ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-09-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3041809
Julien Albertini, J. Hairault, F. Langot, T. Sopraseuth
{"title":"A Tale of Two Countries: A Story of the French and US Polarization","authors":"Julien Albertini, J. Hairault, F. Langot, T. Sopraseuth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3041809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3041809","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates job polarization in the United States and in France. In the data, the dynamics of employment shares for abstract, routine, and manual jobs appear very similar in the two countries. This similarity actually hides major differences in the dynamics of employment levels by tasks. In particular, the routine employment level fell significantly in France until the mid-1990s, and then rebounded until 2007. The evolution of US routine employment went in opposite directions to that of the French economy. We then develop a multi-sectorial search and matching model with endogenous occupational choice to disentangle the respective contributions of task-biased technological change (TBTC), labor market institutions (LMI), and rising educational attainment to job polarization. For the US economy, we find that TBTC and the rising supply of skilled labor are the main drivers of polarization in a context of growing employment levels. In France, in contrast, polarization is driven mainly by LMI changes. This led to a sharp drop in routine employment in a context of declining aggregate employment until the mid-1990s, which then reversed when the impact of the minimum wage was alleviated by a subsidy policy targeted at low wage earners. Next, we quantify the welfare consequences of job polarization. Abstract and manual workers are the main winners of job polarization in both countries. Welfare gains and losses are more dispersed in the routine group. The most productive French routine workers would have been worse off without LMI changes. In contrast, displaced low-ability, routine French workers would have preferred a more flexible labor market to improve their employment prospects in their occupational change. All US routine workers suffered as a result of the drop in LMI generosity.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"21 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123538193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-09-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3035178
M. Akbarpour, A. Saberi, A. Shameli
{"title":"Information Aggregation in Overlapping Generations","authors":"M. Akbarpour, A. Saberi, A. Shameli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3035178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3035178","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model of social learning with overlapping generations, where agents meet others and share data about an underlying state over time. We examine under what conditions the society will produce individuals with precise knowledge about the state of the world. Under the full information sharing technology, individuals exchange the information about their point estimates of the underlying state, as well as the precision of their signals and update their beliefs accordingly. Under the limited information sharing technology, agents observe the point estimates but not precisions, and update their beliefs by taking a weighted average, where weights can depend on the sequence of meetings, as well as the ‘age’ and the number of previous meetings an agent has had. Our main result shows that, unlike static settings, using linear learning rules without access to the precision information will not guide the population (or even a fraction of its members) to converge to a unique belief, and having access to the precision of a source signal is essential for having an informed population.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125338476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2893458
Shijie Lu, Sha Yang
{"title":"Investigating the Spillover Effect of Keyword Market Entry in Sponsored Search Advertising","authors":"Shijie Lu, Sha Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2893458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2893458","url":null,"abstract":"As Internet advertising infomediaries nowadays provide rich competition information, sponsored search advertisers are becoming more strategic when selecting keywords. This paper empirically examines the spillover effects in advertisers’ keyword market entry decisions, that is, how an advertiser’s likelihood of using a keyword is affected by competitors’ keyword entry decisions. We develop a structural model to characterize advertisers’ keyword market entry decisions. We apply the model to a panel data set of 1,252 laptop-related keywords mainly used by 28 manufacturers, retailers, and comparison websites that advertise on Google. Our analysis leads to several interesting findings. First, an advertiser’s expected position affects the nature of the competition. In particular, the spillover effect from below-ranked competitors is always positive, while the spillover effect from above-ranked competitors is either positive or negative. Second, the spillover effect from above-ranked ads is directionally affecte...","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"320 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132417963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-07-11DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3000583
Briana Chang, Hyun-Soo Choi, Harrison G. Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik
{"title":"Hedging and Pricing Rent Risk with Search Frictions","authors":"Briana Chang, Hyun-Soo Choi, Harrison G. Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3000583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3000583","url":null,"abstract":"The desire of risk-averse households to hedge rent risk is thought to increase home ownership and prices. While evidence for the ownership implication is compelling, support for the price effect is mixed. We show that an important reason is search frictions. Rent risk reduces outside options, leading to less-picky buyers and worse home/buyer matches. This attenuates the rise in the price-to-rent ratio that would otherwise occur without frictions. Consistent with our model, a house remains on the market for fewer days when rent risk is higher. Accounting for frictions significantly increases the effect of rent risk on home prices.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126603186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-07-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3009297
Thorsten Drautzburg, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo A. Guerrón-Quintana
{"title":"Political Distribution Risk and Aggregate Fluctuations","authors":"Thorsten Drautzburg, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Pablo A. Guerrón-Quintana","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3009297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009297","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that political distribution risk is an important driver of aggregate fluctuations. To that end, we document significant changes in the capital share after large political events, such as political realignments, modifications in collective bargaining rules, or the end of dictatorships, in a sample of developed and emerging economies. These policy changes are associated with significant fluctuations in output and asset prices. Using a Bayesian proxy-VAR estimated with U.S. data, we show how distribution shocks cause movements in output, unemployment, and sectoral asset prices. To quantify the importance of these political shocks for the U.S. as a whole, we extend an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. We model political shocks as exogenous changes in the bargaining power of workers in a labor market with search and matching. We calibrate the model to the U.S. corporate non-financial business sector and we back up the evolution of the bargaining power of workers over time using a new methodological approach, the partial filter. We show how the estimated shocks agree with the historical narrative evidence. We document that bargaining shocks account for 34% of aggregate fluctuations.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134150841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-07-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3022102
Joseph Williams
{"title":"Housing Markets with Endogenous Search: Theory and Implications","authors":"Joseph Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3022102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3022102","url":null,"abstract":"In this model buyers and sellers enter a housing market with imperfect elasticity. Buyers screen houses for sale in two segments of the market select a set of houses for search in each segment, and then control their intensities of costly search among houses in their preferred sets. Their truncated distributions of acceptable match values are assumed to be power law. Partial equilibrium is calculated explicitly and steady state is characterized analytically. The analysis is extended to multiple segments and markets. Empirical implications include higher average prices and price–rent ratios in preferred segments and markets, as well as spatial diffusion across segments and markets of average prices, price–rent ratios, and search. The predictions are consistent with existing empirical evidence.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132674254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-06-06DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3019903
Damien Besancenot, R. Vranceanu
{"title":"An Equilibrium Search Model of the French Dual Market for Medical Services","authors":"Damien Besancenot, R. Vranceanu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3019903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3019903","url":null,"abstract":"The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127658376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-05-20DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2972648
Yimeng Li, Franco Mariuzzo, Nikolaos Korfiatis, Y. Xiong
{"title":"Information Strategies of New Product Introduction in Vertical Markets","authors":"Yimeng Li, Franco Mariuzzo, Nikolaos Korfiatis, Y. Xiong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2972648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2972648","url":null,"abstract":"An overwhelming stream of research suggests that online reviews impact firms' profits positively. In this study we show conditions where this may not hold true. In a vertical market, we identify strategies that a manufacturer can utilize to affect a retailer's attitude towards publicizing consumer reviews. We model a two-period multi-stage game where vertically integrated and separated firms co-exist and choose prices (of old and new products) and product quality (of new products) along with information strategies. We study the extreme situation where new products have no reviews available yet (i.e., only old products have reviews or the possibility of having reviews). Our main findings are that in a separated distribution channel, the manufacturer always benefits from the availability of online reviews, whereas the retailer only benefits if consumer valuation for a new product is sufficiently low. When competition is not too tough and consumer valuation for the new product is not too high, the manufacturer may opt for discounting the wholesale prices to prompt the retailer to post the online reviews. Furthermore, when consumer uncertainty for the new product is sufficiently low, the optimal strategy for the manufacturer is to limit the release of technical information.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132155968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-05-14DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2968058
Mateusz Myśliwski, F. Sanches, Daniel Junior Silva, Sorawoot Srisuma
{"title":"Identification and Estimation of a Search Model: A Procurement Auction Approach","authors":"Mateusz Myśliwski, F. Sanches, Daniel Junior Silva, Sorawoot Srisuma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2968058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2968058","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a non-sequential search model with a continuum of consumers and a finite number of firms. Both consumers and firms are heterogeneous. Consumers differ in search costs. Firms have private marginal costs of production. We show that an equilibrium price dispersion can arise in this model as firms employ a Bayesian Nash pricing strategy. We provide conditions to identify the model using price and another supply side data (such as market share). Our identification strategy is constructive. We derive the uniform rate of convergence of our estimator.","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130164305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ERN: SearchPub Date : 2017-05-14DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3024275
Weijie Zhong
{"title":"Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition","authors":"Weijie Zhong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3024275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3024275","url":null,"abstract":"I study a dynamic model in which a decision‐maker (DM) acquires information about the payoffs of different alternatives prior to making a decision. The model's key feature is the flexibility of information: the DM can choose any dynamic signal process as an information source, subject to a flow cost that depends on the informativeness of the signal. Under the optimal policy, the DM acquires a signal that arrives according to a \u0000 Poisson process. The optimal Poisson signal confirms the DM's prior belief and is sufficiently precise to warrant immediate action. Over time, given the absence of the arrival of a Poisson signal, the DM continues seeking an increasingly precise but less frequent Poisson signal.\u0000","PeriodicalId":153208,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Search","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129910622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}