De Mesel","doi":"10.3998/phimp.782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.782","url":null,"abstract":"I highlight three features of P.F. Strawson’s later, neglected work on freedom and responsibility. First, in response to a criticism by Rajendra Prasad, Strawson explicitly rejects an argument put forward in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ against the relevance of determinism to moral responsibility. Second, his remarkable acceptance of Prasad’s criticism motivates him to take the ‘straight path’, that is, to be straightforward about the relation between determinism, freedom, the ability to do otherwise and the conditions of responsibility. He claims that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of responsibility and provides a list of additional conditions, including a knowledge condition. Third, he clarifies the relation between responsibility, quality of will and the reactive attitudes. The latter do not figure essentially in his answer to the question, ‘What are the conditions of responsibility?’, but they do play an essential role in his answer to the question, ‘Why do we have the concept of responsibility?’ We have it, Strawson suggests, because of our natural concern about the quality of will with which people act, a concern expressed in our reactive attitudes. I argue that, although Strawson’s later work definitely involves a shift of emphasis when compared to ‘Freedom and Resentment’, his overall account of freedom and responsibility is coherent. The later work helps to better understand the nature and significance of Strawson’s contribution, and to identify problems with common interpretations of and objections to ‘Freedom and Resentment’. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46435870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Idealizations and ideal policing 理想化与理想警务
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-09-18 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.882
Jake Monaghan
{"title":"Idealizations and ideal policing","authors":"Jake Monaghan","doi":"10.3998/phimp.882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.882","url":null,"abstract":"Political philosophy often focuses on “major institutions” that make up the “basic structure” of society. These include political, economic, and social institutions. In this paper I argue first that policing plays a substantial role in generating the kinds of inequalities and problems that are concerns of social or structural justice, and therefore that police agencies qualify as a major institution. When we abandon full compliance or similar idealizations, it is clear that policing is not a concern secondary to, e.g., the electoral system or the scheme of property rights in a society. Nor, I argue, does maintaining full compliance or moral character idealizations obviate an active enforcement role. Eliminating that role from an idealized model society requires engaging in a methodologically and substantively unattractive amount of abstraction. The result is that an active enforcement role is at the core of a complete theory of justice rather than something that is significant only “downstream” from more fundamental issues.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48986278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
For Better And Worse: Taking phenomenalist accounts of intuition seriously 好与坏:认真对待直觉的现象主义解释
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-09-14 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1271
Miguel Egler
{"title":"For Better And Worse: Taking phenomenalist accounts of intuition seriously","authors":"Miguel Egler","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1271","url":null,"abstract":"The historically-influential perceptual analogy states that intuitions and perceptual experiences are alike in many important respects. Phenomenalists defend a particular reading of this analogy according to which intuitions and perceptual experiences share a common phenomenal character. The phenomenalist thesis has proven highly influential in recent years. However, insufficient attention has been given to the challenges that the phenomenalist thesis raises for theories of intuitions. In this paper, I first develop one such challenge. I argue that if we take seriously the idea that intuitions and perceptual experiences have a common phenomenal character, then an analogous version of the familiar problem of perceptual presence arises for intuitions. I call this the 'problem of intuitive presence'. In the second part of the paper I sketch a novel enactivist solution to this problem.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46386954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Assertion is weak 断言很弱
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1076
M. Mandelkern, Kevin Dorst
{"title":"Assertion is weak","authors":"M. Mandelkern, Kevin Dorst","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1076","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has  contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) belief---perhaps knowledge or even certainty.  We argue that this is wrong: assertion is just as weak as belief.  We first present a variety of new arguments for this, and then show that the standard arguments for stronger norms are not convincing.  Finally, we sketch an alternative picture on which the fundamental norm of assertion is to say what you believe, but both belief and assertion are weak. To help make sense of this, we propose that both belief and assertion involve navigating a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity, and so it can makes sense to believe/say something you only have weak evidence for, if it is informative enough.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42135079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
The Logic of Misandrogyny 雌雄同体的逻辑
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-08-19 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.556
Jeff Engelhardt
{"title":"The Logic of Misandrogyny","authors":"Jeff Engelhardt","doi":"10.3998/phimp.556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.556","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an account of misandrogyny that is modeled on Kate Manne's account of misogyny. On Manne's view, misogyny is a system of mechanisms that together police and enforce the gendered hierarchy of a patriarchal order. On the account developed here, misandrogyny is a system of mechanisms that together police and enforce the gender binary of a patriarchal order. The gender binary is constituted by norms that preclude the existence of persons who aren't consistently 'read' either as a man (and only a man) or as a woman (and only a woman). Misandrogyny thus polices and enforces the nonexistence of people who are neither women (only) nor men (only). After some clarifying preliminaries, section 1 describes mechanisms of misandrogyny that push individuals into specific binary gender positions; section 2 describes structures and institutions that compel gender non-conforming people to assimilate to the gender binary; section 3 describes mechanisms that target gender non-conforming persons for fatal violence. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41494201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Essence As A Modality: A Proof-Theoretic and Nominalist Analysis 作为形式的本质：一种证明论和名义主义分析
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2021-05-20 DOI: 10.3998/PHIMP.3521354.0021.007
Preston Stovall
{"title":"Essence As A Modality: A Proof-Theoretic and Nominalist Analysis","authors":"Preston Stovall","doi":"10.3998/PHIMP.3521354.0021.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/PHIMP.3521354.0021.007","url":null,"abstract":"I NQUIRY INTO THE METAPHYSICS OF ESSENCE tends to be pursued in a realist and model-theoretic spirit, in the sense that metaphysical vocabulary is used in a metalanguage to model truth conditions for the object-language use of essentialist vocabulary. This essay adapts recent developments in proof-theoretic semantics to provide a nominalist analysis for a variety of essentialist vocabularies. A metalanguage employing explanatory inferences is used to individuate introduction and elimination rules for atomic sentences. The object-language assertions of sentences concerning essences are then interpreted as devices for marking off structural features of the explanatory inferences that, under a given interpretation, constitute the contents of the atoms of the language. On this proposal, object-language essentialist vocabulary is mentioned in a proof-theoretic metalanguage that uses a vocabulary of explanation. The result is a nominalist interpretation of essence as a modality, understood in the grammatical sense as a modification of the copula, and a view of metaphysical inquiry that is closely connected to the explanatory commitments present in first-order inquiry into things like sets, chemicals, and organisms. This result illustrates that some of the presuppositions that have animated analytic metaphysics over the last few decades can be profitably substituted with more practice-oriented conceptions of the forms of reasoning at work in different domains of human knowledge. 1","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45838182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Gravity and Grace 重力与恩典
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 2019-02-25 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv16km193
G. Belot
{"title":"Gravity and Grace","authors":"G. Belot","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv16km193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv16km193","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits the bearing of underdetermination arguments on scientific realism. First it argues that underdetermination considerations provide good reason to doubt that science is objective in the strong sense that anyone following the its methods will be led closer and closer (without bound) to the truth about any given question within the purview of those methods, as more relevant data are considered. Then it argues that scientific realism is difficult to maintain in the absence of this sort of objectivity.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43801519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Title Pending 1289 1289未决所有权
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1289
{"title":"Title Pending 1289","authors":"","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1289","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70393725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Title Pending 2073 2073年待定头衔
IF 1.4 1区 哲学
Philosophers' Imprint Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.2073
{"title":"Title Pending 2073","authors":"","doi":"10.3998/phimp.2073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.2073","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70394147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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