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White and Black Weight by Socioeconomic Status and Residence: Revaluating Nineteenth-Century Health during the Institutional Change to Free Labor 社会经济地位和居住地的白人和黑人重量:重新评估19世纪自由劳动制度变迁中的健康状况
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2017-12-01 DOI: 10.1628/093245617X14812908932547
S. Carson
{"title":"White and Black Weight by Socioeconomic Status and Residence: Revaluating Nineteenth-Century Health during the Institutional Change to Free Labor","authors":"S. Carson","doi":"10.1628/093245617X14812908932547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245617X14812908932547","url":null,"abstract":"Heights and body mass index (BMI) values are now well-accepted measures that reflect net nutrition during economic development and institutional change from bound to free labor. This study uses 19th-century weights instead of BMIs to measure factors associated with current net nutrition. Across the weight distribution and throughout the 19th century, white and black average weights decreased by 8.5 and 6.3 percent, respectively. Farmers and unskilled workers had positive weight returns associated with rural agricultural lifestyles. Weights in the Deep South were greater than in other regions within the U. S., indicating that while Southern infectious disease rates were high, Southern current net nutrition was better than elsewhere within the U. S.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"213 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124187389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity 同时搜索、进入效率和搜索强度
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2017-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/MIC.20160088
P. Gautier, C. Holzner
{"title":"Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity","authors":"P. Gautier, C. Holzner","doi":"10.1257/MIC.20160088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20160088","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially efficient. Finally, we show that a sequential auction under incomplete information can establish the social optimum and discuss some alternative mechanisms that can, under complete information of the entire network, also deliver social efficiency.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133432335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective ceo如何保护自己不被解雇:社会地位的视角
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2382
Miriam Flickinger, Markus Wrage, Anja Tuschke, Rudi K. F. Bresser
{"title":"How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective","authors":"Miriam Flickinger, Markus Wrage, Anja Tuschke, Rudi K. F. Bresser","doi":"10.1002/SMJ.2382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/SMJ.2382","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddednessas reflected in the number of outside directorshipsplays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125279826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 59
Capital Market Imperfections and Trade Liberalization in General Equilibrium 一般均衡下的资本市场不完善与贸易自由化
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2015-05-18 DOI: 10.5282/UBM/EPUB.24848
Michael Irlacher, Florian Unger
{"title":"Capital Market Imperfections and Trade Liberalization in General Equilibrium","authors":"Michael Irlacher, Florian Unger","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.24848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.24848","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a new international trade model with capital market imperfections and endogenous borrowing costs in general equilibrium. Our theoretical model is motivated by new empirical patterns from enterprise survey data of the World Bank. Observing that a substantial fraction of the variation in financial constraints is across firms within industries, we allow for firm-specific exposure to financial constraints. This leads to credit rationing and divides producers into financially constrained and unconstrained ones. We show that endogenous adjustments of capital costs represent a new channel that reduces common gains from globalization. Trade liberalization increases the demand for capital and thus the borrowing rate. This leads to a reallocation of market shares towards financially unconstrained producers and a larger fraction of credit-rationed firms. Both effects increase the within-industry variance of firm outcomes and reduce welfare gains as consumers dislike heterogeneity in prices.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"04 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130536849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Globalization and labor market institutions: International empirical evidence 全球化与劳动力市场制度:国际经验证据
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2013-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/J.JCE.2013.02.002
N. Potrafke
{"title":"Globalization and labor market institutions: International empirical evidence","authors":"N. Potrafke","doi":"10.1016/J.JCE.2013.02.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JCE.2013.02.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"44 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117373126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 102
Competition within firms 企业内部竞争
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2012-03-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHS004
Lisa V. Bruttel, S. Schudy
{"title":"Competition within firms","authors":"Lisa V. Bruttel, S. Schudy","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHS004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHS004","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the role of incentives set by a parent firm for competition among its subsidiaries. In a Cournot experiment, four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit, and can choose how to distribute the remaining surplus (or loss). Results show that parents allocating profits equally among their subsidiaries reach outcomes close to collusion. However, almost half of the parent firms employ a proportional sharing rule instead. These groups end up with profits around the Cournot level.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121673279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Social preferences and competition 社会偏好与竞争
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2011-07-20 DOI: 10.5282/UBM/EPUB.11313
Klaus M. Schmidt
{"title":"Social preferences and competition","authors":"Klaus M. Schmidt","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.11313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.11313","url":null,"abstract":"There is a general presumption that social preferences can be ignored if markets are competitive. Market experiments (Smith 1962) and recent theoretical results (Dufwenberg et al. 2008) suggest that competition forces people to behave as if they were purely self-interested. We qualify this view. Social preferences are irrelevant if and only if two conditions are met: separability of preferences and completeness of contracts. These conditions are often plausible, but they fail to hold when uncertainty is important (financial markets) or when incomplete contracts are traded (labor markets). Social preferences can explain many of the anomalies frequently observed on these markets.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130057953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 40
Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: A panel data analysis Bjørnskov and Potrafke Politics and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe 中欧和东欧的政治与私有化:面板数据分析
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2011-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1319730
C. Bjørnskov, N. Potrafke
{"title":"Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: A panel data analysis Bjørnskov and Potrafke Politics and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe","authors":"C. Bjørnskov, N. Potrafke","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1319730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1319730","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines how government ideology influenced privatization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe after the transition from socialism. We analyse a dataset of privatization indicators covering small- and large-scale industries in 19 transition countries over the period 1990-2007 and introduce a government ideology index. The results suggest that market-oriented governments promoted the privatization of small-scale industries more than that of large-scale ones. In the rapid transition process in the early 1990s, leftist governments stuck to public ownership more strongly than in the following period from the mid-1990s to 2007. The remarkable differences between leftist and right-wing governments concerning both the role of government in the economy and the basic elements of political order are in line with developments in OECD countries, and may also hold further implications for transition and democratizing countries outside Central and Eastern Europe.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116412741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49
Time limits in a two-tier unemployment benefit scheme under involuntary unemployment 非自愿失业的两级失业救济计划的时间限制
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2010-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFP027
C. Holzner, V. Meier, M. Werding
{"title":"Time limits in a two-tier unemployment benefit scheme under involuntary unemployment","authors":"C. Holzner, V. Meier, M. Werding","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFP027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFP027","url":null,"abstract":"The consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on the receipt of high unemployment benefits are studied in a shirking model. Stricter time limits have an ambiguous impact on the net wage, and changes of utility levels of employed workers and recipients of high unemployment benefits have the same sign as the variation in the net wage. The utility differential between the two groups of unemployed shrinks. The relative income position of skilled workers moves in the same direction as the net wage of unskilled workers. When access to high benefits is denied for shirkers who are caught, stricter time limits may decrease employment.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128916520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Public Debt as Private Wealth 公共债务作为私人财富
Munich Reprints in Economics Pub Date : 2008-02-01 DOI: 10.5282/UBM/EPUB.2143
E. Schlicht
{"title":"Public Debt as Private Wealth","authors":"E. Schlicht","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.2143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.2143","url":null,"abstract":"Government bonds are interest-bearing assets. Increasing public debt increases income, wealth, and consumption demand. The smaller government expenditure is, the larger consumption demand must be in equilibrium, and the larger must be public debt. Conversely, lower public debt implies higher government spending and taxation. Public debt plays, thus, an important role in establishing equilibrium. It distributes output between consumers and government. In case of insufficient demand, a larger public debt entails higher consumption and less public spending. If upper bounds on public debt are introduced (as in the Maastricht treaty), such constraints place lower bounds on taxation and public spending or may even rule out the existence of macroeconomic equilibrium altogether. Domar(1944) and Gehrels(1957) have discussed similar issues in an unemployment setting. In contrast, this note considers the full employment case and looks at adjustments in debt, taxes and government spending that preserve full employment. The explicit modelling of some adjustment processes that have not been considered in the earlier contributions leads to somewhat different and, in a sense, more \"debt-friendly\" results.","PeriodicalId":182509,"journal":{"name":"Munich Reprints in Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114656312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
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