Munich Reprints in Economics最新文献

{"title":"The primacy of institutions reconsidered: Direct income effects of malaria prevalence","authors":"K. Carstensen, E. Gundlach","doi":"10.1093/WBER/LHL001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/WBER/LHL001","url":null,"abstract":"Some recent empirical studies deny any direct effect of geography on development and conclude that institutions dominate all other potential determinants of development. An alternative view emphasizes that geographic factors such as disease ecology, as proxied by the prevalence of malaria, may have a large negative effect on income, independent of the quality of a country’s institutions. For instance, pandemic malaria may create a large economic burden beyond medical costs and forgone earnings by affecting household behavior and such macroeconomic variables as international investment and trade. After controlling for institutional quality, malaria prevalence is found to cause quantitatively important negative effects on income. The robustness of this finding is checked by employing alternative instrumental variables, tests of overidentification restrictions, and tests of the validity of the point estimates and standard errors in the presence of weak instruments. The baseline findings appear to be robust to using alternative specifications, instrumentations, and samples. The reported estimates suggest that good institutions may be necessary but not sufficient for generating a persistent process of successful economic development.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127840280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The green paradox","authors":"H. Sinn","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/8734.001.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8734.001.0001","url":null,"abstract":"The simple but usually overlooked fact is: other than the useful but limited afforestation efforts, there are only two ways to curb the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and, with it, slow down global warming. We either temporarily refrain from extracting carbon from the ground, or we stuff it back into the ground after having extracted its energy. All the technical endeavours to develop alternative technologies and all economic incentive systems to curb the greenhouse effect must subordinate themselves to this fundamental fact.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114504918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The role of cognitive skills in economic development","authors":"E. Hanushek, Ludger Woessmann","doi":"10.1257/JEL.46.3.607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/JEL.46.3.607","url":null,"abstract":"The role of improved schooling, a central part of most development strategies, has become controversial because expansion of school attainment has not guaranteed improved economic conditions. This paper reviews the role of cognitive skills in promoting economic well-being, with a particular focus on the role of school quality and quantity. It concludes that there is strong evidence that the cognitive skills of the population - rather than mere school attainment - are powerfully related to individual earnings, to the distribution of income, and to economic growth. New empirical results show the importance of both minimal and high level skills, the complementarity of skills and the quality of economic institutions, and the robustness of the relationship between skills and growth. International comparisons incorporating expanded data on cognitive skills reveal much larger skill deficits in developing countries than generally derived from just school enrollment and attainment. The magnitude of change needed makes clear that closing the economic gap with developed countries will require major structural changes in schooling institutions.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117245408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Probleme mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3115","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114443842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dynamic duopoly with best-price clauses","authors":"Monika Schnitzer","doi":"10.2307/2555861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2555861","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distinguished: \"most favored customer\" and \"meet or release.\" I examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite-horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods. In each period, new consumers enter the market. I show that in this context, meet-or-release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most-favored-customer clauses.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121988392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Labour Management and Commitment: Reply to Furubotn","authors":"E. Schlicht, C. C. Weizsäcker","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3377","url":null,"abstract":"When writing our contribution on the commitment problem, we contrasted the systems of capitalist management and of labour management in order to learn something about the comparative advantages and shortcomings of the two systems and to improve our understanding of both of them by noting their differences as well as their fundamental similarities. In particular, we got the impression that each of the two systems has its strong points as well as its particular drawbacks and one cannot claim superiority for one of them under all conceivable circumstances (Schlicht and v. Weizsacker [1977] p. 65). In his recent comment, Professor Furubotn has pointed out two additional difficulties of labour management which he deems so severe as to \"make it possible to conclude that the emphasis on the \"commitment mechanism\" may not be appropriate\" (Furubotn [1979] p. 217) and that /'something more than labour immobility is required to guarantee rational policy by the labourmanaged firm\" (Furubotn [1979] p. 226). These difficulties are first: the possible irrationality of democratic decision-making within the firm; and second: the allocative inefficiency caused by labour immobility. We would like to comment very briefly on these two issues and will deal with the more fundamental points thereupon. With regard to the irrationality of democratic decisionmaking it is to be remarked that similar problems arise under many circumstances, and also within the very framework of the capitalist firm, e.g. at the stockholders meeting. These problems are very severe, no doubt, but they can be mitigated by various means, i.e. by a (written or unwritten) constitution or by representative democracy. It is very difficult to give precise recommendations here, but one can argue that an optimal form of organization might evolve from competition just in the same way as one thinks the specific features of the capitalist firm we encounter today have evolved as answers to specific problems Adam Smith has not dreamt of1 . Furthermore, democracy has its advantages too, which might be valued for the sake of their own, and might even translate into efficiency advantages if","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115849265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Trade credit during financial crises: Do negotiated agreements work?","authors":"Alexander Agronovsky, Christoph Trebesch","doi":"10.1108/S1569-3767(2009)0000010017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3767(2009)0000010017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the role of trade credit in financial crises. Using newly collected data, we investigate the impact of negotiated agreements between debtor and creditor countries on bilateral trade. Our results indicate that exports to creditor countries rise considerably after debt restructuring agreements in the period 1980-1997, while we find no effect for imports and for the more recent period. We identify trade credit as one key channel behind this positive effect. Apparently, crisis resolution efforts, in particular agreements to extend and roll over trade credits, play a crucial role for export recoveries. This gives some support to current worldwide efforts to sustain trade financing via coordinated policy interventions.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114430613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Some Investment Functions in a Kaldorian Growth Model","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.14801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.14801","url":null,"abstract":"This paper outlines a variant of Nicholas Kaldor's growth model. An important feature of this model is that it generates steady state growth and Harrod Neutrality of technical progress endogenously. The effect of various assumption on investment bevavior are studied.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116463632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Searching for the \"productivity slowdown’: some surprising findings from West German manufacturing","authors":"G. Flaig, Viktor Steiner","doi":"10.2307/2109626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/2109626","url":null,"abstract":"We test the hypothesis of a negative long-term trend and/or a structural break in total factor productivity (TFP) after the first oil price shock for West German manufacturing industries within an econometric model based on a flexible cost function with capital as a quasi-fixed factor. After adjusting TFP growth for scale economies and varying capacity utilization this hypothesis is not supported by our empirical findings for the great majority of industries studied, whereas the hypothesis that the (log-)level of TFP follows a random walk with drift is not rejected by various statistical tests. -Authors","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116291011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Training Costs and Wage Differentials in the Theory of Job Competition","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.1347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.1347","url":null,"abstract":"A labor market is considered that is characterized by job competition over job ladders. Firms paying more for comparable jobs can attract workers with better background characteristics (with general human capital) and will lose fewer trained workers (with general and firm-specific human capital). Optimizing behavior on the side of the firms gives rise to a wage structure that shows similar correlations between training and wages as would emerge in a human capital framework, but for different reasons. Further, the wage structure responds to other influences, like the degree of labor mobility.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115485306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}