说假话说真话：选择性操纵和改进信息传播

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI:10.1111/jofi.13375

PAUL POVEL, GÜNTER STROBL

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了一个委托人-代理人模型，在这个模型中，一个厌恶努力的代理人可以操纵一份可公开观测的绩效报告。委托人无法观察到代理人的努力成本、她的努力选择以及她是否操纵了报告。最优合同将报酬与实现的产出和（可能被操纵的）报告联系起来。操纵对委托人有利，因为它可以使报告更能反映代理人的努力选择，从而减少代理人的信息租金。这可以通过激励代理人根据其努力选择有选择地进行操纵的合同来实现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission

We analyze a principal-agent model in which an effort-averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.

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来源期刊

Journal of Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

12.90

自引率

2.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.