劳动管理与承诺:对福田的答复

E. Schlicht, C. C. Weizsäcker
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在撰写关于承诺问题的文章时,我们对比了资本主义管理制度和劳动管理制度,以了解这两种制度的比较优势和缺点,并通过注意它们的差异以及它们的基本相似点来提高我们对两者的理解。特别是,我们得到的印象是,这两种体系都有其优点和特定的缺点,在所有可能的情况下,人们不能声称其中一种优越(Schlicht和v. Weizsacker [1977] p. 65)。在他最近的评论中,Furubotn教授指出了劳工管理的另外两个困难,他认为这些困难非常严重,以至于“有可能得出结论,强调‘承诺机制’可能不合适”(Furubotn [1979] p. 217),并且“需要比劳动力不流动更重要的东西来保证劳动力管理公司的理性政策”(Furubotn [1979] p. 226)。这些困难首先是:公司内部民主决策可能存在的不合理性;第二:劳动力不流动导致的配置效率低下。我们愿就这两个问题作非常简短的评论,并将在此基础上讨论较基本的问题。关于民主决策的不合理性,需要指出的是,类似的问题在许多情况下都会出现,而且在资本主义公司的框架内也会出现,例如在股东大会上。毫无疑问,这些问题非常严重,但它们可以通过各种手段得到缓解,即通过(成文或不成文的)宪法或代议制民主。在这里很难给出精确的建议,但我们可以认为,一种最优的组织形式可能从竞争中进化而来,就像我们认为我们今天遇到的资本主义企业的具体特征是为了解决亚当·斯密(Adam Smith)没想到的具体问题而进化而来一样。此外,民主也有它的优势,这些优势可能会为他们自己的利益而受到重视,甚至可能转化为效率优势
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Labour Management and Commitment: Reply to Furubotn
When writing our contribution on the commitment problem, we contrasted the systems of capitalist management and of labour management in order to learn something about the comparative advantages and shortcomings of the two systems and to improve our understanding of both of them by noting their differences as well as their fundamental similarities. In particular, we got the impression that each of the two systems has its strong points as well as its particular drawbacks and one cannot claim superiority for one of them under all conceivable circumstances (Schlicht and v. Weizsacker [1977] p. 65). In his recent comment, Professor Furubotn has pointed out two additional difficulties of labour management which he deems so severe as to "make it possible to conclude that the emphasis on the "commitment mechanism" may not be appropriate" (Furubotn [1979] p. 217) and that /'something more than labour immobility is required to guarantee rational policy by the labourmanaged firm" (Furubotn [1979] p. 226). These difficulties are first: the possible irrationality of democratic decision-making within the firm; and second: the allocative inefficiency caused by labour immobility. We would like to comment very briefly on these two issues and will deal with the more fundamental points thereupon. With regard to the irrationality of democratic decisionmaking it is to be remarked that similar problems arise under many circumstances, and also within the very framework of the capitalist firm, e.g. at the stockholders meeting. These problems are very severe, no doubt, but they can be mitigated by various means, i.e. by a (written or unwritten) constitution or by representative democracy. It is very difficult to give precise recommendations here, but one can argue that an optimal form of organization might evolve from competition just in the same way as one thinks the specific features of the capitalist firm we encounter today have evolved as answers to specific problems Adam Smith has not dreamt of1 . Furthermore, democracy has its advantages too, which might be valued for the sake of their own, and might even translate into efficiency advantages if
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