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AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION 美国金融协会
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-08 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13154
{"title":"AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13154","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13154","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3676-3677"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13154","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142160514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
FinTech Credit and Entrepreneurial Growth 金融科技信贷与企业家成长
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13384
HARALD HAU, YI HUANG, CHEN LIN, HONGZHE SHAN, ZIXIA SHENG, LAI WEI
{"title":"FinTech Credit and Entrepreneurial Growth","authors":"HARALD HAU,&nbsp;YI HUANG,&nbsp;CHEN LIN,&nbsp;HONGZHE SHAN,&nbsp;ZIXIA SHENG,&nbsp;LAI WEI","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13384","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13384","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Based on automated credit lines to vendors trading on Alibaba's online retail platform and a discontinuity in the credit decision algorithm, we document that a vendor's access to FinTech credit boosts its sales growth, transaction growth, and the level of customer satisfaction gauged by product, service, and consignment ratings. These effects are more pronounced for vendors characterized by greater information asymmetry about their credit risk and less collateral, which reveals the information advantage of FinTech credit over traditional credit technology.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3309-3359"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142100787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Working Capital Credit Multiplier 周转信贷乘数
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13385
HEITOR ALMEIDA, DANIEL CARVALHO, TAEHYUN KIM
{"title":"The Working Capital Credit Multiplier","authors":"HEITOR ALMEIDA,&nbsp;DANIEL CARVALHO,&nbsp;TAEHYUN KIM","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13385","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13385","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We provide novel evidence that funding frictions can limit firms’ short-term investments in receivables and inventories, reducing their production capacity. We propose a credit multiplier driven by these considerations and empirically isolate its importance by comparing how a similar firm responds to shocks differently when these shocks are initiated in their most profitable quarter (“main quarter”). We implement this test using recurring and unpredictable shocks (e.g., oil shocks) and provide extensive evidence supporting our identification strategy. Our results suggest that funding constraints and credit multiplier effects are significant for smaller firms that heavily rely on financing from suppliers.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4247-4302"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Capital Commitment 资本承诺
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-27 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13382
ELISE GOURIER, LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU, MARK M. WESTERFIELD
{"title":"Capital Commitment","authors":"ELISE GOURIER,&nbsp;LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU,&nbsp;MARK M. WESTERFIELD","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13382","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13382","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Twelve trillion dollars are allocated to private market funds that require outside investors to commit to transferring capital on demand. We show within a novel dynamic portfolio allocation model that ex-ante commitment has large effects on investors' portfolios and welfare, and we quantify those effects. Investors are underallocated to private market funds and are willing to pay a larger premium to adjust the quantity committed than to eliminate other frictions, like timing uncertainty and limited tradability. Perhaps counterintuitively, commitment risk premiums increase with secondary market liquidity, and they do not disappear when investments are spread over many funds.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3407-3457"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142085577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Treasury Bill Shortages and the Pricing of Short-Term Assets 国库券短缺与短期资产定价
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13376
ADRIEN D'AVERNAS, QUENTIN VANDEWEYER
{"title":"Treasury Bill Shortages and the Pricing of Short-Term Assets","authors":"ADRIEN D'AVERNAS,&nbsp;QUENTIN VANDEWEYER","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13376","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13376","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We propose a model of post-Great Financial Crisis (GFC) money markets and monetary policy implementation. In our framework, capital regulation may deter banks from intermediating liquidity derived from holding reserves to shadow banks. Consequently, money markets can be segmented, and the scarcity of Treasury bills available to shadow banks is the main driver of short-term spreads. In this regime, open market operations have an inverse effect on net liquidity provision when swapping ample reserves for scarce T-bills or repos. Our model quantitatively accounts for post-2010 time series for repo rates, T-bill yields, and the Fed's reverse repo facility usage.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4083-4141"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13376","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Currency Management by International Fixed-Income Mutual Funds 国际固定收益共同基金的货币管理
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-25 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13381
CLEMENS SIALM, QIFEI ZHU
{"title":"Currency Management by International Fixed-Income Mutual Funds","authors":"CLEMENS SIALM,&nbsp;QIFEI ZHU","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13381","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13381","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Investments in international fixed-income securities are exposed to significant currency risks. We collect novel data on currency derivatives used by U.S. international fixed-income funds. We document that while 90% of funds use currency forwards, they hedge, on average, only 18% of their currency exposure. Funds' currency forward positions differ substantially based on risk management demands related to portfolio currency exposure, return-enhancement motives such as currency momentum and carry trade, and strategic considerations related to past performance and fund clientele. Funds that hedge their currency risk exhibit lower return variability, but do not generate inferior abnormal returns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4037-4081"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142084656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bailout Stigma 救市污名
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-23 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13386
YEON-KOO CHE, CHONGWOO CHOE, KEEYOUNG RHEE
{"title":"Bailout Stigma","authors":"YEON-KOO CHE,&nbsp;CHONGWOO CHOE,&nbsp;KEEYOUNG RHEE","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13386","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13386","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short-lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"2993-3039"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship 风险资本支持的创业企业创始人-CEO 薪酬与选拔
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13383
MICHAEL EWENS, RAMANA NANDA, CHRISTOPHER STANTON
{"title":"Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship","authors":"MICHAEL EWENS,&nbsp;RAMANA NANDA,&nbsp;CHRISTOPHER STANTON","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13383","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13383","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)-backed entrepreneurship for high-earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder-CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC-backed entrepreneurship.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3361-3405"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Portfolio-Driven Disposition Effect 投资组合驱动的处置效应
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13378
LI AN, JOSEPH ENGELBERG, MATTHEW HENRIKSSON, BAOLIAN WANG, JARED WILLIAMS
{"title":"The Portfolio-Driven Disposition Effect","authors":"LI AN,&nbsp;JOSEPH ENGELBERG,&nbsp;MATTHEW HENRIKSSON,&nbsp;BAOLIAN WANG,&nbsp;JARED WILLIAMS","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13378","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The disposition effect for a stock significantly weakens if the portfolio is at a gain, but is large when it is at a loss. We find this portfolio-driven disposition effect (PDDE) in four independent settings: U.S. and Chinese archival data, as well as U.S. and Chinese experiments. The PDDE is robust to a variety of controls in regression specifications and is not explained by extreme returns, portfolio rebalancing, tax considerations, or investor heterogeneity. Our evidence suggests that investors form mental frames at both the stock and the portfolio levels and that these frames combine to generate the PDDE.</p>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 5","pages":"3459-3495"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142165725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission 说假话说真话：选择性操纵和改进信息传播
IF 7.6 1区 经济学
Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13375
PAUL POVEL, GÜNTER STROBL
{"title":"Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission","authors":"PAUL POVEL,&nbsp;GÜNTER STROBL","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13375","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jofi.13375","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We analyze a principal-agent model in which an effort-averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 6","pages":"4303-4352"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142045714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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