{"title":"我的细腻品味:审美缺陷再探","authors":"Iskra Fileva","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1523","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Pessimistsabout aesthetic testimony argue that it is inappropriate to rely on otherpeople’s aesthetic judgments in forming our own aesthetic beliefs. Some suggestthat such reliance violates an epistemic norm, others – that it violates anon-epistemic norm. In making their case, pessimists offer several arguments.They also put forward cases meant to elicit pessimist intuitions. In thispaper, I claim that none of the main pessimist arguments succeeds against aplausible version of optimism, that is, the view that reliance on testimony inaesthetic matters is appropriate. However, I suggest also that pessimistintuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second taskis to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on theirsource. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"My Delicate Taste: Aesthetic Deference Revisited\",\"authors\":\"Iskra Fileva\",\"doi\":\"10.3998/phimp.1523\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Pessimistsabout aesthetic testimony argue that it is inappropriate to rely on otherpeople’s aesthetic judgments in forming our own aesthetic beliefs. Some suggestthat such reliance violates an epistemic norm, others – that it violates anon-epistemic norm. In making their case, pessimists offer several arguments.They also put forward cases meant to elicit pessimist intuitions. In thispaper, I claim that none of the main pessimist arguments succeeds against aplausible version of optimism, that is, the view that reliance on testimony inaesthetic matters is appropriate. However, I suggest also that pessimistintuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second taskis to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on theirsource. \",\"PeriodicalId\":20021,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophers' Imprint\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophers' Imprint\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1523\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophers' Imprint","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1523","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Pessimistsabout aesthetic testimony argue that it is inappropriate to rely on otherpeople’s aesthetic judgments in forming our own aesthetic beliefs. Some suggestthat such reliance violates an epistemic norm, others – that it violates anon-epistemic norm. In making their case, pessimists offer several arguments.They also put forward cases meant to elicit pessimist intuitions. In thispaper, I claim that none of the main pessimist arguments succeeds against aplausible version of optimism, that is, the view that reliance on testimony inaesthetic matters is appropriate. However, I suggest also that pessimistintuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second taskis to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on theirsource.