Dick Willems, Hanno Tan, Nikolaos Dagres, Marieke A R Bak
{"title":"How can non-inferiority studies with mortality end points be ethically justified?","authors":"Dick Willems, Hanno Tan, Nikolaos Dagres, Marieke A R Bak","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110517","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Non-inferiority (NI) studies with mortality end points are increasingly frequently conducted. They aim to show that a new treatment strategy does not entail an unacceptably higher mortality than the comparator. They raise specific ethical issues related to the rationale of the study, the NI margin, certainty and informed consent. There is a need for ethical reflection.</p><p><strong>Method: </strong>Analysis of ethical issues informed by a literature search using terms related to NI, mortality and ethics, in PubMed, CINAHL and Embase. Results are illustrated using the example of the PROFID-EHRA NI trial that the authors are involved in.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>Justifications for conducting an NI study instead of a superiority study are often insufficient. The NI margin is most often taken from previous studies without additional justification. There is no consensus about how patients should be involved in the design and justification of the studies and about how participants should be informed.</p><p><strong>Discussion: </strong>We conclude that NI studies with mortality end points can be ethically justified if secondary benefits are proven and large enough for participants, and if the NI margin is acceptable to patients and ethics committees. Acceptability of the NI margin should be determined on a case-by-case basis and risks should be framed appropriately. The justification for choosing an NI rather than a superiority design should be made more explicitly. Further studies are needed on patients' views about NI trials with mortality as an end point; also, the degree of certainty and the very distinction between primary and secondary outcomes deserve systematic study.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144957343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John Read, Christopher Harrop, Lisa Morrison, Sarah Price Hancock, Lucy Johnstone, Sue Cunliffe
{"title":"A large exploratory survey of electroconvulsive therapy recipients, family members and friends: what information do they recall being given?","authors":"John Read, Christopher Harrop, Lisa Morrison, Sarah Price Hancock, Lucy Johnstone, Sue Cunliffe","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110629","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110629","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The right to informed consent is a core ethical principle. Recent audits of patient information leaflets about electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), in Australia, England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, suggest that this principle is often not implemented, with efficacy being exaggerated and risks minimised. In the current study a convenience sample of 858 ECT recipients and 286 family members and friends, from 44 countries, responded to an online survey about their experiences of ECT, including the information they recall being given to them before ECT. Most (59%) of the ECT recipients reported that they had not been given 'adequate information' and a further 17% were 'not sure'. For example, 63% of recipients recall being told that 'ECT can cause temporary memory problems', but only 17% that 'ECT can cause long-term or permanent memory problems, 12% that 'ECT can cause heart problems' and 28% that there are 'Risks from repeated general anaesthesia'. There were higher levels of recalling being told about definite benefits, even though some of these benefits are disputed. When asked to consider a list of items of misinformation, many recipients and relatives reported being told 'Depression is caused by a chemical imbalance in the brain' (58% and 53%, respectively) and 'ECT corrects chemical imbalance or other brain abnormality' (42% and 41%). Study limitations include potential sampling issues (eg, self-selection bias, snowball sampling bias, or other barriers to representativeness due to convenience sampling or network-based recruitment), as well as potential recall bias among survey respondents (last ECT treatment was between 1958 and 2024; average=2012.5). Nevertheless, these findings, in conjunction with previous studies, suggest an urgent need for greater efforts to ensure that patients and families are provided with comprehensive, balanced, evidence-based information when deciding whether to have ECT.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144855524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trans bodies, multiplicity and the limits of digital representation.","authors":"Vishnu R Subrahmanyam, Grayson R Jackson","doi":"10.1136/jme-2025-111178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2025-111178","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144957458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trapped in the promising role of digital twins?","authors":"Michiel De Proost, Brandon Ferlito, Seppe Segers","doi":"10.1136/jme-2025-111179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2025-111179","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144957404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Priority for registered organ donors: unfair discrimination against non-donors?","authors":"Andreas Albertsen","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1136/jme-2024-110029","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Priority rules give priority to registered organ donors in the allocation of organs. Such rules might directly discriminate against non-donors or indirectly discriminate against those whose religious commitments prevent them from registering. However, while priority rules may qualify as discriminatory, they are not necessarily wrong for the reasons discrimination is usually thought to be wrong-for reasons related to harm and disrespect. While they can be so for reasons related to problematic mental states and demeaningness, they need not be.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144957284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should newborn genetic testing for autism be introduced?","authors":"Ramkumar Aishworiya, Hui-Lin Chin, Julian Savulescu","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110166","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110166","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This manuscript provides a review of the potential role of newborn genetic testing for autism, and whether the state has an inherent responsibility to facilitate and subsidise this. This is situated within the broader construct of benefits and limitations of genetic testing currently. Potential benefits of such presymptomatic genetic testing include facilitating earlier diagnosis and access to appropriate intervention which can improve the treatment outcome for the child and indirectly benefit caregivers and society by reducing the care needs of the child and adult in future. However, there are several limitations to newborn genetic testing including the variable penetrance of 'autism-risk' genes, marked phenotypic heterogeneity of autism, real-world limitations in access to treatment, potential psychological harm to caregivers and financial considerations. We hence argue for facilitation of diagnostic genetic testing instead, especially for parents who seek to have greater understanding of recurrence likelihoods, related to reproductive decision-making. Facilitation of such testing can be in the form of both financial subsidies and infrastructural elements including availability of testing facilities and trained healthcare personnel for individualised pregenetic and postgenetic test counselling.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"603-608"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7617952/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142769722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defending manic competence: a reply to Kane.","authors":"Samuel Director","doi":"10.1136/jme-2025-110744","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2025-110744","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a recent paper in this journal, I defended the thesis that some, although not all, patients experiencing acute bipolar mania are competent to consent. I made this argument based on the fact that the burden of proof lies with those who want to make judgements of incapacity (because autonomy is the default option until proven otherwise). We then need to ask what the reasons are for claiming that manic patients are not competent. I surveyed and critiqued the two most common reasons offered in the literature, which are that manic patients are irrational or that their value shifts in mania are defunct in some way. I argued that for many manic patients, neither of these reasons is strong enough to justify removing their decision-making capacity. Kane (2024) replied to my paper. In this short response, I defend my original arguments from Kane's objection.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"653-654"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143449320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On interpreters: the ethics of interpreter use in general practice.","authors":"Richard Armitage","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110389","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110389","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the absence of language congruency between patient and general practitioner (GP), the use of an interpreter is essential for a safe and effective clinical consultation. A substantial proportion of individuals living in the UK lack sufficient command of the English language to allow direct communication with their GP. Interpreters in UK general practice can be classified into three major categories: Casual, professional in-person and professional telephone interpreters. The use of casual interpreters threatens the safety and quality of care provided in interpreted consultations, increases the potential for safeguarding concerns to go unrecognised by the GP, poses a potential legal risk to the GP and is burdensome for and potentially harmful to the relatives, friends and carers who act as such interpreters. The use of professional in-person interpreters greatly improves the safety and quality of care above that of casually interpreted consultations, increases the probability that safeguarding concerns will be recognised by the GP, avoids the legal risk inherent to casually interpreted consultations, is neither burdensome nor potentially harmful to accompanying relatives, friends and carers or the interpreter and permits interpreter continuity while generating a small non-clinical opportunity cost borne by administrative staff. The use of professional telephone interpreters shares the same advantages as the use of professional in-person interpreters but prevents interpreter continuity and generates a large clinical opportunity cost borne by other patients. The paper also explores ethical challenges that are common to the use of all major categories of interpreter and offers four policy recommendations in light of the analysis.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"614-619"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142739156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dominic Wilkinson, Safoora Teli, Claire Litchfield, Anna Madeley, Brenda Kelly, Lawrence Impey, Rebecca Ch Brown, Elselijn Kingma, Helen Lynne Turnham
{"title":"Ethics round table: choice and autonomy in obstetrics.","authors":"Dominic Wilkinson, Safoora Teli, Claire Litchfield, Anna Madeley, Brenda Kelly, Lawrence Impey, Rebecca Ch Brown, Elselijn Kingma, Helen Lynne Turnham","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110503","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110503","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Decisions about how and where they deliver their baby are extremely important to pregnant women. There are very strong ethical norms that women's autonomy should be respected, and that plans around birth should be personalised. However, there appear to be profound challenges in practice to respecting women's choices in pregnancy and labour. Choices carry risks and consequences-to the woman and her child; also potentially to her caregivers and to other women.What does it mean for women's autonomy to be respected in obstetrics? How should health professionals respond to refusals of treatment or requests for care outside normal guidelines? What are the ethical limits to autonomy? In this clinical ethics round table, service users, midwives, obstetricians, philosophers and ethicists respond to two hypothetical cases drawn from real-life scenarios.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"588-592"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12418576/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142755236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When the patient can't walk away.","authors":"Edwin Jesudason","doi":"10.1136/jme-2024-110615","DOIUrl":"10.1136/jme-2024-110615","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>When the clinician and patient are unable to reconcile differences over treatment, does this mean the latter lacks capacity to decide in such matters? Wellesley <i>et al</i> analyse the legal judgements in the case of Ms Sudiksha Thirumalesh where, on the particulars, the Court of Protection answered yes, only for the Court of Appeal to disagree. The authors highlight concerns about using isolated false belief as an indicator of incapacity and advise that such matters may be better resolved by greater discussion of the benefits and burdens of treatment, alongside consideration of their costs. Here, I suggest that a disability perspective is also helpful to such cases, recognising that this was a disagreement from which the patient couldn't walk away. Disability means that particular care is required when considering the burdens and benefits of treatment as these may vary widely in the eye of the beholder. Second, the costs of litigation are particularly high when a disabled person, with life-limiting illness, is left feeling they are using precious time and energy arguing for their existence. Third, any such legal judgments ought to make clear what reasonable adjustments have been offered to include the disabled person in proceedings. Fourth, and relatedly, such disputes should be attentive to the significant risk of epistemic injustice, where disabled patients find themselves less believed, in part because the 'able-bodied' have not shared their experiences. Together, these considerations (i) add to the call made by Wellesley <i>et al</i> for better discussions and (ii) suggest that early involvement of Rehabilitation Medicine, with expertise in disability and related ethics, could offer an important means to reduce the need for such litigation in the future.</p>","PeriodicalId":16317,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Medical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"649-650"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143006870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}