{"title":"The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation","authors":"Klaus M. Schmidt","doi":"10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00080-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00080-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124080263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Tenant's Decreasing Willingness to Pay and the Rent Abatement Phenomenon","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3349","url":null,"abstract":"It has been observed that, as a rule, new tenants pay higher rents than oldestablished tenants for the same type of flat in the same building: Rents actually paid seem to be influenced negatively by the previous duration of the tenancy1. Let us call this the rent abatement phenomenon. The only theoretical explanation for this phenomenon I am aware of has been given by Eekhoff [1981]. He argues that the German tenants' protection legislation, which reduces the scope for rent increases during a tenancy, is conductive to rent abatement2. The phenomenon, however, has been observed in Germany also before the relevant bills have been passed, and it can be observed in other countries as well: The \"legal\" interpretation of the phenomenon seems not to be able to capture the whole of the story3. The purpose of the present note is to offer an alternative theoretical explanation for rent abatement. It rests on the proposition that the willingness to pay of the tenant decreases with the length of the tenancy because his economic situation changes and the previously optimal flat becomes suboptimal in the course of time. 1. The Tenant's Decreasing Willingness to Pay","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1981-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123482655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Zwei makroökonomische Koordinationsprobleme","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.14810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.14810","url":null,"abstract":"Aus neoklassischer Sicht bestimmen sich Lohne und Zinsen (und damit die funktionelle Einkommensverteilung) so, das eine richtige Wahl der Pruktionsverfahren induziert wird. In neokeynesianischer Sicht bilden sich Lohne und Zinsen (und damit die funktionelle Einkommensverteilung) so, das der Gutermarkt geraumt wird. Die beiden Theorierichtungen unterscheiden sich mithin dadurch, das sie die Einkommensverteilung als Losung von zwei verschiedenen Koordinationsproblemen sehen und damit zu verschiedenen Ergebnissen kommen. In diesem Beitrag wird kritisiert, das sich diese beiden Theorierichtungen jeweils auf nur eins der beiden Koordinationsproblem konzentrieren und das jeweils andere vernachlassigen. Es wird die These vertreten, das beide Koordinationsprobleme wichtig sind aber nicht gleichzeitig gelost werden konnen. Dies wirft wichtige Fragestellungen fur die Konjunkturtheorie auf.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1981-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132016984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Rehabilitation of the Principle of Insufficient Reason","authors":"H. Sinn","doi":"10.2307/1884581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1884581","url":null,"abstract":"It is shown that two of the axioms necessary for the expected utility rule imply the Principle of Insufficient Reason. Whenever a decision maker knows the possible states of the world, but completely lacks information about the plausibility of each single state, he has to behave as if all states occurred with the same objective probability, known with certainty. The result is applied to decision trees and used to solve a problem formulated by Savage in order to discredit the classical version of the Principle of Insufficient Reason.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1980-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128924849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note on the Arrow-Lind Theorem","authors":"R. Rees, L. Foldes","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3416","url":null,"abstract":"discount rate applied to expected returns. It would also argue in favor of state participation in private investments where this allows risks to be spread over a larger number of persons. A review of the explicit assumptions alone must cast doubt on the general validity of such applications. The assumption of independence is unrealistic for many investments, for example in infrastructure and \"basic\" industries whose returns are highly correlated with national income. The assumption that the share of the net benefits of an investment accruing to any person becomes negligible as population tends to infinity is unacceptable in at least three cases: for public goods, where the benefit is not \"shared\" but increases with the population; for projects whose scale must be adjusted roughly in proportion to the size of population (such as the construction of a grid system of electricity distribution); and for projects whose benefits accrue wholly or in part to a section of the population which is \"small\" in the sense of the theorem. The last reservation applies not merely to those projects which are specifically designed to benefit only a small part of the population, but also to those special benefits and costs from any project which happen to accrue unavoidably to limited groups. Arrow and Lind avoid this problem in their formal discussion by assuming that the government taxes all benefits and compensates all losses, although they acknowledge that this is unrealistic. Be that as it may, the present note accepts the Arrow-Lind approach more or less on its own terms, and considers more fully the role of certain implicit assumptions concerning the fiscal system and public expenditure. Specifically, it will be recalled that Arrow and Lind work with only two random variables, the disposable income of a typical individual and the income from distribution of project retums by the government. Although the latter is referred to in","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1977-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116881044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investment in Education and Redistributive Taxation without Precommitment","authors":"Panu Poutvaara","doi":"10.1628/0015221032643182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/0015221032643182","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares private investment in risky education in a laissezfaire economy and with income redistribution. Obtaining higher education requires time and may require paying nondeductible resource costs. The paper shows that redistributive taxation may actually increase private investment in risky education also without precommitment. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121368826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Company-tax coordination cum tax-rate competition in the European union","authors":"Wolfgang Eggert, Andreas Haufler","doi":"10.1628/001522106X172706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/001522106X172706","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the recent theoretical literature that analyzes the European Union’s policy to eliminate preferential corporate-tax regimes and the proposal to introduce a consolidated EU tax base with formula apportionment for the taxation of multinational firms. Since neither proposal includes a harmonization of corporate-tax rates, a core issue is how tax competition between member states will be affected by these partial coordination measures. The conclusions from our review are supportive of the EU’s ban on preferential tax regimes, but the economic incentive effects of a switch to formula apportionment are found to be ambiguous.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126167494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tying in International Trade","authors":"Dalia. Marin","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3114","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"39 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122411795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Besprechung von M. Weitzmann: Das Beteiligungsmodell","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.3134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126236731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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